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The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the
Management of Publicly Held Companies
by
STEVE T HEL*
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act' (Exchange Act) is prob-
ably the most criticized provision of the federal securities statutes.
Critics typically disapprove of the approach section 16 takes to en-
suring that no person trading common stock has superior access to
relevant information emanating from the corporation that issued the
stock. They complain that section 16 permits many corporate insiders
to use nonpublic corporate information to trade stock profitably at
the same time that it keeps many people who do not possess inside
information from trading at all.
Tis Article offers a different way of thinking about section 16.
It suggests that section 16 is better understood as a tool for promoting
the efficient operation of publicly held corporations. Section 16 deters
those who control publicly held corporations from manipulating cor-
porate affairs for their own ends, and it encourages them to acquire
a personal interest in the long-term success of those corporations. This
explanation recogmzes in section 16 an elegance it is usually thought
to lack. It also suggests that most courts and commentators have un-
derestimated the reform that the Exchange Act was designed to achieve.
I. Introduction
A. Two Explanations of Section 16
Section 16 requires the officers, directors, and principal stock-
holders of most publicly held companies to disclose how much of the
* Associate Professor, Fordham Umversity School of Law. B.A. 1976, University of
North Texas; J.D. 1979, Harvard University.
I am grateful to Allen Boyer, Bill Bratton, Victor Brudney, Jill Fisch, Ed Kitch, Don
Langevoort, Michael Malloy, Mike Martin, Bill Wang, and Ed Yono for helpful comments.
The staffs of the Harvard Law School Library, the Library of Congress, the National Archives,
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1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 16, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988)). For the text of § 16, see Appendix, mnfra. For a summary
of criticism of § 16, see infra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
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equity securities of those companies they beneficially own at the time
they become affiliates and to report any change in ownership there-
after. It also forbids them to sell such securities short and requires
them to forfeit to the issuers any profits they realize in short-swing
transactions in such securities. These provisions interfere with the pre-
rogatives of some of the most influential people in America, and not
surprisingly they and others have attacked section 16. While section
16 was bound to receive criticism, the nature of that criticism is re-
markable.
Commentators often take issue with the goals of statutes, in-
cluding the federal securities statutes. Those who find section 16 want-
ing, however, have generally expressed sympathy with what they take
to be its end-preventing corporate insiders from trading stock on the
basis of important, nonpublic corporate information. 2 Perhaps pre-
cisely because they find this end so attractive, many people have com-
plained that section 16 fails to achieve it. Almost alone among the
provisions of the federal securities statutes, section 16 is consistently
criticized for the way it works.
Section 16 is not the only provision of the federal securities laws
that regulates insider trading. In fact, most of the highly publicized
insider trading cases of the past few years have been brought under
rule 10b-5 . Just what rule 10b-5 prohibits is not entirely clear, but
the rule can be stretched to cover a wide variety of insider trading
practices that are beyond the scope of section 16.4 Largely because of
2. Cf. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1088 (2d ed. 1961) ("The purpose of § 16(b)-
prevention of the unfair use of information by corporate insiders-does not, of course, admit
of dispute."); Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
68 CoLUM. L. REv. 260, 261 (1968) ("Although Section 16 has many shortcomings and has
been subject to substantial criticisms, its fundamental purpose has never been seriously
questioned." (footnote omitted)). Some writers argue that there is nothing wrong with insiders
trading while in possession of important nonpublic information, but their arguments are usually
directed at Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1988). See infra notes 14, 18.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988). Although § 16 may be the most criticized provision of
the federal securities statutes, 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 1087-88, rule lOb-5 is surely the
most controversial. In exploring what § 16 is about, it is important to remember that rule
lOb-5 was not enacted by Congress. It was promulgated by the SEC pursuant to § 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988), and there is no reason to think that Congress
intended § 10(b) to be used to deal with insider trading in particular. See infra note 5 and
accompanying text.
4. See Aldave, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988: An
Analysis and Appraisal, 52 ALB. L. REV. 893, 896-905 (1988) (discussing clarity and coherence
of case law); Symposium: Defining "Insider Trading," 39 ALA. L. REv. 337 (1988). See
generally R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 264 (1986) (definitions); D. LANGEVOORT, INsmER
TRADING REGULATION 3-4 (1988). The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78t(d), 78u(d)(2), 78ff(a) (1988)),
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this, the strictures of section 16 have generally been ignored in recent
debate over the propriety and legality of insiders trading on the basis
of nonpublic information.5 Section 16 continues to draw criticism,
however, 6 and it is still well known-especially among those who con-
trol publicly held companies-for requiring officers, directors, and
principal stockholders of publicly held companies to disclose their
trading in the stock of the companies with which -they are affiliated
and to disgorge their profits if they buy and sell stock within any six-
month period.
"The most distinctive feature" of section 16 is that none of its
provisions turns on whether insiders actually possess material, non-
public infQrmation when they trade. 7 This simplifies enforcement and
makes it easier to predict legal outcomes, but many people find the
price for simplicity and certainty much too high.8 According to its
and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704,
102 Stat. 4677 (codified in part at 15 U.S.C. §§ 780, 78t-1, 78u(a), 78u(d), 78u-1, 78ff(a),
78kk(c), 80b-4a (1988)), amended the Exchange Act to add sanctions against insider trading.
These amendments had substantive implications, but they did not define the offense directly.
5. See FEDERAL SEcUrES CODE § 1714 comment 1 (1980) (stating argument that §
16(b) should be repealed because rule lOb-5 jurisprudence renders it obsolete); D. LANoEVOORT,
supra note 4, at 331 ("[T]heories of liability for insider trading under the antifraud provision
of the federal securities laws... are the most visible weapons against unlawful trading activity
... ."); Aldave, supra note 4, at 897 ("The current body of law regulating insider trading
has developed gradually, primarily through a process of judicial interpretation of rule lOb-5
... ."); Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. Rnv. 1, 3 (1980);
Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REv.
117, 117 n.1 (1982) ("Most of the law in this area [i.e., the regulation of insider trading]
derives from Rule lOb-5."); Morgan, Insider Trading and the Infringement of Property Rights,
48 Omo ST. L.J. 79, .82 (1987) ("Although Section 16 is Congress' specific response to the
problem of insider trading, it is another section of the Securities Exchange Act-Section 10b
[sic]-that has formed the basis for most of the administrative and judiciaf attempts to regulate
actual insider trading." (footnotes omitted)); Scott, Insider Trading: Rule lob-5, Disclosure
and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STtD. 801 (1980); cf. Macey, From Fairness to Contract:
The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HoFsTRA L. Rnv. 9, 9 n.1 (1984)
("Because of the extremely limited scope of section 16(b), this Article will focus ... on Rule
lob-5.").
6. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 26,333, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 84,343, at 89,600 (Dec. 2, 1988) ("The staff of the Division of Corporation
Finance receives more requests for interpretive and no-action advice concerning the Section 16,
rules than any other area."); Exchange Act Release No. 27,148, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,439, at 80,383 (Aug. 18, 1989) (271 comment letters received on
proposed rule changes); Block & Barton, Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act: An Archaic
Insider Trading Statute in Need of Reform, 12 SEc. REo. L.J. 203 (1984); O'Connor, Toward
a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider Trading: The Repeal of Section 16(b), 58 FORDHAm L.
REV. 309 (1989).
7. Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Regu-
lation of Insider Trading-Part II: Reform of Section 16, 42 Bus. LAW. 1087, 1089-90 (1987)
[hereinafter Task Force Report].
8. According to Jennings and Marsh, "[j]udging solely from the facts stated in the
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critics, section 16 is more than simple and clear; it is crude9 and ar-
bitrary.'0
Anyone who has read this far can probably recite the shortcom-
ings of section 16."1 It is hornbook law that the purpose of section
16 is to keep corporate insiders from trading on the basis of inside
information; 2 the statute says almost as much.' 3 The problem is that
opinions in the decided cases, the function of Section 16(b) would appear to be to impose
unjust liability upon entirely innocent persons." R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SEcurrIs
REGULATION-CASES AND MATERIALS 1402 (6th ed. 1987). They support this conclusion by
quoting from Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 743 n.7 (8th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966), in which the court said that the ethical positions
of the parties were not relevant. "[l1n other words, justice has nothing whatever to do with
Section 16(b)." R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra, at 1402 n.2.
9. Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 787, 791-92 (N.D. Cal.
1971), aff'd, 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 423 U.S. 232 (1976), quoted in R. JENNINGS
& H. MARSH, supra note 8, at 1402 n.1, and in L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 547 n.17 (2d ed. 1988); see also Halleran & Calderwood, Effect of Federal
Regulation on Distribution of and Trading in Securities, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 86, 115
(1959) ("almost unprecedented chaos"); Wentz, Refining a Crude Rule: The Pragmatic
Approach to Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 221
(1975).
10. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972) (quoting Bershad
v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970)); FEDERAL SEctrIaIs CODE § 1714 comment
I (stating argument that § 16(b) is arbitrary); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 8, at
1402 n.3 ("wholly arbitrary").
11. If not, the imprecision of § 16 was succinctly described in a recent report on insider
trading:
[S]ection 16 imposes liability on many transactions that contain no elements of the
abuses that Congress sought to eliminate. It can create unwarranted restrictions for
insiders who arbitrarily are prevented from trading even when they do not possess
information that is confidential and material, as well as anomalies for tender offerors
While in certain circumstances the scope of section 16 is too broad, it also has
several limitations. Most importantly, by primarily focusing upon so-called "short-
swing" profits, section 16 provides no protection for abuses of insider status involving
only a purchase or only a sale. Moreover, it is limited to trading of equity securities
by officers, directors, and ten percent shareholders and therefore does not reach all
insiders. In addition, it has no application to tipping by insiders.
Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 1090.
12. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIAILS ON CORPORATIONS 844-48 (5th ed.
1980); R. CLARK, supra note 4, at 293-96; 2 T. HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SEcu-urms
REGULATION § 12.3, at 20, 27 (2d ed. 1990); L. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SEcuarrms
LAWS 273 (1987); see also C. MEYER, THE SEcurTriEs EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 ANALYZED AND
EXPLAINED 20-21, 111 (1934). Since 1934, over 150 law review articles, comments, and notes
devoted to § 16 have been published. These typically have developed one or another complexity
or inadequacy of § 16, and almost all of them take as a premise that the purpose of § 16 is
to prevent corporate insiders from trading on the basis of inside information. See, e.g., Cole,
Insiders' Liabilities Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 12 Sw. L.J. 147, 147-48 (1958);
Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARv. L. REv. 385,
386 (1953); Halleran & Calderwood, supra note 9, at 114-17; Hamilton, Convertible Securities
and Section 16(b): The End of an Era, 44 TEX. L. Ray. 1447, 1447-48 (1966); Jacobs, An
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section 16 does not always keep those who possess inside information
from trading, and the people it does keep from trading do not always
possess inside information. Robert Clark has captured the conven-
tional criticism: "Section 16(b) catches defendants who did not violate
the policy decision underlying the rule (here, the decision that trading
on inside information is unfair), and it fails to catch other defendants
who did violate it."''
Section 16 is ill-tailored for the task of preventing insiders from
taking advantage of inside information. The best proof is probably
the fact that the recent crusade against insider trading has been mounted
on rule lOb-5, 1 5 but there is also a staggering body of commentary
expounding the section's various inadequacies.1 6 The critics essentially
complain that the legislature failed in creating section 16 becauseof
lack of skill.1 7 They do not argue that statutes are always imprecise
Analysis of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 N.Y.L. ScH. L. Rzv. 209,
209-10 (1987); Kaplan, Wolf v. Weinstein: Another Chapter on Insider Trading, 1963 Sup.
CT. REv. 273, 301; Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54
CoRNEL L. REv. 45, 57-61 (1968); Meeker & Cooney, The Problem of Definition in Deter-
mining Insider Liabilities Under Section 16(b), 45 VA. L. REv. 949, 950 (1959); Munter,
Section 16(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Alternative to "Burning Down the Barn
in Order to Kill the Rats, " 52 CoNzL L.Q. 69, 70 (1966); Painter, The Evolving Role of
Section 16(b), 62 MIcH. L. Ray. 649, 649 (1964); Ribstein, The Application of Section 16(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to Tender Offers, 31 Sw. L.J. 503, 503 (1977); Rubin
& Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95
U. PA. L. Ray. 468, 468-70 (1947); Seligman, Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act,
21 VA. L. Ray. 1, 3 (1934); Tomlinson, Section 16(b): A Single Analysis of Purchases and
Sales-Merging the Objective and Pragmatic Analyses, 1981 DUKE L.J. 941, 941; Wu, supra
note 2, at 261.
13. See Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). But see infra notes 318-352
and accompanying text (purpose clause an afterthought intended to legitimate SEC exemptive
authority).
14. R. CLARK, supra note 4, § 8.6, at 295.
15. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Further proof may lie in the fact that
insiders subject to § 16 continue to trade profitably. In fact, their trading is abnormally
profitable. R. BRnaAnY & S. Myros, Purcn'cai.s OF CORvORATE FINANCE 288 (3d ed. 1988);
W. KrEm & J. CoFFEE, Businuss ORGANIZATION AND FiNANcE-LEGAL AND EcONOMIC PRIN-
cIPLEs 362 (4th ed. 1990); Carney, Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATm. U.L.
REV. 863, 878 (1987); Samuelson, The Prevention of Insider Trading: A Proposal For Revising
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 25 HARv. J. oN LEGIS. 511, 517 (1988).
Insiders may be able to realize abnormal trading profits without taking advantage of corporate
information, see Carney, supra, at 878-79; Givoly & Palmon, Insider Trading and the
Exploitation of Inside Information: Some Empirical Evidence, 58 J. Bus. 69, 85-86 (1985),
but whatever explains the profits, the fact remains that § 16 does not stand in the way of
profitable trading. Cf. Dooley, supra note 5, at 3 (difficulty of enforcing rule lOb-5).
16. See supra notes 5, 7, 10-11.
17. See Dooley, supra note 5, at 57 ("It is sometimes implied that the narrow scope of
[§ 161 is attributable to a failure of imagination, subsequently remedied by the creative
development of rule lob-5 .... "). But see R. CLARK, supra note 4, § 8.7, at 306 (ambiguities
of § 16(b) result from drafters' inevitable uncertainty about the future).I
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or arbitrary; on the contrary, section 16 bothers them because they
find it a peculiarly inadequate statute. Their judgment presupposes
that Congress thought it was wrong to trade stock on the basis of
nonpublic corporate information and enacted section 16 because it
wanted to prevent insiders from doing so. The problem with section
16, however, may lie not in the statute but in the premise of its critics:
that section 16 was created to keep people from taking advantage of
nonpublic information. In other words, section 16's well-known short-
comings actually may show that it was intended to serve some purpose
other than preventing people from taking advantage of inside infor-
mation.
Few critics seem to have even considered the possibility that Con-
gress was trying to do anything but stop insiders from trading on the
basis of inside information. ' Here again, Clark has captured the con-
18. A few commentators have recognized that § 16 may serve policies other than infor-
mational equality, but usually as an aside in discussion of rule 10b-5 and without much
development of the point. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CnmsLsTErN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPOIATE FINANCE 1023, 1028 (3d ed. 1987); H. MANNa, INSIDER TRADINO AND THE STOCK
MARKET 9-10 (1966); id. at 30 (stating that "§ 16(b) can be rationalized as an antimanipulation
device but not as an effective prohibition of insider trading .... Neither legislative history nor
the subsequent literature ... has viewed Section 16 as another of the antimanipulation devices
Congress included in the 1934 Act."); Brudney, Insider Securities Dealings During Corporate
Crises, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1962); Dooley, supra note 5, at 56-59 (legislative history and
statutory language show § 16 to be directed at manipulation); Easterbrook & Fischel, Trading
on Inside Information, 36 LAW SCH. REC. 10, 17 (1990); see also Task Force Report, supra
note 7, at 1092 (§ 16(b) "is aimed at three specific types of insider trading abuses, only one
of which involves abuse of inside information"); Yourd, Trading in Securities By Directors,
Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 MIcH. L. REv. 133,
143-44, 147-48 (1939) ("behind this purpose [prevention of insider trading] lies the larger and
predominant design to protect the securities market from untoward influences"). But see H.
MANNE, supra, at 26 (§ 16 "was designed only to prevent insiders from profiting from inside
information").
The failure of most critics of § 16 to consider the possibility that it was addressed to
something other than insiders taking advantage of corporate information is probably explained
by a number of factors. The language of § 16(b) suggests that the reason affiliates are required
to forfeit short-swing profits is that forfeiture will prevent them from making unfair use of
inside information, but the conventional wisdom on § 16 may have been influenced even more
profoundly by the fact that for 30 years after the Exchange Act was enacted, there was no
real debate about insider trading. Until Henry Manne called attention to the incentive effects
of insiders trading on the basis of nonpublic information, see infra note 65 and accompanying
text, two sides to the issue did not exist: insider trading was criticized, but not defended. So
long as everyone agreed that trading on the basis of inside information was immoral, it would
have been hard to discuss or to justify § 16 in the relatively mundane terms of efficiency or
incentive. By the time the propriety of insider trading was carefully considered, every aspect
of § 16 had already been discussed extensively. Moreover, the debate had shifted from § 16
to rule lOb-5; the operation of § 16 was relatively settled, while many important questions
under rule lob-5 were still open. See supra notes 3, 5 (rule lob-5 dominates recent discussion
of federal regulation of insider trading). Finally, anyone who thinks insiders should not be
allowed to trade on inside information is hard pressed to concede some other purpose in §
[Vol. 42
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ventional-if generally unarticulated-wisdom: "Did Congress decline
to make the rule turn on the insider's knowledge and intent because
it thought these things to be theoretically irrelevant? Because it was
interested in some evil other than insider trading? The answer to both
questions is no, of course."' 19
This Article reaches a different conclusion. Section 16 does much
more than regulate the use of corporate information; it discourages
those who control publicly held corporations from manipulating cor-
porate affairs to create opportunities to trade corporate stock prof-
itably. If widely held assumptions about the way corporations work
are true, section 16 is an extraordinarily precise measure for getting
those in charge of publicly held companies to operate them in ways
that will benefit the general public. Those who secured the enactment
of section 16 knew this, and they were probably more concerned with
reforming the way publicly held corporations conduct their business
than with the interests of security traders.
After outlining the mechanics of section 16, more fully, this Article
proceeds in Part II to show how section 16 regulates the operation
of publicly held corporations. The key is that publicly held companies
are managed by people who do not own them. The separation of man-
agement from ownership that defines publicly held companies has dis-
turbing implications for the way they do business, calling into question
the legitimacy of large-scale corporate enterprise. By moving the in-
terest of those who control corporations into alignment with the in-
terest of stockholders, section 16 addresses a distracting and destructive
opportunity that the separation problem creates, and in so doing it
encourages those in control to run publicly held companies in the pub-
lic interest. If the separation of ownership and control really is a prob-
lem, section 16 cannot solve it of course; if corporate managers can
shirk and steal, they can do so without trading stock. Nonetheless,
section 16 is calculated to improve the way publicly held corporations
operate and to prevent many abusive management practices.
People who ought to know have called section 16 "[t]he most
subtle and least understood" provision of the Exchange ActY° None-
16, for if Congress was concerned with something other than informational equality in § 16,
the legitimacy of regulating insider trading under rule l0b-5 is open to question. It is instructive
that Dooley, Easterbrook and Fischel, and Manne suggested the possibility of explaining § 16
as an antimanipulative provision while they were engaged in extensive and more general
criticism of rule lOb-5. (Brudney on the other hand has recognized the antimanipulative
function of § 16 and also championed informational equality.).
19. R. CLAx, supra note 4, § 8.6, at 295.
20. Cook & Feldman, supra note 12, at 386; see also Meeker & Cooney, supra note 12,
at 949 (quoting Cook & Feldman) (Donald Cook and Thomas Meeker were, respectively,
Chairman and Special Counsel of the'SEC when they made these observations).
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theless, section 16 works in a relatively straightforward manner on one
aspect of the management process. It regulates the way publicly held
corporations are managed by manipulating the incentives that operate
upon those who control these corporations. The several provisions of
section 16 work together to tie the personal fortunes of directors, of-
ficers, and principal stockholders more closely to long-term appre-
ciation of stock prices and to discourage them from arranging corporate
affairs to suit their personal ends at the expense of corporate profit.
Section 16 makes it likely that those whose affairs it regulates will
profit when stock prices rise over the long term. It encourages officers
and directors to buy and hold stock in their companies by requiring
them to disclose how much stock they own and by discouraging fre-
quent trading. Officers, directors, and principal stockholders are left
with an incentive to pursue corporate policies that will cause stock
prices to rise, since they are allowed to trade profitably while prices
are rising, even if they trade on the basis of nonpublic corporate in-
formation. Finally, by requiring those it regulates to disclose their
trading and to disgorge their profits from short-swing trading and by
forbidding them to sell short, section 16 makes it difficult for those
in charge of publicly held companies to profit when stock prices fall
steadily or fluctuate rapidly.
Section 16's technique of manipulating private incentives with
simple, statutorily enunciated rules is uncharacteristic of the Exchange
Act. Commentators consistently have considered administrative dis-
cretion to be the hallmark of the Exchange Act, and taken as a whole
the Act reflects tremendous confidence in administrative expertise. 21
Almost every substantive provision of the Act provides for regulation
of some set of practices by an administrative agency, typically the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which is supposed to per-
fect the regulatory scheme in light of experience and changing
circumstances. Administrators, however, play a minimal role in sec-
tion 16. Instead of providing for continuing bureaucratic oversight,
section 16 adjusted the management system once, in hopes of making
the system work correctly for a long time. This approach gave section
21. See J. BROOKS, ONCE IN GOLCONDA: A TRUE DRAMA OF WALL STREET 1920-1938, at
204-05 (1969); R. DEBEDTS, THE NEW DEAL's SEC 81 (1964); J. FLYNN, SECURITY SPECULATION
1 (1934); M. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEw DEAL 143 (1970); J. SEuGMAN,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 99-100 (1982); R. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF STOCK
EXCHANGE MEMBERS 132-34 (1941); Hoffman, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in THE
SECURITY MARKETS: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF A SPECIAL STAFF OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND 700, 700 (1935) [hereinafter THE SECURITY MARKETS]; Thel, The Original
Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REv. 385, 419-24
(1990); D. Levin, Regulating the Securities Industry 403-04 (1969) (Ph.D. dissertation, Political
Science, Columbia University).
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16 a rigidity that may be unfortunate, but at the same time it made
the section politically palatable.
The idea that section 16 was designed to encourage those in, con-
trol of a publicly held company to devote themselves to raising the
price of its common stock is somewhat at odds with prevailing wisdom
about the purpose of section 16 and of the Exchange Act generally.
Part III of this Article shows that the people responsible for the en-
actment of section 16 intended to influence the way publicly held cor-
porations are managed. The regulation of corporate management had
long been a goal of those who pressed for stock. exchange reform, and
management regulation seemed imperative during the crisis that led
to enactment of the Exchange Act. The model of the publicly held
corporation implicit in section 16 comports with thinking at that time,
and the record of public and private deliberations on the Exchange
Act shows that the drafters and sponsors of section 16 intended to
regulate corporate management.
Some of the implications of the explanation of section 16 offered
here are outlined in Part IV. The courts and the SEC regularly refer
to congressional intentions to justify the way they construe and ad-
minister the federal securities statutes, and some of their decisions are
inconsistent with the congressional intentions implicit in the vision of
section 16 offered here. Measuring recent'judicial and administrative
initiatives against those intentions leads to the conclusion that federal
securities regulation has evolved in a way that would have surprised
and perhaps disappointed those involved in enacting. the Exchange Act.
It may be appropriate that the intentions of the drafters of the
Exchange Act have not been realized. Nonetheless, the startling dif-
ference between what the drafters saw and what we see today says
something important about the way statutes are written and under-
stood. By and large, section 16 -still works as the drafters intended:
it is effective largely because the courts and the SEC rarely have to
delve into its underlying purpose. Intentionally or not, wisely or na-
ively, the drafters of section 16 coordinated the interests of manage-
ment and stockholders of publicly held corporations. In doing so, they
codified the best.business practices and fundamentally changed, with-
out challenge, the system under which corporate managers work. Those
who want to understand the federal securities statutes or to reform
big business should study section 16 carefully.
B. The Mechanics of Section 16
The Exchange Act provides for pervasive regulation of the op-
erations of stock exchange members and others continuously engaged
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in the securities business. 22 It also provides for less extensive regulation
of the affairs of industrial and commercial firms whose securities are
owned by the public. 23 When the Exchange Act was first enacted, the
provisions governing security issuers did not come into play until a
business registered its securities on a national securities exchange pur-
suant to section 12 of the Act.2 Section 16 did not apply unless an
issuer registered a class of its equity securities .25 Registration was vol-
untary, and although issuers might have been under substantial pres-
sure to register, 26 an issuer could have avoided most provisions of the
Exchange Act, including section 16, by not registering.
The reach of section 16 was extended when the Exchange Act was
amended in 1964.27 Although companies still trigger section 16 by reg-
istering their equity securities under section 12, section 12 now requires
them to register most publicly held equity securities with the SEC if
they are not registered on an exchange. 2 As a result, almost all pub-
22. See Exchange Act §§ 8, 15 U.S.C. § 78h (1988) (borrowing by exchange members,
brokers and dealers), 11, 15 U.S.C. § 78k (1988) (segregation of broker and dealer functions),
15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1988) (regulation of over-the-counter market), 17, 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1988)
(accounts and records).
23. See Exchange Act §§ 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1988) (registration of securities), 13, 15
U.S.C. § 78m (1988) (reporting), 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988) (solicitation of proxies).
24. See Exchange Act § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1988) (registration); see also Exchange
Act §§ 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1988) (periodic reporting), 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988) (regulation
of proxy solicitation).
25. See Exchange Act § 16(a), 48 Stat. 881, 896-97 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
78p(a) (1988)). The reporting requirements of § 16(a) are tied to an issuer's registering a class
of its equity securities pursuant to § 12 of the Exchange Act, and the rest of § 16 builds on
§ 16(a). See, e.g., id. § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) ("such security").
26. Registration is a condition of participating in the exchange market, since exchange
members, brokers, and dealers cannot effect transactions in a security on an exchange unless
the security is registered. Id. § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1988). See generally 2 L. Loss, supra
note 2, at 406-12.
27. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The scope of § 16 was expanded by changing §
12 to require the registration of many equity securities traded over-the-counter. The language
of § 16 was changed in 1964 to accommodate the change in § 12 and to provide an exemption
for market makers. These are the only changes that have been made in § 16 since it was first
enacted in 1934.
28. With a few exceptions, any security traded on a national securities exchange and any
equity security held of record by 500 persons issued by a company with $5,000,000 or more
in assets must be registered pursuant to § 12. Exchange Act § 12(a), (g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(a),
(g) (1988); rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1988). An issuer must register an equity security
under § 12(g) within 120 days after the last day of its first fiscal year on which such security
is held of record by 500 or more persons. Issuers may also register their securities under § 12
voluntarily. Exchange Act § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1988); see 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at
411-12. Since brokers and dealers may not make a market in a security unless they have
extensive information about the issuer's operations, rule 15c2-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11
(1988), even issuers that are not required to register their securities are under considerable
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licly held equity securities are registered under section 12, and ac-
cordingly section 16 now influences the way almost all publicly held
companies do business. 29
Relatively f~w people are subject to section 16, but they are gen-
erally prosperous and influential people: the directors and officers of
issuers of equity' securities registered under section 12 and what the
caption for section 16 refers to as "principal stockholders" (persons
who, directly or indirectly, beneficially own more than ten percent of
any class of any equity security registered under section 12).30 These
principal stockholders, 31 directors, and officers32 control publicly held
pressure to register them if they want to foster a trading market. See also National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc., By-Laws, Schedule D § 1, NASD Manual (CCH) 1803.
29. See R. CLARK, supra note 4, at 294; cf. SEC, DIRECTORY OF COMPANIES REQUIRED
TO FIn ANNUAL REPORTS wrru TE SECunmas AND EXCHANGE COMUnSSION UNDER THE
SEcURrrIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1988) (listing 14,620 companies registered under § 12 or
required to file reports pursuant to § 15(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1988)).
30. A § 12 registration now covers a whole class of securities, but at one time specific
securities were registered. See Exchange Act § 12(g)(1), 15 i.S.C. § 78l(g)(1) (1988) (class
registration); rule 12dl-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d1-1 (1988) (applications under § 12(b) and (c)
deemed to apply for whole class); 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 407-08. This history accounts
for § 16's reference to "any class of any equity security that is registered," rather than simply
any class of equity security that is registered.
31. When stock is widely held, a substantial stockholder can often control the corporation
with less than a majority of the outstanding stock. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before
the Committee on Banking and Currency, United States Senate on S. Res. 84 (72nd Congress)
and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 (73d Congress), 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6556 (1934) [hereinafter
Stock Exchange Practices] (testimony of Thomas Corcoran) ("Five percent is a lot in a modem
corporation. Many corporations are controlled by 5 percent or 10 percent."), reprinted in 6
LEOisLATnvE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECUorTIs EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934,
item 22 (J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar eds. 1973) [hereinafter LEGIsLATrvE HISTORY]; 4 L. Loss
& J. SuaGmAN, SECURITIES REGoULATON 1703 (1990) ("It has been generally recognized, back
far further than 1933, that practical control of a corporation does not require ownership of
51 percent of its voting securities-or anything like that amount."); see also Report of the
Committee Appointed Pursuant to House Resolutions 429 and 504 to Investigate the Concen-
tration of Control of Money and Credit, H.R. REP. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 145-46
(1913) ("a small fraction [of outstanding stock] is able to control a corporation if the holdings
are widely scattered"), reprinted in part in Sheldon, The Pujo Committee, in 3 CONGRESS
INVESTIGATEs: A Docurmmr=D HISTORY 1792-1974, at 2356-81 (A. Schlesinger, Jr. & R. Burns
eds. 1975) [hereinafter CONGRESS INVEsTIGATEs]; H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1934) ("Not only is nearly one half of the entire national wealth of the country represented
by corporate stocks and corporate and Government bonds, but nearly one half of that corporate
wealth is vested in the 200 largest nonbanking corporations which, piercing the thin veil of
the holding company and disregarding a relatively few notable exceptions, are . . controlled
by those owning only a very small proportion of the corporate stock"), reprinted in 5
LEGISLATrVE HISTORY, supra, item 18; W. RIPLEY, MAIN SRET AND WALL STREr 95 (1927).
See also A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND) PRrVATE PROPERTY (1932);
Berle, "Confrol" in Corporate Law, 58 CoLut. L. REv. 1212 (1958); Sommer, Who's "In
Control"?-SEC, 21 Bus. LAW. 559 (1966).
32. State corporate law typically provides that the affairs of a business corporation are
to be managed by the- board of directors or by officers under the direction of the board, see,
THE GENIUS OF SECTION 16January 1991]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
companies, and section 16 has mbre pervasive implications for their
personal affairs than any other provision of the securities laws.
Directors, officers, and principal stockholders become subject to
the reporting requirements of section 16(a) as soon as they take their
companies public or become affiliated with publicly held companies. 33
Section 16(a) requires them to disclose beneficial ownership of any
equity securities, registered or not, issued by the companies with which
they are affiliated. In addition to reporting their initial holdings, they
must report any change in ownership to the SEC and to any stock
exchange on which their companies have equity securities registered.3 4
Section 16(b) is the provision that most complicates the personal
affairs of those in control of publicly held companies, and it is also
the most maligned part of section 16. Broadly speaking, it provides
that if anyone subject to section 16(a) buys and sells, or sells and buys,
any equity security issued by the company with which she is affiliated
within a period of less than six months, the company is entitled to
recover any profits she realizes from the transactions." If the company
fails to pursue such profits, its security owners may do so in its behalf.
The courts have given section 16(b) teeth by computing profit so as
to maximize the forfeiture and by awarding attorneys fees when se-
curity owners prosecute section 16(b) suits in behalf of issuers. 6
e.g., CAL. CoiP. CODE § 300(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)
(Supp. 1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 1986); REVISED MODEL BusINEsS CORP.
ACT § 8.01(b) (1985); PRINcnLES OF CORP'oRAT GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOM1WSNDA-
TIONS § 3.01, at 61, § 3.02, at 66 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984) [hereinafter CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE], with stockholders electing the board of directors, see, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 708 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 703 (McKinney 1986); REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT §§ 8.03, 8.04.
33. Directors, officers, and principal stockholders must report when the issuer with which
they are affiliated registers an equity security. Persons who become directors, officers, or
principal stockholders of issuers with registered equity securities have 10 days to file. Trans-
actions effected before a company registers equity securities under § 12 or before a person
becomes an officer or director of a company with registered equity securities can have
implications under § 16(b). An officer or director's trade can be matched with an earlier trade
made before the trader became an officer or director. See Jacobs, supra note 12, at 380-89.
A purchase or sale made prior to the effective date of a § 12 registration may be matched
with a sale or purchase occurring after registration but within six months of the first transaction.
Perfect Photo, Inc. v. Grabb, 205 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Pa. 1962); see Jacobs, supra note 12,
at 265-66; Sargent, The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964: Background, Effect and Pract-
icalities, 20 Sw. L.J. 434, 452 (1966).
34. An issuer that has equity securities registered on more than one exchange may designate
one of them as the only one with which § 16(a) reports need be filed. Rule 16a-l(c), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.16a-1(c) (1988).
35. The statute uses the male form of the pronoun but presumably applies to women as
well.
36. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 751 (1943) (adopting lowest-in, highest-out measure of profit and awarding attorney fees
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There has been very little litigation or commentary on the other
parts of section 16, and accordingly they are less well known than
sections 16(a) and 16(b). Section 16(c) imposes two limitations on ac-
tivities of those subject to section 16 (again, directors and officers of
issuers of registered equity securities and beneficial owners of more
than ten percent of any class of registered equity security). First, it
makes it unlawful for them to sell stock short-they cannot sell equity
securities issued by the companies with which they are affiliated if they
-'do not own the securities. Second, it forbids them to sell such securities
against the box-if they sell stock that they do own, they must deliver
to the buyer promptly. In declaring short sales and delayed deliveries
illegal, section 16(c) is markedly different from section 16(b), which
provides for the disgorgement of short-swing profits but does not for-
bid anything.
The rest of section 16 limits the scope of the first three parts. 37
Section 16(d), which was added in 1964, exempts market makers from
section 16(b) and section 16(c). 38 Section 16(e) provides that no part
of section 16 will apply to arbitrage transactions unless they contra-
vene such rules as the SEC "may adopt in order to carry out the pur-
poses of [the] section." '39
H. Section 16 and the Regulation of Corporate Management
By regulating the affairs of the officers, directors, and principal
stockholders of publicly held corporations, section 16 influences the
to the plaintiff-securityholder out of the amount forfeited); cf. 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at
558 (Smolowe "has reigned supreme."). See generally W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note
12, at 597-98 (computation of profits).
37. The operative provisions of § 16 also include limitations. "Exempted securities" are
excluded from each of them. Section 16(b) does not apply when the traded security "was
acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted," and it does not
"cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the' time of the
purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved." The SEC is granted
further exemptive power in § 16(b) ("This subsection [16(b)] shall not be construed to cover
... any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may
exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection."), and § 12(h) ("The
Commission may ... exempt from section 16 any officer, director, or beneficial owner of
securities of any issuer, any security of which is required to be registered pursuant to subsection
[12(g)] ... if the Commission finds ... that such-action is not inconsistent with the public
interest or the protection of investors."). The § 12(h) exemptive authority with respect to
certain types of regulated financial institutions is vested in different regulatory agencies.
Exchange Act § 12(i), 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1988).
38. See generally Painter, Section 16(d) of the Securities Exchange Act: Legislative
Compromise or Loophole?, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 358 (1965) (discussing the legislative and
judicial history of § 16(d)).
39. Old § 16(d) was redesignated § 16(e) when the present § 16(d) was added to the
Exchange Act in 1964.
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way publicly held corporations are managed. Although section 16 reg-
ulates the business affairs of publicly held corporations indirectly, an
examination of the way it does so reveals a coherent scheme for the
regulation of corporate management. That regulatory scheme seems
to envision a publicly held corporation as one which "should have as
its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing
corporate profit and shareholder gain, ' 4° and one which is owned by
its stockholders. 41 It follows from these propositions that the people
in charge of corporations should devote themselves to producing prof-
its and causing stock prices to rise. 42 The problem with publicly held
corporations is that managers who do not own the corporations they
manage may have less incentive to maximize stockholder wealth than
do managers who are owners. 43
This conception of the corporation has its critics," and a variety
of mechanisms minimize the actual conflict between stockholders and
managers of publicly held corporations. 41 No doubt a more sophis-
40. CoPsORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 32, § 2.01.
41. See A. BERLE & G. MEANs, supra note 31, at 120; cf. Fama & Jensen, Separation of
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EcON. 301 (1983) (ownership as residual risk-bearing)
(explaining "the survival of organizations characterized by separation of 'ownership' and
'control''').
42. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 32, § 3.02(a)(2) (Directors of a publicly held
corporation should oversee its business with a view to evaluating whether it is being managed
consistently with § 2.01.). Although some critics contend that managers should concern
themselves with non-stockholder constituencies, it is fair to say that those who concern
themselves with the Exchange Act generally agree that stockholder welfare should be at least
an important goal of corporate managers. Cf. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47
HARv. L. REV. 1305, 1322 (1934) (stating that "the board is to be employed as a medium for
the protection and enhancement of the interests of the corporation and the stockholders ... ");
Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of Independence, 67
TEx. L. REV. 1351, 1367-68 (1989) (explaining fiduciary model of directors' duties in terms of
stockholder wealth maximization). Compare Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are
Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1365 (1932) and Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in
Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931) with Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
43. Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
CoLuM. L. REV. 1403, 1406-07 (1985); Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims,
26 J.L. & EcON. 327, 331 (1983); Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND.
L. REV. 1259, 1262-63 (1982) [hereinafter Fischel, Corporate Governance]; Fischel, The "Race
to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation
Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913 (1982) [hereinafter Fischel, Race to the Bottom].
44. Cf. Brudney, supra note 43; Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in
the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 25-40 (1986) (surveying theories); Fischel, Race to
the Bottom, supra note 43, at 917 (criticizing model as based on shareholder irrationality);
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 1395 (1989) (discussing debate
on corporate contractual freedom).
45. See R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978); Coffee, supra note 44,
at 25-28 (summarizing literature); Dent, Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public
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ticated and qualified model is needed to determine whether section 16
makes the world a better place and whether it in fact helps to align
management and stockholders interests. Nonetheless, whatever its lim-
itations in reflecting the way publicly held corporations actually work,
the simple model does help make sense of section 16.
Even if the market and state law constraints are adequate to the
challenges posed by the separation of management and ownership in
publicly held corporations, the fact remains that many people think
these constraints are inadequate. The Exchange Act was written and
debated in the light-some might say the glare-of' The Modern Cor-
poration and Private Property, in which Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gar-
diner C. Means undertook to show that ownership and control had
been separated in large corporations." Section 16 should be recognized
as an early response to this problem.
One can appreciate that section 16 may have been a response to
a perceived problem of separation of ownership from control without
agreeing .that the separation is in fact a problem. To understand sec-
tion 16, however, it is necessary to understand why people worried
about the separation in 1934. 47 Scholars have been preoccupied with
the implications of Berle and Means's thesis since 1932, and perhaps
the theme of separation now carries some connotations that Berle and
Means did not identify." Those who are troubled by the separation
Corporation, 1989 Wis. L. RPv. 881, 884-85 (summarizing literature); Manne, The "Higher.
Criticism" of the Modern Corporation, 62 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 399 (1962); Werner, Management,
Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77 CoLUM. L. REv. 388
(1977) (financial markets cause modem corporate management to pursue constantly increasing
corporate earnings); Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197 (1984); McCraw,
In Retrospect: Berle and Means, Reviews in American History, (forthcoming; manuscript at
15) (describing "the sociology of professional management[:] executives' submergence in a
corporate culture obsessed with competitive market performance, their keen identification of
the self with the company"). It-may be noteworthy that the co-author of the most extensive
discussion of the way that § 16 aligns stockholder and manager interests, Carlton & Fischel,
The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. Ra,. 857, 891-94 (1983), is also one of the
most vigorous proponents of the view that the separation of ownership and control does not
pose problems justifying substantial law reform. See, e.g., Fis chel, Corporate Governance,
suprq note 43, at 1291-92; Fischel, Race to the Bottom, supra note 43, at 918.
46. A. BERL & G. MEANs, supra note 31. On the influence of this work see J. ScHWARz,
LmEAL: ADOLF A. BEn AND THE VISION OF AN AAMERICAN ERA 59-68 (1987); Corporations
and Private Property: A Conference Sponsored by the Hoover Institution, 26 J.L. & EcON.
235 (1983); Werner, supra note 45, at 395-97; McCraw, supra note 45.
47. S. BRucHEY,. ENTERIsE: THE DYcAMIC ECONOMY OF A FREE PEOPLE 452 (1990)
("Men and women can attend only to what they understand to be the exigencies of their
time."); id. at 421-22 ("the historian's insistence that the past be viewed ... in the light of
what contemporaries believed about their situation and about themselves").
48. See W. Ki.miN & J. CorrmE, supra note 15, at 160 (The Berle and Means thesis "has
remained the point of departure for most modem commentary about the publicly held
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today often argue that something should be done to protect stock-
holders from selfish managers; their case is essentially for investor or
stockholder protection. If the separation of ownership from control
is of consequence at all, however, it has consequences for people who
are neither owners nor managers.
The Modern Corporation was provocative because it treated the
separation of ownership and control in large publicly held corpora-
tions in the broadest terms of public welfare. When corporate man-
agers failed to pursue profits, according to Berle and Means, business
stopped working in the public interest. 49 Their ultimate aim was to
reform big business. They were not interested in publicly held cor-
porations without substantial assets or sales. Almost all big businesses
were publicly held corporations though, and big businesses dominated
the economy. According to Berle and Means, a relatively small number
of publicly held companies formed "the very framework of American
industry. The individual must come in contact with them almost con-
stantly. He may own an interest in one or more of them, he may be
employed by one of them, but above all he is continually accepting
their service." 50
corporation."); R. WINTER, supra note 45, at 16 ("With a few exceptions, the legal literature
is single-mindedly concerned with the discretion corporate management can exercise as a result
of the 'separation of ownership and control' popularized by Berle and Means."); Coffee,
supra note 44, at 15; DeMott, Foreword: Reweaving the Corporate Veil, 41 LAw & CowTraM,.
PROBS., No. 3, at 1 ("In the past fifty years, writing about corporation law has pursued
several distinct lines of inquiry. One such line of analysis began with Berle and Means'
demonstration that ultimate legal ownership was separate from effective control in large
publicly held corporations."); Dent, supra note 45, at 881; Fischel, Race to the Bottom, supra
note 43, at 913-15; Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate
Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. Rav. 927, 927 (1983) ("A central intellectual theme of the
analysis of corporation law in the twentieth century has been the separation of ownership and
control in the modern publicly-held corporation .... "); Williamson, supra note 45, at 1199;
cf. 2 L. Loss & J. SELIoMAr, supra note 31, at 23.
49. See Berle, High Finance, Master or Servant?, 23 YALE Rav. 20, 43 (1933). In its focus
on the public interest, as distinct from investor interest, the argument differs in important
respects from recent arguments for federal corporate law standards. See R. WINTER, supra
note 45, at 9 (characterizing Cary's argument for federal standards: "This last claim, it is
absolutely critical to note, is not that an overriding social goal is sacrificed by state law but
that Delaware is preventing private parties from optimizing their private arrangements."). In
Berle's argument, private ordering is appropriate when private parties pursuing their own
interests arrange their affairs in a way that contributes to the public good, but when they fail
to do so they injure a public interest independent of their own.
Many proponents of corporate law reform also are concerned more with average citizens
than with stockholders and other investors. See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SEaIMAN,
TAMo THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976).
50. A. BERLE & G. MEAs, supra note 31, at 24:
Corporations have ceased to be merely legal devices through which the private
business transactions of individuals may be carried on .... The corporation has, in
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Berle and Means focused on corporate structure because they be-
lieved that corporate structure determines the way big business works.
The separation of ownership from control was important because it
defined the framework of industry and brought the fundamental jus-
tification for private property into question:
[Slelf-interest has long been regarded as the best guarantee of ec-
onomic efficiency. It has been assumed that ... [the individual's]
desire for personal gain, for profits, can be relied upon as an effective
incentive to his efficient use of any industrial property he may pos-
sess.
In the quasi-public corporation, such an assumption no longer
holds.51
Investors had reason to be concerned, but the explosive implication
of separating the control of industrial assets from ownership was that
it seriously undermined the legitimacy of big business. "It requires
little analysis to make plain the fact that private property, as under-
stood in the capitalist system, is rapidly losing its original character-
istics. Unless the law stops the wide open gap which the corporate
mechanism has introduced, the entire system has to be revalued.1 52
It may be hard to believe that many Americans, let alone members
of Congress, actually questioned the legitimacy of big business or pri-
vate property in 1934, or that they were moved to do so by a technical
analysis of industrial structure and corporate law. Nonetheless, even
if the tone of The Modern Corporation was overblown, 53 the argument
fact, become both a method of property tenure and a means of organizing economic
life. Grown to tremendous proportions, there may be said to have evolved a
"corporate system"-as there was once a feudal system-which has attracted to
itself a combination of attributes and powers, and has attained a degree of promi-
nence entitling it to be dealt with as a major social institution.
Id. at 1; see also J.W. HuRST, LAW AND SociAL ORDER i T=E UNrE STATES 242 (1977)
[hereinafter J.W. HURST, LAW AND Socia. ORDER] ("Great practical power over resource
allocation and over the social and political values it affected had come to rest in modem
corporate management."). For a recent statement of the argument that the importance of
corporate operations justifies public intervention in corporate affairs, see R. NADER, M. GREEN
& J. SEioma , supra note 49, ch. 1.
51. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 31, at 8-9.
52. Id. at 247.
53. Other commentators have also stated the issue in terms of legitimacy. See J.W. HURST,
LAw AND SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 50, at 242 ("At mid-twentieth century public policy thus
emerged with a patchwork of consensus and conflict that left unresolved questions of the
political and social legitimacy of the big business corporation. The issue of legitimacy was real
and urgent."); J.W. HURST, THE LEorrm cY oF THE Busnmss CoRPoRAToN 84-85 (1970)
[hereinafter J.W. HURnsr, LEzrr!cY] ("The conventional view assigned the stockholder two
roles in legitimating corporate power.... In both respects, the shareholders' involvement
would insure that those immediately in charge of the enterprise would be held to a profit-
seeking performance, which under market discipline would make the firm an acceptably
productive contributor to the economy."); W. RisPLY, supra note 31, at 83 ("Veritably the
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was compelling. During the Great Depression it was clear that "some-
thing had gone terribly wrong with unfettered capitalism. '5 4
Although the New Deal securities statutes are conventionally
viewed as a program of investor protection, the Exchange Act was
directed as much to protecting the general public as to protecting inves-
tors.5 Stockholders took a terrible beating in the early 1930s, but in
1934 their problems paled in comparison to the problems of just about
everyone else. Congress recognized that corporate structure and the
securities markets affect people who do not own securities. The Ex-
change Act responded to the perceived problem of the separation of
ownership from control in a variety of ways.5 6 Most obviously, it pro-
vided for the reorganization of proxy machinery so that stockholders
could assert control.17 Section 16 responded by regulating the personal
finances of those who control publicly held corporations.
Section 16 reinforces incentives that will encourage directors, of-
ficers, and principal stockholders who control the operations of pub-
institution of private property, underlying our whole civilization, is threatened at the root
unless we take heed" of absentee ownership and involved corpbrate financial structures.); cf.
id. at v ("Property should never be allowed to degenerate into an instrument of oppression....
This, then, is really a study in the relation of property to civilization."); id. at 99-100 (trend
of corporate law to lessen responsibility and accountability of property owners). Ripley's book,
first published in 1927, had explored the failure of stockholders to control corporate policy,
id. at 78-117, and Berle and Means acknowledged that Ripley had "pioneered this area." A.
BERLE & G. MEA~s, supra note 31, at ix.
54. McCraw, supra note 45, at 22.
55. On introducing the bill that became the Exchange Act, Senator Duncan Fletcher
explained that it was
made necessary by the misfortunes of great numbers of our people who have lost
part, or all, of their savings through unregulated stock exchanges. Still more, this
bill has been made necessary by the needs of the entire American public that the
operation of the securities exchanges shall never again intensify a business depression,
or help precipitate a business depression.
78 CONG. REc. 2270 (1934).
Section 2 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1988), expressly enumerates the reasons
that pervasive regulation was necessary, and while it mentions that stock market practices
establish prices for investors, it focuses on the effect such practices have on the underlying
economy. See, e.g., id. § 2(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1988) ("National emergencies, which produce
widespread unemployment and the dislocation of trade, transportation, and industry, and
which burden interstate commerce and adversely affect the general welfare, are precipitated,
intensified, and prolonged by manipulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of
security prices and by excessive speculation .... "). See generally Thel, supra note 21, at 426-
28 ("manipulation of security prices and excessive speculation can cause not only depressions
but also unreasonable price fluctuations which interfere with the supply of credit, the calculation
of taxes, and the proper functioning of financial institutions.").
56. Cf. Karjala, An Analysis of Close Corporation Legislation in the United States, 21
ARiz. ST. L.J. 663, 666 (1989) ("In a very meaningful sense, federal securities regulation has
thus created a public company law, leaving 'pure' state corporation law as a kind of private
company law.").
57. Exchange Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988). See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 31,
at 3, 5, 13-14; Dent, supra note 45, at 895-96; Manne, supra note 45, at 408.
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licly held companies to manage those companies in ways that will cause
steady appreciation of stock prices, while at the same time it deprives
them of trading opportunities that might lead them to manage cor-
porate affairs in ways that will cause prices to fluctuate or decline.
By so refining the incentives under which they operate, section 16 may
cause those in control to manage publicly held companies in ways that
will benefit others legitimately interested in corporate affairs, includ-
ing stockholders and the-public at large.
If corporate stock prices are directly correlated with issuer prof-
its, then the section 16 incentive structure should work to improve
the way publicly held companies do business. In looking for co-
herence in the statute, conventional wisdom about the relationship
between stock prices and issuer profits may be more important than
the actual relationship, and the conventional wisdom is that prices
tend to rise and fall with corporate profitability, at least over the
long run.5 In 1934 there was evidence that corporate earnings were
an important determinant of stock prices, 59 and even the skeptical
Keynes recognized that earnings were influential (although he thought
other factors were likely to be overbearing). 60 Aside from what peo-
ple thought actually determined prices, prevailing sentiments that
sechrity prices should reflect corporate profitability also played a
large role in the way the Exchange Act was written,61 and at the time
there was widespread agreement that security prices should reflect
corporate profitability. 62
58. See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 (1988) ("The market is acting as the unpaid
agent of the investor, informing him that given all the information available to it,- the value
of the stock is worth the market price.") (quoting In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D.
134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)); R. BREALEY & S. MYERs, supra note 15; at 882 ("security prices
reflect the true underlying values of assets"); Mendelson, The Economics of Insider Trading
Reconsidered, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 470, 470 (1969) (reviewing H. MANNE, supra note 18)
("[T]he capital markets" do a reasonably good job of keeping the prices of securities in line
with their earning power and riskiness .... "); Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient:
An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MicH. L. REv.
613 (1988); Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAvis
L. REv. 341 (1986).
59. J. Buar, VALuEs IN THE MARKPLACE: THE AmRacA STocK MARKET UNDER
FEDERAL SEcutrrms LAw 56-57 (1988).
60. J. KEYNEs, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INrrERE T AND Mo imY 156-58
0936).
61. See J. BuRE, supra note 59, at 45-47.
62. See, e.g., S. REP'. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGWsiAnVE
HISTORY, supra note 31:
It is universally conceded that adequate information as to the financial structure and
condition of a corporation is indispensable.... The concept of a free and open
market for securities necessarily implies that the buyer and seller are acting in the
exercise of an enlightened judgment as to What constitutes a fair price.
Id. at 30; H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 31, at 5 ("The causes of dangerous speculation in
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To the extent stock prices are a function of corporate profita-
bility, section 16 may serve the interests of both stockholders and the
general public by causing managers to focus on producing sustained
price increases. Higher stock prices benefit stockholders, and attending
to the interests of stockholders was (and probably still is) widely re-
garded as management's primary responsibility. Consumers and work-
ers also benefit if steadily rising stock prices are a result of rising
corporate profits. Companies ordinarily profit by producing goods
and services efficiently, and profitable companies presumably provide
more employment than failing companies. In trying to make sense of
the Exchange Act, it helps to remember that in 1934 Congress was
concerned far more with increasing employment than with protecting
investors or stock-market speculators.
A. Management Conduct that Causes Stock Prices to Rise
If stock prices reflect issuer profits, it may be possible to inspire
the profitable operation of publicly held corporations by giving those
in charge a personal stake in stock prices. 63 One obvious way to do
this is to encourage corporate managers to own corporate stock. 64
the securities markets . . include inadequate corporate reporting which keeps in ignorance of
necessary factors for intelligent judgment of the values of securities a public continually
solicited to buy .. "); id. at 11; J. KEYNES, supra note 60, at 152 (characterizing conventional
view); Moore & Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the Exchange Act, 2 U. Cm. L. REv.
46, 51 n.26 (1934); Legislation, 21 VA. L. Rav. 103, 108 (1934); see also J. BURK, supra note
59, at 45-70; Danielian, The Functions of an Ideal System of Exchanges, in THE SECuRrry
MARKETS, supra note 21, at 19; Thel, Regulation of Manipulation Under Section 10(b): Security
Prices and the Text of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1988 COLUm. Bus. L. REv. 359,
405-15 (provisions of the Exchange Act designed to discourage speculation).
63. This incentive argument only applies to those who can affect corporate profits and
thus stock prices. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 45, at 877-78; Levmore, supra note 5, at
149; Scott, supra note 5, at 809; cf. R. CLARK, supra note 4, §6.2, at 201 (Incentive
compensation schemes "are often, though not always, limited to upper and middle-level
executive personnel."). Robert Haft has argued that corporate employees may delay the
transfer of information to their superiors so that they can trade on it. Haft, The Effect of
Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MicH. L. RyV.
1051, 1054-55 (1982). If this is a problem, the solution may lie in regulating trading by
subordinate employees. Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in PRIN CIPALS
AND AGENTS: THE STRucTuRE OF BusntEss 81, 85 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds. 1985)
[hereinafter PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS]. But see Haft, supra, at 1060-64 (Allowing insider trading,
even with fiduciary duties imposed on directors inter se, would return the board to hierarchical
decision-making and would undermine peer group decision-making superiority.).
64. See NYSE Listed Company Manual 309.00 ("Many shareholders feel that directors
and officers should have a meaningful investment in the companies they manage.... As
shareholders themselves, directors are more likely to represent the viewpoint of other share-
holders whose interests they are charged with protecting. Similarly, officers-the executive
management group-may well perform more effectively with the incentive of stock options or
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Some commentators go further and argue that the best way to
motivate corporate managers is to allow them to buy stock on the basis
of inside information. If managers can trade, the argument goes, they
will have a powerful incentive to maximize corporate profits toward
the end of causing share prices to increase. 6.
Of course, many people think it is profoundly unfair for cor-
porate insiders to buy common stock when they are aware of favorable
corporate developments of which the public is ignorant. 66 Nor is it
clear that permitting insiders to trade while in possession of nonpublic
corporate information will improve corporate performance; the profits
of trading based on advance knowledge of good news may be un-
necessary, imprecise, or counterproductive incentives for corporate
managers. 67
Even if critics of insider trading are right, however, it may not
be a good idea-to try to prevent it.68 Legal sanctions are imprecise,
and any effort to prevent insiders from buying stock on the basis of
inside information risks discouraging insiders from buying stock at all.
a share in the equity ownership of the company."), reprinted in 4 FED. SEC. L. Rm,. (CCH)
26,100, at 19,103; see also R. CLARK, supra note 4, § 6.2.1, at 202:
Incentive compensation plans usually seek to give the executive a long-term reward
that is linked to some measure of company performance. The performance measure
might be the market price of the company's stock or the operating results ... of
the company or of the particular subsidiary or unit for which the executive works.
See also Fischel, Race to the Bottom, supra note 43,'at 919; Mendelson, supra note 58, at
492 n.49 (recommending caution in curtailing long-term insider trading); Samuelson, supra
note 15, at 523; cf. Lieberman v. Becker, 38 Del. Ch. 540, 155 A.2d 596 (1959) (upholding
compensation plan).
65. The leading exponent of this view is Henry Manne. See H. MANNE, supra note 18,
at 138-41; Manne, Economic Aspects of Required Disclosure Under Federal Securities Laws,
in WALL STmRET iN TRANSITION 21 (1974) [hereinafter Manne, Economic Aspects]; Manne,
Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. Rv. 547, 578-79 (1970); see also Carlton
& Fischel, supra note 45, at 869-82 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of allowing
corporate managers to buy stock on the basis of inside information).
66. 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 544-45; cf. R. POSN'ER & K. Scorr, EcoNOmCs OF
CoRPoRATioN LAW Am SECURnIEs REGULATIoN 119 (1980) ("Much, if not most, of the judicial
discussion of insider trading has been in terms of fairness and equal treatment of all investors
.... "); Carlton & Fischel, supra note 45, at 880 ("the most common argument against insider
trading-that it is unfair or immoral"); Dooley, supra note 5, at 55 (Even though enforcement
of insider trading restrictions is unwise, insider trading "is behavior that falls below a standard
of conduct to which many, including the author, aspire.")- See generally Easterbrook, Insider
Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup.
CT. REv. 309, 323-30 (discussing "fairness as the source of the obligation to disclose");
Lawson, The Ethics of Insider Trading, 11 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'y 727 (1988) (in-depth
treatment of the moral issues arising from insider trading).
67. R. CARK, supra note 4, § 8.3, at 277-80; Levmore, supra note 5, at 149-50; Mendelson,
supra note 58, at 486-90; Schotland, Unsafe At Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading
and the Stock Market, 53 VIA. L. Rxv. 1425 (1967).
68. See Dooley, supra note 5.
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If insider stock ownership creates appropriate incentives, any program
that regulates trading on the basis of inside information must justify
the incidental burden placed on insider stock ownership. The ultimate
evaluation of such a program involves balancing the value of pre-
venting insider trading against any damage to management incentives.
That balance will shift with changes in the overall health of business.
During the Great Depression incentive problems were quite press-
ing, and section 16 in fact seems to be directed at encouraging cor-
porate managers to hold stock for the long term. Some parts of section
16 work to discourage insiders from buying stock, but not so much
from buying on inside information as from buying on speculation.
There is no reason to believe that the drafters thought that buying on
inside information is good, but neither do they seem to have been
willing to compromise appropriate management incentives to prevent
such buying.
The presumption that section 16 was supposed to prevent insiders
from trading on the basis of inside information is hard to square with
the fact that section 16 permits insiders to buy or sell on the basis of
inside information. 69 Under the scheme Congress put in place with
section 16, corporate managers are free to trade on the basis of in-
formation they acquire in the course of their work if they are prepared
to walt to convert their profits to cash. 70
The automatic forfeiture provision of section 16(b) is usually
treated as the heart of section 16. Section 16 works to focus the at-
tention of corporate managers on corporate business. Automatic for-
feiture of short-swing profits eliminates the incentive to speculate for
the short swing, and thus helps to keep corporate managers from being
69. Cf. H. MANNE, supra note 18, at 30 ("Section 16(b) can be rationalized as an
antimanipulation device but not as an effective prohibition of insider trading.").
70. Of course rule 10b-5 also regulates insider trading, but rule lOb-5 was promulgated
by the SEC, not by Congress. See 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 543 ("It is interesting that the
only explicit answer of Congress to the insider trading problem was § 16, not some sort of
provision . . . along the lines of the vast jurisprudence that ultimately developed under Rule
lOb-5 .... "); supra notes 3, 5 and accompanying text. The Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA) more or less ratified the insider trading law that
had developed under rule 1Ob-5. Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 2, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified following
15 U.S.C. 78u-1 (1988) under caption "Congressional Findings") ("The Congress finds that
... the [SEC] has, within the limits of accepted administrative and judicial construction of
[its rules and regulations governing trading while in possession of material, nonpublic infor-
mation], enforced such rules and regulations vigorously, effectively, and fairly .... "); see
also Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (authorizing the SEC to bring civil actions for
insider trading and allowing for treble damages); H.R. RaP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
35 (findings in ITSFEA of 1988 "are intended as an expression of congressional support for
[SEC] regulations"), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. Naws 6043, 6072.
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distracted from the business of running publicly held companies. 71
Moreover, since officers and directors cannot profit from being stock-
holders unless they hold for at least six months, when they do buy
stock they acquire interests similar to those of long-term public stock-
holders.
Section 16(b) influences those it governs in subtle ways. Officers,
directors, and principal stockholders cannot be held accountable under
section 16(b) unless prices change for the better after they trade, and
even then they are accountable only to the extent that they return to
their original positions by effecting countervailing trades within six
months; they can avoid forfeiture if they can delay their profitable
offsetting trades for six months. Because of the short-swing trigger,
section 16(b) tends to burden short-term speculations while leaving
long-term investments alone. Specifically, section 16(b) will deter in-
siders from trading in two situations: (1) when they hope to make
offsetting trades at better prices within six months; or (2) when they
have made countervailing trades at better prices in the preceding six
months (that is, a previous purchase may deter a sale, and vice versa).
If section 16(b) sometimes produces unfair results, it is in the sec-
ond situation. When the second of two trades matched under section
16(b) is entirely independent of the first except for the fortuity of time,
section 16(b) forfeiture may not serve any constructive purpose. Any
time those subject to section 16 trade, they give up their right to make
profitable trades in the other direction during the next six months. If
the first trade is effected with no intention of making an offsetting
trade, however, the burden of section 16(b) is unpredictable and not
likely to deter trading on inside information or to encourage efficient
corporate management. If an insider trades stock for the long term
and subsequently decides to effect an offsetting trade within six months,
section 16(b) will cause a problem only on the happenstance that prices
have changed favorably since the first trade. In that event, the prospect
of forfeiture may discourage the insider from making an offsetting
trade, but it will do so irrespective of whether the insider possesses
71. See S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 62, at 186-87 ("Officers of commercial banking
institutions, who were most substantially compensated to devote their time and energy to the
performance of their essential duties, ... encouraged and participated in speculative ventures
[in the stock of their banks] for their own personal gain."); R. CLARK, supra note 4, § 8.3,
at 280; Schotland, supra note 67, at 1451-52 (insiders "trading in the shares, as differentiated
from investing in them, raises the danger that they may be distracted from single-minded
devotion to their work for the corporation"); Werner, supra note 45, at 391 (.'[S]tock
gambling' or speculation-trading to realize a quick profit from fluctuations in stock prices
... was a mania that 'causes unutterable woe and ruin' to its practitioners, Cook said, and
'unsettles the minds of men and unfits them for serious earnest business."') (footnote omitted)
(quoting W.W. CooK, THE CoRoRAaoN PROBLEM 71-72 (1891)).
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nonpublic information at the time of the second trade. Moreover, the
threatened forfeiture is not calculated to deter the insider from trading
on inside information acquired after the first trade. The amount the
insider will forfeit is determined by how the market has responded to
information made available since the first trade, while the insider's
profit from the offsetting trade will be determined by the way the
market reacts when the inside information is released, which by hy-
pothesis will not occur until after the offsetting trade is complete. 72
Those responsible for section 16 were concerned with matched
trades that were related by more than proximity in time. They wanted
to keep corporate affiliates from entering into transactions with the
intention of effecting offsetting transactions in the near future . 3 They
72. In other words, insofar as forfeiture is a function of the difference of price between
two matched trades, it is not calculated to deter the use of inside information acquired after
the original trade. An insider who learns nonpublic information after the original trade and
is trying to decide whether to make an offsetting trade is concerned with what will happen to
prices after the offsetting trade, while the amount of the § 16(b) forfeiture is a function of
what has happened to prices between the time of the original and offsetting trade.
Consider an insider who buys stock without inside information and within six months learns
negative information the disclosure of which she knows will depress share prices. She can sell
all of her stock before the information is disclosed, and she will not have to make good the
loss she has avoided by virtue of her possession of inside information. If the price has risen
in the interim she will have to forfeit any profit she made on her purchase (but not profit she
made on purchases made more than six months before), but by hypothesis she did not make
that profit on the basis of inside information. She will sell if, but only if, the loss she hopes
to avoid by selling on the basis of inside information exceeds the amount of the forfeiture.
That is, she will sell if she expects the price to fall below her purchase price. In any case, the
amount of the forfeiture is not tied to the value of nonpublic information but to the value of
information released since the original purchase. In fact, the forfeiture is less likely to deter
the offsetting sale when the nonpublic information is particularly important, for it is in those
cases that the loss likely to be avoided is greatest.
Conversely, forfeiture is not particularly effective at discouraging an insider who sells stock
from buying on the basis of positive inside information she learns after she sells. She can buy
on the basis of the positive information. When the information subsequently becomes public,
the price of the newly acquired stock will rise, but she will be able to keep the appreciation,
which is the only profit she made on the basis of the inside information-that profit will be
forfeited only if she sells again within six months. If the market price rose during the period
between the original sale and the purchase, she will have to make good any loss she avoided
by selling, but that is not a loss she avoided by using inside information; she avoided the loss
by selling in the first place, and the original sale was not based on inside information. Once
again, § 16(b) may require a forfeiture, but not the forfeiture of profits based on inside
information.
73. As first introduced by Senator Fletcher and Representative Rayburn, the Exchange
Act made it illegal for control persons to trade "with the intention or expectation of" effecting
an offsetting transaction within six months, and provided for the forfeiture of any profits
from such an offsetting transaction, regardless of the trader's intentions on entering the original
transaction. S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(b) (1934), reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 31, item 34; H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(b) (1934), reprinted in 10
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 31, item 24 [S. 2693 and H.R. 7852 were identical, and
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may not have recognized that section 16(b) can effectively freeze in-
siders out of the market for six months after they trade, and they
might not have cared. While section 16(b) limits the options available
to managers who trade, it does so regardless of whether they have
inside information; they simply cannot trade at a profit for six months.
Section 16(b) is structured to ensure that when affiliates trade, they
trade for the long haul.
Section 16(b) was intended to deter affiliates from trading except
on the basis of long-term (almost permanent) investment decisions. Its
most powerful and constant force is on officers, directors, and prin-
cipal stockholders who would trade with the intention or expectation
of effecting offsetting trades within six months-that is, the burden
it places on speculation for the short term. They must recognize that
if they make offsetting trades within six months, for whatever reason,
they will have to forfeit any profits they realize. In sum, section 16(b)
burdens short-term trading, not trading on inside information.
Section 16(b) is not calculated to keep insiders from trading stock
on the basis of inside information. Insiders who have not traded for
six months are free to buy or sell on the basis of inside information.
To be sure, they will be unable to effect profitable offsetting trades
hereinafter are referred to jointly as the Fletcher-Rayburn bill].
The intention element disappeared when the prohibitory portion of the provision was
eliminated, but it is clear from the way the drafters explained the intention element in early
hearings on the bill that their primary concern was influencing the first trading decision.
Thomas Corcoran explained § 15(b)(1) of the Fletcher-Rayburn bill, which was the predecessor
of § 16(b) of the Exchange Act. After reading the sentence that declared intentional short-
swing trading illegal and provided for the forfeiture of short-swing profits irrespective of
intention, he explained:
That is to prevent directors receiving the benefits of short-term speculative swings
on the securities of their own companies, because of inside information. The profit
on such transaction [sic] under the bill would go to the corporation. You hold the
director, irrespective of any intention or expectation to sell the security within 6
months after, because it will be absolutely impossible to prove the existence of such
intention or expectation, and you have to have this crude rule of thumb, because
you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove that the director intended, at
the time he bought, to get out on a short swing.
Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at 6556-57; see Comment, Section 16(b): An
Alternative to the Six Month Limitation Period, 20 UCLA L. Rav. 1289, 1294-1300 (1973).
This testimony is frequently said to show that the drafters intended § 16(b) to prevent
control people from trading on the basis of inside information. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note
12, at 357. Yet, while Corcoran did mention inside information, it is clear that his precise
concern was with preventing insiders from engaging in short-term trading. See also Lowenfels,
supra note 12, at 61. Section 16(b) still says that profits are to be forfeited "irrespective of
any intention on the part of [the trader] in entering into such transaction of holding the
security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months."
This language is a vestige of the Fletcher-Rayburn bill, in which criminal punishment depended
on intent but the forfeiture provision did not. See infra notes 284-285 and accompanying text.
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for six months, but if the information relates to the corporation's long-
term prospects, they will be able to wait before effecting offsetting
trades. Consider, for example, officers who learn that the corporation
they run has discovered very valuable mineral deposits. They can buy
the corporation's stock on the market while they keep the information
secret. When the information is made public, the price of the stock
will climb. Inasmuch as the new price reflects future corporate income
previously unknown to the market, the price is permanent.74 The in-
siders' holdings will be much more valuable, and the insiders will be
wealthier. 75 Regardless of whether they sell, they will have made all
the money they can on the inside information, and there is no extra
profit to be made by returning to their original positions .76 The insiders
74. Section 16(b) will deter insiders from trading in hopes of profiting from temporary
fluctuations in prices. This is in fact its primary effect. This subject is considered more fully
in the next part, but it may be enough here to suggest that the publication of inside information
is likely to have a permanent effect on prices.
The ABA Task Force recommended shortening the six-month period in § 16(b) because
today information is disseminated more quickly than it was when the Exchange Act was
enacted. Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 1130-31. The Task Force presumed that the
drafters of § 16(b) chose the six-month period because they "believed that inside information
.. would lose its vitality after six months and, in the usual case, would no longer provide
the basis for improper trading activities." Id. at 1130. The recommendation reflects a confusion
of the life of a secret, which is usually short, with the life of the underlying fact, which can
be quite long. See H. MANNE, supra note 18,. at 84; Lawson, supra note 66, at 764; cf.
Dooley, supra note 5, at 58 ("Because most manipulations occur within a short period, the
purposes of section 9 [of the Exchange Act] are advanced by denying insiders short-swing
profits."); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 17 ("Manipulation is a short-run or one-
shot phenomenon.").
In the example in the text, the price of the corporation's stock will rise as the market learns
of the ore discovery, and the price will stabilize when the market knows everything there is
to know about the discovery. The price of the stock will 'change again with the release of new
information, whether about the mine or other corporate operatibns. The fact that prices may
change in the future does not mean that the information about the original discovery had only
a short-term value, however. That information had real value that lasted a long time in the
sense that it allowed the officers and directors to reap a permanent financial gain. The stock
they bought was in fact worth more than what they paid for it, and the price at which it
traded after disclosure was as correct as market prices can be. What had only short-term value
was the secret. The officers and directors had to act quickly, before news of the discovery
leaked, but once they acted they had long-term (i.e., permanent) wealth.
This is not to say that changing the length of the short-swing period in § 16 will not
fundamentally change the sort of trading insiders engage in. As developed below, infra Part
II.B., § 16(b) keeps insiders from trading on the basis of information that has short-lived
implications. Shortening the six-month period will permit managers to take advantage of
developments with shorter-term implications. This might encourage them to devote their energies
to achieving transient results.
75. The facts are drawn from SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 839-47 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), which arose under rule 10b-5.
76. See Manne, Economic Aspects, supra note 65, at 58, 75-79. The same is true of sales
made before a price decline in order to avoid taking a loss on a previously held position. A
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will not have cash until they sell, but in that the price rise is permanent,
they can wait to sell.
If they do not sell immediately, their investment in the stock will
continue to be at risk of course. This risk is tied to the fortunes of
the business and the market; anything that happens during the next
six months will affect them. The risk of a price fall will sometimes
keep insiders from trading on nonpublic information, but not always.
Section 16(b) does not prevent insiders from trading profitably on good
news; it just makes holding stock for six months, risking a price fall,
the price of buying the stock on the basis of nonpublic information.
By putting a six-month quarantine on insider profits instead of for-
bidding them, section 16(b) works to align management and stock-
holder interests. In a sense, it holds out the reward of profits based
on nonpublic information to affiliates who will tie their interests to
those of their stockholders by holding an equity position for six months.
The reporting requirements of section 16(a) were supposed to dis-
courage insiders from trading on inside information: insiders may not
trade on inside information if they have to expose their trades to the
public.7 7 Embarrassment attendant to post-trading disclosure, how-
principal stockholder may want to repurchase her stock as soon as the price falls, see infra
note 265, but if she repurchases, it is because she values control, not because she has inside
information that causes her to expect the market price to increase in the future.
77. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 31, at 13, 24. The predecessor of § 16 in the
version of the Exchange Act that the House of Representatives sent to conference required
control persons to report their trades and forbade them to sell short, but it did not restrict
their short-term trading. H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15 (1934), reprinted in 10 LEGIsLATrvE
HISTORY, supra note 31, item 30. The committee report on this bill suggested that the reporting
provisions might "bring these practices [i.e., insider trading] into disrepute and encourage the
voluntary maintenance of proper fiduciary standards by those in control of large corporate
enterprises whose securities are registered on the public exchanges." H.R. REP. No. 1383,
supra note 31, at 13; see also Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 1099 ("Such publicity
[public disclosure of changes in beneficial ownership] was designed to encourage voluntary
compliance with proper fiduciary standards by subjecting insider trades to public scrutiny.").
Although Congress hoped that the publicity created by trading reports would change
management practices, it presumably recognized that post-trading disclosure was not likely to
shame insiders into refraining from trading on inside information. Congress knew that many
executives thought that insider trading was entirely appropriate. "Prior to the enactment of
the Securities Exchange Act, profits from 'sure thing' speculation in the stocks of their
corporations were more or less generally accepted by the financial 'community as part of the
emolument for serving as a corporate officer or director notwithstanding the flagrantly
inequitable character of such trading." 10 SEC ANN. RFP. 50 (1944), quoted in 2 L. Loss,
supra note 2, at 541; see also H. MANaN, supra note 18, at 2 (citing 1915 survey) ("90% of
business executives interviewed admitted to trading regularly in their own company's shares");
Painter, supra note 12, at 668-69 (citing REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY oF SECURETIES MARKETS
OF rE SEcutrrms AND EXCHANGE ComAssioN, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt.
1, at 433-35 (1963)) (While some firms attempt to draw a distinction between confidential and
general information, "a few fims candidly admit that they consider it their prerogative to
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ever, is about the only price section 16 imposes on insiders who take
advantage of favorable buying opportunities. Since insiders need not
report until after they trade, section 16 reports do not alert the market
to the insiders' views soon enough to cause prices to change before
they trade. 71 Outside investors who sell before favorable developments
are disclosed may be upset when they later learn that insiders were
buying at the same time they were selling, but they will be powerless
to do anything about it. Neither the Exchange Act nor the common
law at the time the Act was adopted gave outside sellers any redress
in court. 79 Because these outside sellers have sold their stock, they can-
not even vote to throw the insiders out. Continuing stockholders who
do have power to change directors will also learn of the insiders trad-
ing. But post-trading reports are not at all certain to move continuing
stockholders to remove officers and directors who have traded on in-
side information. Insider trading may hurt continuing investors, 80 yet
make whatever use they wish of confidential information."). Even if that perception was
changing, section 16 was hardly calculated to stop them, at least not if corporate managers
were more interested in money than in their reputations, as must have seemed the case in
1934.
78. Section 16(a) requires those subject to it to file reports "within ten days after the
close of each calendar month . . . .if there has been a change in [beneficial] ownership during
such month." Some commentators have recommended that insiders be required to report
before trading. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 15, at 523-28; see also Task Force Report,
supra note 7, at 1102 (noting suggestions for pre-transaction reporting). While the Exchange
Act was under consideration, the drafters considered requiring affiliates to report before
trading, but decided against it. See I.N.P. Stokes' master draft of comments on Fletcher-
Rayburn bill at § 15 (handwritten comment: "Should they [i.e., affiliates] give notice in
advance?") (James M. Landis, who helped draft the Exchange Act, see infra Part II.B.,
collected and bound most of the drafts of the Act as well as related materials. [The collection
is hereinafter referred to as the DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION.] I.N.P. Stokes' master
draft is in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION item 2. Copies of the collection are in the
James McCauley Landis Papers in the Manuscript Collection of the Harvard Law School
Library and in the SEC Library. For bibliographic information useful in locating the collection
in the SEC Library, see Thel, supra note 21, at 391 n.28).
79. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.) ("By the majority rule,
aggrieved stockholders had no right to recover from the insider in such a situation."), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); Cook & Feldman, supra note 12, at 408-09 (surveying cases and
literature as of 1934); Yourd, supra note 18, at 139-43 (same); Annotation, Duty of Officer
or Director of Corporation Toward One From Whom He Purchases Stock, 84 A.L.R. FED.
615-35 (1933) (same). See generally Ash, State Regulation of Insider Trading-A Timely
Resurgence?, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 393 (1988) (discussion of the development of common law
regulation and its resurgence); Hazen, Corporate Insider Trading: Reawakening the Common
Law, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 845 (1982) (discussion reconciling the recent federal decisions
and the common law of fiduciary responsibility).
80. Compare Carlton & Fischel, supra note 45, at 858-59 ("it is generally believed that
firms have made little, if any, attempt to prohibit insider trading"), 866-72 (discussion entitled
"Why Firms Might Want to Allocate the Property Rights in Valuable Information to Managers
as Opposed to Shareholders") with R. CLARK, supra note 4, § 8.2.4, at 274 (rational stock-
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stockholders may see little reason to protect themselves from insiders
who have presided over an increase in the value of their stock.8'
Whatever effect the reporting requirements of section 16(a) have
on insiders buying on the basis of inside information, their overall
effect is to encourage directors and officers to buy and hold stock in
the companies they manage. Section 16(a) is more than an adjunct to
section 16(b) serving to reveal transactions that might give rise to for-
feiture. Periodic reports of change in ownership are the key to an ef-
fective forfeiture scheme,8 2 but section 16(a) reports were to have an
independent role in regulating the behavior of corporate managers. 83
By requiring insiders to report their trades, section 16 was supposed
to alert the market to the predictions of insiders,84 albeit perhaps in
a potentially misleading fashion. 85 Trading, moreover, is only one of
the things control persons have to report. Section 16(a) also requires
them to disclose their initial positions and to keep that disclosure cur-
rent.86
holders would not approve of insiders trading on nonpublic information) and Clark, Agency
Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties in PRiNCipAS AND AoENM', supra note 63, at 55, 75 (rules
against insider trading are particular example of general rule against fiduciaries making secret
profits).
81. R. CLtRK, supra note 4, at 276 (firms may not have sufficient incentive or ability to
curb destructive insider trading); Easterbrook, supra note 63, at 90-95 (survival of insider
trading does not mean it benefits investors). Even if disposed to act, continuing stockholders
cannot use their residual power over corporate management to discipline non-manager principal
stockholders who buy on the basis of inside information.
82. See 2 T. HAZEN, supra note 12, § 12.2, at 19-20.
83. The version of the Exchange Act that the House of Representatives sent to conference
with the Senate contained a reporting provision but no provision analogous to § 16(b). It
would also have required issuers to report on trading by officers and directors in their periodic
rep~orts to stockholders. H.R. 9323, supra note 77, § 15(a); see infra note 358 and accompanying
text.
84. H.R. Rm. No. 1383, supra note 31, at 13, 24.
85. See Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearing Before The House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce on I.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 488, 917 (1934)
[hereinafter House Hearings], reprinted in 8 & 9 LEGISLATvE HIsTORY, supra note 31, item
23; H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 31, at 24; Letter from the Counsel for the Committee
on Banking and Currency Under S. Res. 84, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (Comm. Print 1933)
[hereinafter Letter from the Counsel], reprinted in 5 LEGISlIVi HISTORy, supra note 31, item
15; see also Carney, supra note 15, at 889-91; Samuelson, supra note 15, at 519-20 ("Insiders
profit from making the required disclosures because the market mimics their transactions.");
Thel, supra note 62, at 401-02 (While trades "convey the predictions of the traders" these
"reports can create erroneous impressions."); infra note 361 and accompanying text (floor
debate in House).
86. See also Exchange Act § 12(b)(1)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b)(1)(D) (1988) (application for
registration with exchange must disclose interests of officers, directors, and principal stock-
holders in issuers securities); Exchange Act §§ 12(b)(1)(D), 12(g)(1), 13(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §§
781(b)(1)(D), 781(g)(1), 78m(a)(1) (1988) (issuers required to report interests of officers, directors,
and security holders of record holding more than 10 percentum of any class of any equity.
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The requirement that officers and directors disclose their equity
security holdings has the potential for encouraging managers to ac-
quire equity positions, and thus interests similar to those of stock-
holders. Berle and Means made a powerful case for the proposition
that stockholders are better off if corporate managers own stock in
the companies they manage. 87 They argued that non-owner managers
pursued their own interests to the detriment of stockholders, con-
vincing at least some members of Congress. Opponents of the Ex-
change Act also emphasized the importance of corporate managers
holding stock in the companies they manage. 88 The consensus on the
desirability of managers owning stock was underscored by the critics'
argument that section 16 would have the unintended effect of dis-
couraging officers and directors from owning stock at all.8 9 Even if
investors think they are injured when insiders trade on inside infor-
mation, they may be reluctant to entrust their financial interests to
managers who are unwilling to participate in the common enterprise
by owning stock.90 Managers who hold substantial amounts of stock
have a powerful incentive to work effectively. 91
Prior to the enactment of section 16(a), it would have been dif-
ficult for stockholders to determine what interest officers and directors
had in the companies they ran.92 Stockholder lists and information
security of the issuer (other than an exempted security)); Regulation S-K, item 403, 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.403 (1988) (information on equity securities beneficially owned by management to be
reported on Exchange Act forms); Regulation 14A, item 8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1988)
(reporting in proxy statements).
87. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
88. House Hearings, supra note 85, at 917 (Memorandum of National Automobile
Chamber of Commerce) ("That it is in the interest of the stockholders of a corporation to
have those charged with the responsibility of management own a substantial interest in the
corporation has long been recognized.").
89. Id.; see also infra notes 312-317 and accompanying text (Sachs Memorandum).
90. Munter, supra note 12, at 87-88.
91. See Werner, supra note 45, at 404; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text
(incentive compensation); cf. In re Calton Crescent, Inc., 173 F.2d 944, 952 (2d Cir.) (L.
Hand, J., dissenting) ("I conceive that the law allows a director to increase his stake in the
company, because it adds to his incentive to make it succeed; the greater the prize, the greater
the effort .... "), aff'd sub nom. Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304 (1949);
Carlton & Fischel, supra note 45, at 893 n.114 (employment contracts may implicitly forbid
managers to sell short excessively); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 12 ("Better
managers signal their quality by willingness to tie a higher proportion of their compensation
to stock performance."). See generally Stigler & Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The
Case of Berle and Means, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 237, 254-58 (1983) (analyzing the effect of owner-
controlled versus management-controlled corporations on profits and investment).
92. In fact, stockholders may not have been interested. Although there has been a great
deal of academic interest in the separation of management and control, stock market partici-
pants do not seem to care whether managers are stockholders. While many investors and
analysts follow management trading, management ownership is not widely followed. The
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
THE GENIUS OF SECTION 16
about management holdings generally were not available. 93 As a result,
it was charged, "Insiders having little or no substantial interest in the
properties they. manage have often retained their control without an
adequate disclosure of their interest and without an adequate expla-
nation of the management policies they intend to pursue." 94 The in-
formation made available by section 16(a) reports enabled stockholders
to protect themselves, and indirectly the public, from uninterested
managers by selling their stock or by electing new directors. 95
The ability of managers to disassociate themselves from declines
in the value of their companies' stock is also undercut by section 16(c),
which requires directors, officers, and principal stockholders who sell
any equity securities to deliver them promptly. Prior to enactment of
section 16(c), managers could deliver borrowed securities against their
sales. They sometimes used this practice, known as selling against the
box,9 to dispose of their holdings while delaying or even altogether
avoiding disclosure of their sales. 97 Moreover, those who were short
market may be uninterested because other incentives under which managers operate are so
powerful that increased stock ownership would have little impact on management behavior.
Berle and Means suggested that separation would be a problem even if managers'were
stockholders, so long as managers did not own all outstanding stock. A. Bmu & G. MEANs,
supra note 31, at 343-44.
93. See id. at 90-118 (describing sources of ownership information); see also 78 CoNG.
RPc. 8038 (1934) (debate on making public the names of shareholders in corporations registered
on national securities exchanges); cf. S. 4939, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) (proposing to require
corporations with capital stock of $200,000 or more to make available financial statements
and stock holdings of officers and directors).
94. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 31, at 13-14; see also id. at 3 ("Ownership and
control are in most cases largely divorced."); House Hearings, supra note 85, at 139-41; Stock
Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at 6543-45.
95. Managers may manage their companies in the best interest of stockholders even if
they do not have any equity in the companies they manage. Perhaps in recognition of this, §
16(a) requires managers to disclose what they own, but leaves it to investors to insist that
managers have an equity interest in the companies they manage.
Once again, investors will not be able to do anything to discipline a substantial stockholder
who sells. Cf. supra note 81 and accompanying text (principal stockholders buying on good
news). Unlike sales by directors and officers, however, sales by principal stockholders do not
create a risk of uninterested management, inasmuch as principal stockholders lose their power
to influence management when they sell. See infra note 170 (principal stockholders will not
create short-lived price rises).
96. "In a sale against the box, the seller owns enough securities to deliver the shares that
have been sold but chooses to borrow securities in order to make the delivery. Subsequently,
the seller completes the transaction by buying stock or using his own stock in order to repay
the lender." Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 1098; see also F. MACAULAY, SHORT SELLIo
oz; nr NEw YoRK SToCK EXCHANGE 14 (1951) ("Selling against the box occurs when, for
some reason, the seller prefers to deliver borrowed stock rather than his own.").
97. See S. RaP. No. 1455, supra note 62, at 52 ("This is a devise [sic] which can be
employed by corporate officials and insiders who desire to sell their corporation's stock short
without disclosing such short selling."); H.R. RaP. No. 1383, supra note 31, at 25; Letter
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against the box retained the corporate control attendant to record
ownership of stock even though by selling they abandoned any interest
in the income from the stock.98 Indeed, they never gave up control
if they covered their short positions with purchases in the market.9
With the enactment of section 16(c), those in control of publicly held
companies must accept the full consequences when they sell their stock.
In sum, section 16 encourages those in control of publicly held
companies to hold stock. It also permits them to buy stock on the basis
of confidential information they learn through their corporate affil-
iation, even if they know they will profit once the public learns that
information and bids up the price of the stock. While section 16 did
not do much to discourage insiders from buying on the basis of inside
information, it did refine the incentive system under which corporate
managers operate in a way that makes them more likely to pursue
corporate policies that will cause stock prices to rise.
When section 16 was enacted, the incentive system it put into place
may have seemed much more attractive than it does now.'0° By 1934,
the perspective of the nation had been jarred by two interrelated de-
velopments that surely shaped the Exchange Act. One was a growing
consensus that something had to be done about large corporations that
were not managed by their owners. The other, and far more impor-
tant, was the Great Depression. The Exchange Act was passed in ter-
rible times, and those who enacted it desperately wanted to get people
from the Counsel, supra note 85, at 7, 32; F. MACAULAY, supra note 96, at xii, 2-3; Hoffman,
Short Selling, in THE SECURITY MARKETS, supra note 21, at 362 ("If the seller is a large
stockholder, . . . the practice [of selling against the box] at best is deceptive. In its worst
setting it may be done by a director or official of the corporation presenting a front of good
faith and confidence and through the rear door getting out from under or even going short.").
98. F. MACAULAY, supra note 96, at xi-xii ("Sometimes the reason [for selling against the
box] was merely to preserve a voting privilege."); Hoffman, Short Selling, supra note 97, at
362 ("To the advocates of short selling this [i.e., selling against the box] is a desirable practice
since it permits the seller to maintain control over his actual shares while at the same time
'hedging' against the possibility of a decline in price."); see also J. MEEKER, SHORT SELLING
26-27 (1932) ("In the widespread distribution of stocks effected in recent years, this practice
of hedging [with sales against the box] has provided the means whereby many types of
individual and institutional investors could avoid capital losses. Companies which before the
stock panic of 1929 inaugurated 'employee stock ownership' plans have also been provided
with facilities for protecting employee-investors .... How far such a use of the hedging short
sale has actually been used is uncertain, but a good argument could be made to the effect
that it should have been done."); Yourd, supra note 18, at 157 n.78 ("This is said, by the
advocates of short selling, to be desirable practice because it permits the seller to maintain
control over his actual securities while at the same time hedging against a decline in price.").
99. F. PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH 157 (1939 & reprint 1968); see also S. REP.
No. 1455, supra note 62, at 52 ("It is plain, however, that where a person initially makes a
sale 'against the box' but subsequently changes his mind, there is nothing to prevent him from
covering in the open market. In such case he is indistinguishable from any other short seller.").
100. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (unfairness of insider trading).
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back to work. It is no wonder that as originally enacted the Exchange
Act encouraged corporate managers to buy stock and did not stand
in the way of their buying on the basis of inside information. When
the Exchange Act was written, there was little immediate prospect of
the stock market achieving a sustained advance. Under the circum-
stances, it would have seemed irresponsible to have made it illegal to
take advantage of good news.' 0'
B. Management Conduct that Causes Stock Prices to Fall
To the extent that section 16 interferes with the trading oppor-
tunities of those who control publicly held companies, its impact is
much greater when stock, prices are falling than when they are rising.
Here again, though, section 16 does not so much prevent insiders from
taking advantage of corporate information as it regulates the way
managers run corporations. Directors, officers, and principal stock-
holders are largely free to take advantage of inside information to
protect themselves from losses. They may sell any stock they own be-
fore they disclose corporate information that is likely to cause stock
prices to fall °.' Section 16 does not keep insiders from using infor-
101. See also S. BRucijEY, supra note 47, at 458 ("Many critics ... believed that both
the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act inhibited recovery by increasing the costs
and risks of new flotations and by making officers of issuing companies and underwriters
reluctant to assume risks for fear of incurring civil and criminal penalties."); cf. 1 L. Loss &
J. SmAOM ,N, supra note 31, at 380; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 45, at 881 ("[I]f insider
trading is a desirable compensation scheme, it benefits insiders and outsiders alike. Nobody
would argue seriously that salaries, options, bonuses, and other compensation devices allow
insiders to profit at the expense of outsiders .... "). Samuel Williston may be too closely
associated with reaction to credit him with holding popular or common views, but his revealing
autobiography is little enough known that it may well be mentioned. He described a com-
mencement address delivered in -1923 in which a student challenged the people of New England
for not freeing their "wage slaves." Several years into the Depression, Williston wrote that
the address "does not seem so pertinent now, when jobs are not too abundant and when
capitalists are reproached for not initiating more enterprises that will give employment." S.
WLmSToN, Ln AND LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 180 (1941).
102. Since managers will have to disclose their sales, they may be reluctant to sell for fear
that stockholders will dismiss them for their failure to act in the stockholders' interests. See
supra note 95 and accompanying text. This sanction is not calculated to discriminate between
sales based on inside information and other sales; it works against all insider sales equally.
See also supra note 92 (stockholders may not care).
Section 16(c)'s prohibition of sales against the box, discussed supra text accompanying notes
96-99, may keep managers from locking in current stock prices and hedging against price
declines. See Ydurd, supra note 18, at 157 ("[A] sale against the box is, at best, a hedge
against [the insider's] bad management."). But selling against the box is a sale, not a hedge,
and the seller does not participate in any gains if the price of the stock rises before she covers.
See Hoffman, Short Selling, supra note 97, at 362 ("This practice is obviously not a hedge
since the short sale of borrowed shares is not a closely allied subject matter but the same
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mation about unfavorable corporate developments that will depress
share prices, but it does makes it difficult for them to profit by cre-
ating unfavorable developments.
One objection to managers trading the stock of their corporations
is that since it is possible to profit from bad news as well as good,
insider trading may create perverse incentives, possibly even an in-
centive to run companies badly in order to depress share prices.° 3 Eve-
ryone presumably agrees that corporate managers should not
manipulate corporate affairs to depress share prices, 1°4 but one might
wonder whether managers would ever have an incentive to do so. Clark
dismisses the possibility that managers will mismanage their companies
in order to depress security prices so that they can buy stock cheaply.
As he explains, the stock they buy at depressed prices will be worth
only the depressed price they pay. 05 Moreover, if they mismanage cor-
porate affairs, managers may destroy part of the value of any se-
curities they already own. Thus, in the usual case it would be irrational
for corporate managers to act against corporate interests intentionally.
There is no reason to think that the drafters of the Exchange Act
thought that corporate managers were irrational, and no one ever sug-
gested that managers should be forbidden to sell their holdings.'°6
subject matter as that being held."). If a manager is certain that the market price is about to
fall, she can always simply sell her stock outright. The prohibition of sales against the box
does not deter insiders from selling on bad news except insofar as it may trigger the disclosure
requirements of § 16(a) and thereby discourage managers from selling at all.
103. R. CLARK, supra note 4, § 8.2.1, at 267; H. MMNN, supra note 18, at 150-51; Carlton
& Fischel, supra note 45, at 873-75; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 13; Levmore,
In Defense of the Regulation of Insider Trading, 11 H~Av. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 104-05
(1988); Levmore, supra note 5, at 149; Schotland, supra note 67, at 1453.
104. Some critics who argue that stockholders will benefit by permitting management to
trade on the basis of inside information suggest that managers should be able to trade while
prices are declining, but they do not argue that insiders should have an incentive to depress
stock prices. On the contrary, they argue that it is extremely unlikely that managers will
successfully pursue corporate projects that they know are bad. Carlton & Fischel, supra note
45, at 873-74. They simply argue that allowing managers to trade on bad news will reduce the
cost of managers to stockholders or will encourage managers to undertake risky enterprises
that stockholders would find attractive but managers would avoid because of the career risks
they entail. Id. at 872. See generally Coffee, supra note 44 (managers more risk averse than
stockholders).
These arguments suggest that the § 16(c) prohibition against short-selling by insiders may in
some cases destroy an appropriate incentive. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 45, at 872,
893-94. This does not substantially undercut the theory that § 16 was intended to align the
interests of managers with those of stockholders, however. Section 16 still allows insiders to
sell stock on the basis of inside information; thus, they are able to reduce their exposure to
losses from risky projects to at least some extent. In any case, no one appears to have defended
insider short selling while the Exchange Act was being considered. Cf. Schotland, supra note
67, at 1453 ("novel twist").
105. R. CLARK, supra note 4, § 8.2.1, at 267.
106. Clark's observation, that a manager who ran her company badly in order to depress
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Nonetheless, as Clark himself elsewhere recognizes, managers can profit
by depressing share prices if they are allowed to sell short. 1°7
Short sellers borrow securities to make delivery of what they sell
and subsequently purchase securities to repay the loan. They profit
if prices fall between the time they sell and the time they cover, and
lose if prices rise. Professor Loss has observed that "legislators in
different ages and different lands [have shared the feeling] that the
very idea of a person's selling something he does not own, in the hope
of buying it back later at a lower price, is essentially immoral."' 08
While popular criticism of short-selling often reflects little more than
a distaste for those who would profit from the misfortunes of others,
short selling by corporate managers poses more concrete problems.
Corporate managers can help effectuate a fall in stock prices, and
while they are in a short position they have a great incentive to do
so. Congress was presumably troubled by this possibility. It could not
decide what to do about the general issue of short-selling, which it
simply delegated to the SEC, 109 but it took a hard line against short
selling by those in control of publicly held companies.110 ,
stock prices would shoot herself in the foot (cut off her nose to spite her face would be
better), actually underscores how well-suited § 16 is to encouraging managers to maximize
stockholder welfare. Since managers who cannot sell short cannot produce trading opportunities
by hurting the long-term value of their companies, the problem of managers -purposely
destroying corporate profit opportunities to create trading opportunities is solved without
forbidding all insider sales.
107. R. CLARK, supra note 4,-§ 8.2.4, at 274 n.15, § 8.3.1, at 278; see also Carlton &
Fischel, supra note 45, at 873, 893-94 ("[S]hort selling may have benefits ... if it induces
managers to invest in a way that maximizes the value of the firm."); Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 18, at 17 ("The perverse incentives created by the ability to trade are most acute
when insiders engage in short selling."). Another way managers may be able to create profitable
trading opportunities is by manipulating corporate affairs to depress prides temporarily. See
infra Part II.C.
108. 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 647. See generally S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 62, at
50-54; J. MEEKER, supra note 98, at 45 ("Assertions that short selling is immoral proceed,
not from refined ethical sensibilities, but merely from misunderstanding."); Hoffman, Short
Selling, supra note 97, at 356-401.
109. Exchange Act § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a) (1988); see 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 648-
49.
110. The singular rigidity of § 16(c)'s prohibition is noteworthy even in the context of the
generally severe federal regulation of short selling. See Macey, Mitchell & Netter, Restrictions
on Short Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule and Its Role in View of the October 1987
Stock Market Crash, 74 CoaRNan L. REv. 799, 812 n.52 (1989). In the extensive congressional
hearings on short selling held during 1932, no one suggested that short selling by insiders
caused unique problems. See Short Selling of Securities: Hearing Before the House Committee
on the Judiciary on H.R. 4, H.R. 4604, H.R. 4638, H.R. 4639, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
Thus § 16(c) seems to be directed not at particularly demoralizing short selling but at particularly
reprehensible manipulative practices. See J. MEEKER, supra note 98, at 74-75; Hoffman, Short
Selling, supra note 97, at 401.
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Corporate managers have a great personal stake in the success of
the companies they manage, entirely apart from any profits they might
make in the stock market, since corporate failure is likely to lead to
career failure. Thus it may well be that few corporate insiders will
mismanage the corporations they run in order to make it possible to
trade profitably."' Nonetheless, an agent who intentionally fails her
principal for personal profit is "distinctly reprehensible. ' " 2 It is not
surprising that the public and their representatives in Congress were
moved to act against the danger of managers intentionally misman-
aging corporate affairs on the basis of even one well-publicized ex-
ample of a manager selling short while stock prices were falling.
While the Exchange Act was being debated, the set of provisions
that evolved into section 16 were identified with Albert Wiggin." 3 Wig-
gin was one of the most influential and respected financiers in Amer-
ican until 1933, when he testified before the Senate Banking and
Currency Committee as part of its investigation of stock exchange
practices. Wiggin had been chairman of the board of directors of the
Chase National Bank, the largest bank in the country, and he admitted
that he had traded extensively in the stock of the bank while affiliates
of the bank alternatively bought and sold huge quantities of the stock
to manipulate its price. He made immense personal profits by selling
while the price of bank stock plummeted with the stock market late
in 1929.114
The public disapproved of much that Wiggin had done,"5 but not
particularly his selling of bank stock on the basis of inside infor-
111. H. MANNE, supra note 18, at 150-51; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 45, at 872, 873-
75; Schotland, supra note 67, at 1453; see also supra note 45 (constraints on management
discretion).
112. Yourd, supra note 18, at 157.
113. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 31, at 13; House Hearings, supra note 85, at 134,
937; Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at 6555, 7741.
114. F. PECORA, supra note 99, at 148-52; see also S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 62, at
62-63, 173-83. Not surprisingly, these revelations ruined Wiggin's reputation. See 78 CoNo.
REc. 8037 (1934) (Rep. Fish) ("[A]lthough I come from New York, I am not taking this floor
to defend Albert Wiggin, as I believe he and those like him, in selling short and in mulcting
the public and deceiving the members of his own bank and his own stockholders, has done
more to create communism in America than all the reds combined. [Applause.]"); D. Levin,
supra note 21, at 322; ("The enormity of the malpractices perpetrated by Albert H. Wiggin
demands attention."); see also F. PECOia, supra note 99, at 160-61 ("For his own part, Mr.
Wiggin professed to see nothing wrong in his own short selling of Chase Bank stock....
[T]he new management of the Bank, and the country at large, thought otherwise."); Yourd,
supra note 18, at 134 n.2 ("Sometimes those thought to be most exemplary in conduct turn
out to be the ones who have taken greatest undue advantage of a trust.").
115. Wiggin also sold stock of another company with which he was affiliated on the basis
of inside information (the Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corporation), but despite occasional
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mation." 6 What Wiggin did that seemed so wrong was to manipulate
the price of the stock while selling it short."7 Ferdinand Pecora, who
led the investigation that uncovered Wiggin's activities," 8 later ex-
plained that Wiggin made $4,008,538 by trading Chase National Bank
stock
in the amazingly short period between September 19, 1929 and De-
cember 11, 1929, and in the very midst of the great Wall Street crash.
To make four million dollars at any time is considered a brilliant
achievement; to make that much money, in less than three months,
and during the greatest collapse in the history of the stock market,
would seem to call for a mysterious genius. But, like other mysteries,
the answer, once found, was quite simple. Mr. Wiggin made all that
money by selling Chase National Bank stock short. 119
Although "Congress viewed the prohibitions against short sales
as a core prohibition of" section 16,120 section 16(c) is ignored
in most analyses of section 16.12z This may be because section 16(c)
suggestions to the contrary, see, e.g., W. PAINTmt, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADiNo
1-2 (1968); Comment, Section 16(b): Re-Evaluation Is Needed, 25 U. MLA L. REv. 144, 145
(1970), this was not the reason that § 16 was named after him. The context in which Wiggin's
name was used in congressional hearings indicates that his trading bank stock was the problem.
See I L. Loss & J.SEuGIAN, supra note 31, at 204 n.81; Dooley, supra note 5, at 57 n.239;
Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CoRP. L.
1, 29 (1983). Moreover, the final report of the Senate investigative committee focused on that
trading, S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 62, at 62-63, 173-83, as did the counsel for the committee
when he subsequently wrote a book about the investigation. F. PEcORA, supra note 99, at
148-53.
116. Cf. Dooley, supra note 5, at 57-58.
117. While Wiggin traded, unbeknownst to the public the bank was manipulating the price
of the stock. Thus he was both taking advantage of inside information and manipulating
corporate affairs to cause price fluctuations that would allow him and his associates to trade
profitably. The Senate Banking and Currency Committee's report on the bill that became the
Exchange Act discusses the provision that became § 16 of the Act under the heading
"Manipulative Practices." S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1934), reprinted in 5
LEcIsLATvE HISTORY, supra note 31.
118. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
119. F. PEcoRA, supra note 99, at 153; see also S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 62, at 186-
92. Wiggin financed his trading with loans from the bank, and while he was short the bank
was buying its own stock to support the price. "To the extent that this was successfully
accomplished, it of course helped Mr. 'Wiggin by tending to hold up this market, while he
was selling short." F. PEGORA, supra note 99, at 155; see also Ritchie, The Pecora Wall Street
Exposb 1934, in 4 CONoRss INvEsTIGATEs, supra note 31, at 2555, 2571-73 (detailed description
of Wiggin's transgressions). Wiggin's testimony is extensively quoted in Ritchie. See id. at
2698-2707.
The whole time Wiggin was selling short he held substantial positions in bank stock, so that
his sales were actually sales against the box, and thus he had no incentive to depress the price
permanently. This defense was ignored, however, in the Senate Report on Wiggin's trading.
See S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 62, at 186-92.
120. Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 1096; see also Dooley, supra note 5, at 57 (noting
that there was more interest in prohibiting short sales by insiders than in providing for the
issuer's recovery of short-swing profits).
121. See, e.g., W. PARER, supra note 115.
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does not fit into a scheme directed at preventing insiders from trading
on inside information.'2 Section 16(c) keeps those who control pub-
licly held companies from profiting personally when they fail as man-
agers.
Section 16(c) takes a particularly hard line on short sales. Whereas
the reporting requirements of section 16(a), supplemented by section
16(c)'s prohibition of sales against the box, leave it to investors to
insist that managers hold an equity stake, and section 16(b) only takes
the profit out of managers' short-swing trading, section 16(c) makes
management short sales illegal. Someone who has undertaken to work
on another's behalf should not intentionally fall so that she may profit
personally. Moreover, any management short sale, even one effected
by a manager trying to protect herself from the personal cost of the
failure of a reasonable corporate endeavor, 23 looks a lot like a dis-
tasteful bet against the agent's own success. 124 Section 16(c) forbids
corporate managers to sell short, and by doing so it reduces any temp-
tation they might have to act against stockholder interests. 21
122. Smith, Section 16(b): Too Much or Too Little?, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 6, 1989, at 5, col.
1. One could argue that no insider will sell stock short unless she possesses inside information,
and thus that § 16(c) does deal with the abuse of inside information. But this argument proves
too much; by this same logic, no insider will buy (or sell) stock unless she has inside information,
and yet insider buying (and selling) is neither made illegal nor effectively constrained by § 16.
Insider short selling may be more analogous to insider buying on margin, since margin buying
and short selling are each forms of trading on credit and both couple the risk of price changes
with fixed repayment obligations. The Exchange Act does not forbid insiders to buy on margin
either. Cf. Seligman, supra note 12, at 23-24 (section 16(c) involves no real hardship, so
categorical prohibition on those with access to inside information can be justified).
123. See supra note 104.
124. See Schotland, supra note 67, at 1453; Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 1098
("The purpose of the section 16(c) prohibition is to prevent insiders from in effect betting
against the performance of their own company."); Yourd, supra note 18, at 157 ("In a sense,
a short sale by one in control is a bet against his successful management .... "); cf.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 17 ("Any corporate manager caught with a large net
short position would be fired. Section 16's prohibition against short selling enforces these
enduring patterns.") Dennis Carlton and Daniel Fischel restate the argument that short selling
may lead to perverse incentives in an intriguing way in their article on insider trading as
management compensation:
Many commentators have argued that insider trading is harmful because it creates
a moral hazard by allowing insiders to profit on bad news. At the extreme, they
claim that allowing insiders to profit on bad information makes managers indifferent
between working to make the firm prosperous and working to make it bankrupt.
Carlton & Fischel, supra note 45, at 873 (footnote omitted). What they call the extreme claim
seems to ignore the possibility that trading profits may actually lead insiders to engineer
business failures. Maybe they mean to cover that possibility or maybe they think that there is
no practical possibility that trading profits would lead managers to undermine corporate success
(which may well be true). Nonetheless, they consider the possibility in their discussion, and
perhaps their statement simply reflects common revulsion to the idea of an agent purposely
damaging her principal in order to further her own ends.
125. Easterbrook, supra note 66, at 319 n.50.
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C. Management Conduct that Causes Stock Prices to Fluctuate
When the Exchange Act was enacted, many people attributed the
Great Depression to the bull market of the 1920s and the stock market
collapse that ended it.126 In this atmosphere, stock market volatility
was considered harmful. 127 Congress went so far as to state its mis-
givings about volatility in the text of the Act. In section 2 of the Act,
a sort of preamble, Congress explained why it was necessary to reg-
ulate all aspects of the stock market, including specifically transactions
by officers, directors, and principal security holders. 128 All of the rea-
sons section 2 gives for taking control of the market come down to
excessive volatility: as Congress saw it, or at least as Congress said
it saw it, prices in the public securities market are susceptible to being
controlled and manipulated, which gives rise to excessive speculation,
which in turn results in unreasonable price fluctuations.129 All of this
might have damaged investors, but Congress did not refer to the in-
terests of investors in section 2.130 The problem with speculation, ma-
nipulation, and volatility, according to Congress, is that it leads to
widespread unemployment and its accompanying commercial and in-
dustrial dislocations.13 '
The whole Exchange Act was a response to the problem of vol-
atilify. 32 Part of the response was to reorganize the market in a way
that would make it possible for investors to focus on issuer earnings
instead of speculating on future stock prices. 133 Another part of'the
126. See J. SEumAN, supra note 21, at 76 ("Like Herbert Hoover, [Franklin] Roosevelt
accepted the conventional wisdom that 'unregulated speculation in securities ... [was] one of
the most important contributing factors in the artificial and unwarranted "boom" which had
so much to do with the terrible conditions in the years following 1929."') (quoting Letter
from President Roosevelt to Sam Rayburn (March 26, 1934), reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
1383, supra note 31, at 2); see also Thel, supranote 21, at 407-10 (discussing how the rise
and fall of the market shaped public and congressional perceptions).
127. See Thel, supra note 21, at 407-10; cf. H.R. 3657, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1990)
(proposing to add § 9(h)(1) to the Exchange Act, which would authorize the SEC to regulate
practices contributing to extraordinary volatility); H.R. REP. No. 477, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
33 (1990) (in recommending H.R. 3657, supra, "the Committee recognizes that price movement
in our capital markets is not damaging per se."). See generally R. SmT.PR, MARKET VOLATIrrY
(1989).
128. Exchange Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b(3) (1981).
129. Id. § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78b(3) (1981).
130. Section 2 does say that reform was necessary "to insure the maintenance of fair ahd
honest markets." Id. § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1981).
131. Id. § 2(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (1981); see also id. § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78b(3) (national
credit, tax and banking systems).
132. See Thel, supra note 62, at 374-82.
133. Practices used to manipulate prices were outlawed or subjected to regulation in §§ 9
and 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j (1988), and §§ 12 and 13, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m (1988), which
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response was to make it difficult for those who wanted to speculate
on price changes to participate in the market, at least on the scale that
they had in the past.'34 Still, the Exchange Act does not as a general
matter stop people from trading securities in anticipation of changing
market prices, and as the preceding discussion shows, section 16 does
not stop insiders from trading in anticipation of price changes either.
Section 16(b) does interfere, however, with the plans of directors, of-
ficers, and principal stockholders who would trade in anticipation of
imminent, short-lived price changes.
Those who trade in anticipation of long-lived price changes and
thus do not trade during the requisite six month period are not subject
to the provisions of section 16(b). By requiring forfeiture of profits
from six-month in-and-out trading, however, section 16(b) foils those
who would trade on rapid price fluctuations. A trade made in antic-
ipation of a temporary fluctuation in prices will be profitable only if
an offsetting trade is made in the limited period of time during which
the new price is available. This is the situation in which section 16(b)
substantially impedes directors, officers, and principal stockholders
who would effect the essential offsetting trades. 3 5 They cannot realize
their profits until they effect offsetting trades, and because they must
forfeit short-swing profits, they cannot hope to realize profits unless
they expect different prices to prevail six months or more in the
future. 3 6
Whatever else it may accomplish, then, section 16(b) is precisely
calculated to keep those in control of publicly held companies from
trading in anticipation of imminent temporary price changes. This is
exactly what those responsible for the enactment of section 16 wanted
required issuers of exchange-traded securities to release information about their earnings. See
generally J. BusRx, supra note 59, ch. 3 (arguing that the disclosure requirements of the
Securities Act and the anti-manipulation provisions of the Exchange Act restructured the stock
market in a way that reflected a belief that stock prices will be determined by corporate
earnings); Thel, supra note 62, at 396-415 (discussing issuer disclosure requirements and the
effects of disclosure on the price of the issuer's stock).
134. For example, to the extent that the regulation of margin trading and short selling
provided for in §§ 7 and 10(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g, 78j(a) (1988), makes
it difficult to buy or sell stock on credit, the Act discourages speculators who anticipate profits
from price changes from participating in the market.
135. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (deterrent effect of § 16(b)).
136. A director, officer, or principal stockholder can expect a trade to lead to profits from
future price changes (as opposed to profits from issuer distributions) only if she expects post-
trade price changes either to last for more than six months or not to occur for six months.
Dividends are sometimes included in profit realized for purposes of § 16(b). See Western Auto
Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965) (forfeiture of dividends),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959) (no forfeiture
of dividends); 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 561; Jacobs, supra note 12, at 544-48.
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it to accomplish. In the words of Duncan Fletcher, who sponsored the
Exchange Act in the Senate, section 16(b) effectively forbids "direc-
tors, officers, and principal stockholders .. . to speculate in the se-
curities of the corporation" with which they are affiliated. 137
The key to understanding section 16(b) is understanding why man-
agement speculation for the short-swing was treated more harshly than
other speculative activity. One problem with insiders trading for the
short-swing is that the possibility of realizing trading profits may be
an incentive to manipulate corporate affairs to create short-term price
fluctuations and their attendant trading opportunities. Section 16 de-
stroys this incentive by depriving managers of the ability to profit from
short-term price fluctuations.'38 It encourages those in control of pub-
licly held corporations to manage in a way that pushes security prices
up, and it discourages them from managing in a way that pushes prices
down. Most of all, though, it discourages management practices that
cause prices to go up and down. 139
The Exchange Act was written and enacted against the back-
ground of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee's hearings on
stock exchange practices, the so-called Pecora Hearings. 14  The ex-
tensive record of those hearings is replete with instances of managers
causing their companies to undertake unwise operations for no reason
other than to produce price changes that would allow them to trade
profitably. 141 For example, Albert Wiggin, whose identification with
137. Digest presented by Sen. Fletcher to accompany the introduction of S. 2693, 78 CONG.
REc. 2270, 2271 (1934); see also supra note 73 (Corcoran testimony in Senate); cf. Principal
Changes Embodied in New Draft for National Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 2 (undated
memorandum) (stating that the predecessor of § 16(b) made the profits of short-term speculation
recoverable by the issuer) (copy in 3 Docu mARY HSTORY CoLLECToN, supra note 78, item
13) (The provenance of this memorandum is discussed in Thel, supra note 21, at 446 n.275.).
138. A secondary benefit of stopping managers from speculating to focus the attention of
management on their jobs rather than on market speculation. See supra note 71 and accom-
panying text.
139. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 16.
140. Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31.
141. Letter from the Counsel, supra note 85, at 32 ("Among the various subjects touched
upon in the testimony produced before the committee are short selling; syndicates or pools
for the purpose of conducting operations in stocks; the manipulations of the affairs of
corporations by those in control .... "); see also Exchange Act Rel. No. 18,114, 4 FED. SEc.
L. REP. (CCH) 26,062, at 19,063-3 (Sept. 23, 1981) ("On occasion, insiders actually
manipulated the market price of their stock by causing a corporation to follow financial
policies calculated to produce sudden changes in market prices in order to obtain short swing
profits."); Exchange Act Rel. No. 26,333, supra note 6, 89,599 ("In some cases, insiders
manipulated the market price of their stock and caused the company to follow financial
policies calculated to produce sudden changes in market prices."); C. DicE, Tim STOCK
MAKE 439 (1926) ("A generation ago the standards of business permitted boards of directors
and officers of corporations to manipulate earnings, dividends, and the property of their
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section 16 has already been mentioned, furthered his personal trading
schemes by causing the bank he controlled to be managed in a way
that contributed to changes in the price of its stock.142 The Senate
Banking and Currency Committee report, which was the only com-
mittee report that discussed the forfeiture provision that became sec-
tion 16(b), 143 cited another case of trading coupled with mismanagement
as a "glaring instance" of the sort of misconduct that it said section
16(b) addressed.144
Any example of misconduct cited to justify section 16(b) was bound
to involve questionable management decisions; anything else would
have made patent the section's shortcomings as a provision for pre-
venting insiders from trading on the basis of nonpublic information.
Obviously, the provision could not have been explained with examples
of insiders who simply traded before they announced important cor-
porate news with long-term implications, since such insiders can avoid
forfeiture by the simple expedient of holding for six months. Nor could
the section have been justified with an example of trading in antic-
company in such a manner as to cause great fluctuations in the price of the stock of the
concern."); H. MANNE, supra note 18, at 6-7; id. at 8 ("Certainly this relationship [between
insider trading and the danger of manipulation of corporate affairs] was frequently alluded to
in the congressional hearings on the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.") (citing Stock
Exchange Practices, supra note 31); Brudney, supra note 18, at 8 n.27; Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L.
REv. 322, 335 n.50 (1979) ("Evidence of the connection of insider trading with such manip-
ulation of corporate affairs was frequently alluded to in congressional hearings."); Dooley,
supra note 5, at 56 ("The hearings ... focused on insiders' participation in pools designed
to manipulate their corporation's stock .... The few questions pertaining to inside information
were only incidental to inquiries regarding the manipulations in which the information had
been used, which were Congress's primary concern." (footnotes omitted)); Samuelson, supra
note 15, at 514-31; Steiner, Security Markets and Business, in Tan SEcuRITY MARKETS, supra
note 21, at 154, 199 ("Some corporations, in fact, seem to have been operated by their
managements as an aid to personal stock market profits, rather than to earn business profits
for the shareholders. Moreover, the corporation may be used to 'bail out' speculative direc-
tors."); cf. Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 11-12, Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec.
Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972) (No. 70-79) ("Congress had uncovered many instances where those
in control of large corporations ... had manipulated the affairs of their corporations to profit
from short-term speculative trading in their corporations' securities.").
142. While he traded for his own accounts, Wiggin caused affiliates of the bank to expend
a tremendous amount of money trading stock of the bank in order to manipulate its price.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
143. The version of the Exchange Act that the House passed and sent to conference, H.R.
9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 31, item
31, did not contain any provision analogous to § 16(b) of the Exchange Act. See H.R. REp.
No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36 (1934) (discussion of §16 in conference report), reprinted
in 5 LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 31, item 20.
144. S. REP. No. 792, supra note 117, at 9, reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 31, item 17; see also infra notes 163, 241 (discussing the General Asphalt pool, to which
the Senate committee report was probably referring).
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ipation of a short-term price change for which the trader was not re-
sponsible; if the problem is the unfairness of trading on the basis of
nonpublic information, there is no reason to draw lines on the basis
of the duration of the information's effect on the market (and if a
line had to be drawn, it seems that information with long-term im-
plications is more important).
A trader can predict a security price that will be short lived if she
is aware that the movement to a new equilibrium price will be irreg-
ular. 145 For example, a deviant price may reflect an inappropriate mar-
ket response to new information-overreaction to the truth or
acceptance of falsehood-that will be corrected over time. 146 Insider
trading in anticipation of short-lived price changes has greater prac-
tical implications than other trading on the basis of nonpublic in-
formation because insiders will have an incentive to create price
volatility if they can profit from it, and price volatility is itself ob-
jectionable. Those in control of publicly held corporations are uniquely
situated to produce price fluctuations by manipulating either corporate
income-producing operations or the public's perception of corporate
prospects.
Managers are much more likely to manipulate corporate affairs
to produce transient trading opportunities than they are to mismanage
corporations in order to depress share prices permanently. If managers
can depress prices temporarily, they can create opportunities to trade
profitably without destroying the value of what they buy. Thus, sub-
stantial stockholders who would never want to create permanent price
drops can profit from short-lived ones. Moreover, short-lived mani-
pulations are less likely to have the devastating personal consequences
for officers and directors that will attend sustained price drops. 147
The easiest way that managers can temporarily influence stock
prices is to manipulate the flow of corporate information to the
public. 148 Even if businesses cannot keep secrets forever, corporate
management often has broad discretion about when and how to dis-
close important information, and corporate disclosure practices can
145. Cf. Niederhoffer & Osborne, Market Making and Reversal on the Stock Exchange,
61 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 897 (1966) (examination of price fluctuation in the stock market);
Thel, supra note 62, at 415-38 (disruptive trading).
146. Manipulation by misrepresentation "is inherently a short run phenomenon," since
market prices will bounce back with the passage of time as statements or acts are shown to
have been misleading. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 45, at 892; Mendelson, supra note 58, at
474 ("[W]hen mispricing occurs, it is relatively quickly eliminated.").147. See supra notes ,105-111 and accompanying text (personal damage to affiliates from
declining stock prices).
148. Cf. Haft, supra note 63, at 1053-60 (lower-level employees may conceal information
from superiors in order to preserve their own trading opportunities).
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be manipulated to create or preserve trading opportunities. 49 Since the
goal is only to change the public's perception of corporate income,
managers need not tamper with corporate business activities that di-
rectly produce income. Their deception may injure non-trading stock-
holders, nonetheless, for its revelation will injure corporate credibility,
a valuable asset. 15 Other forms of manipulation, however, may dam-
age the interests of long-term stockholders even more than corporate
deception.
Managers may be able to profit personally if they undertake cor-
porate practices that will depress corporate earnings, buy stock at prices
reflecting those lower earnings, and then reverse those practices and
sell at a profit after prices rise again. This will work only if the market
believes that the unprofitable corporate practices will not be changed,
and the market will of course be trying to figure out management's
plans. Management might hide its plans or even try to mislead the
market about them, in which case the scheme might be said to be de-
ceptive, but a business manipulation might succeed even if fully dis-
closed. If the market recognizes that the interests of management and
public stockholders diverge, stock prices may fail even though the pub-
lic is fully aware that the managers will change business practices after
trading.1 5'
Even if it is possible for managers to create short-swing trading
opportunities by manipulating corporate business operations, they may
in fact be unlikely to do so very often. Aside from the effects of mar-
ket discipline and judicially administered rules against fraud and self-
dealing, even managers who would delay corporate announcements in
order to trade might find it difficult to rationalize abandoning valuable
corporate opportunities for selfish ends. A proscription of trading may
be too broad a tool for controlling a rare problem. 5 2 In trying to make
sense of the Exchange Act, however, it is wise to remember that it
was the product of very unusual circumstances. What might now pass
as unexceptional confidence in the efficacy of ordinary incentives to
prevent management manipulation would have seemed horribly mis-
149. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969). See generally H. MANNE, supra note 18, at 6-7, 151-52 (delay in
disclosures).
150. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912-13, 301 N.Y.S.2d
78, 81-82 (1969).
151. Berwald v. Mission Development Co., 185 A.2d 480 (Del. 1962), may be an example
of managers manipulating corporate affairs to allow them to trade profitably. See, e.g., J.
HOCKENBERRY & T. HARDY, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO AccoMPANY BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN'S
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 65-67 (1972).
152. H. MANNE, supra note 18, at 8.
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placed in the extraordinarily terrible times in which section 16 was
enacted.
Ordinary market and legal restraints on management behavior
may be ineffective in controlling the behavior of managers during a
corporate crisis. Managers may not know the best way to maximize
stockholder value in difficult and unusual situations, yet such situa-
tions are peculiarly likely to result in management abuse or error, of-
fering as they do both wonderful trading opportunities and the threat
of ruined careers. When the Exchange Act was passed, the public had
reason to doubt the judgment of business executives, especially those
who were active in the stock market. In the circumstances, there was
little reason to be confident that managers faced with a choice between
personal interest and fiduciary obligations would recognize the conflict
or act responsibly if they did.
Insider trading restrictions that would ordinarily be rejected as
excessive appear to be appropriate when they are applied to corpo-
rations in crisis. Especially severe restrictions on insider trading during
corporate reorganizations have been justified by the potential conflict
between management and stockholder interests.153 The Supreme Court
has on several occasions upheld trading rules that were said to be jus-
tified by the risk of management's manipulating the reorganization
process to create trading opportunities. In Wolf v. Weinstein,154 the
Court emphasized the danger of officers misusing their power over
corporate affairs to enhance their trading profits as it expansively con-
strued rules on trading during the pendency of reorganization pro-
ceedings under the old Bankruptcy Act. The Court recognized the link
between the unfair use of inside information and the manipulation of
corporate affairs, and went so far as to suggest that section 16 of the
Exchange Act was directed at preventing both. 55
153. See Bandier, Securities Trading and Fee Sharing Under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy
Act, 15 REc. N.Y.C.B.A. 230 (1960); Brudney, supra note 18; Douglas, Improvement in
Federal Procedure for Corporate Reorganizations, 24 A.B.A. J. 875, 877-78 (1938); Ferber,
Blasberg & Katz, Conflicts of Interest in Reorganization Proceedings Under the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935 and Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 28 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 319, 330, 376-377 (1959); Gerdes, Corporate Reorganizations: Changes Effected by
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 HLv. L. Ra,. 1, 38-39 (1938); Kaplan, supra note 12,
at 276-77; Note, Conflict of Interests as a Factor in the Allowance of Representatives' Claims
in Insolvent Corporate Reorganizations, 106 U. PA. L. Ray. 1139, 1148-61 (1958); see also 2
L. Loss, supra note 2, at 1124-30.
154. 372 U.S. 633 (1963).
155. Access to inside information or strategic position in a corporate reorganization
renders the temptation to profit by trading in the Debtor's stock particularly
pernicious. The particular dangers may take two forms: On the one hand, an insider
is in a position to conceal from other stockholders vital information concerning the
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The Court also dealt with the issue of management manipulation
in one of the best known cases arising under the federal securities laws.
The Court's two opinions in SEC v. Chenery are remembered mainly
for their holdings on the role of adjudication in administrative de-
cision-making and the scope of judicial review of administrative or-
ders. 156 Nonetheless, underlying the dispute in Chenery was the SEC's
concern about corporate managers manipulating corporate affairs dur-
ing reorganizations to produce profitable trading opportunities. 5 7
Chenery involved the reorganization of a holding company under
the Public Utility Holding Company Act,'58 which required that re-
organization plans be fair and equitable and not detrimental to the
public interest or the interest of investors. The SEC objected to a series
of reorganization plans that would have allowed managers to receive
common stock of the reorganized company on the basis of preferred
stock they had purchased in the market while various reorganization
plans were under consideration. 59 The SEC reasoned that by virtue
of its control of the holding company's business, management could
affect the market price of outstanding securities and had "a formi-
dable battery of devices that would enable it, if it should choose to
use them selfishly, . . . to influence the market for its own gain."6
The SEC concluded that it would have been inconsistent with the stat-
utory standards to allow managers to receive common stock in the
reorganized company on the basis of securities they bought at prices
Debtor's financial condition or prospects, which may affect the value of its securities,
until after he has reaped a private profit from the use of that information. On the
other hand, one who exercises control over a reorganization holds a post which
might tempt him to affect or influence corporate policies-even the shaping of the
very plan of reorganization-for the benefit of his own security holdings but to the
detriment of the Debtor's interests and those of its creditors and other interested
groups.
Congress enacted two distinct types of sanctions to prevent these possible practices.
One appears in § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act .... The other sanction,
directed at preventing insider trading during insolvency or reorganization, appears
in § 249 [of the Bankruptcy Act (repealed 1978)]; it denies to a "fiduciary" or
"representative" any compensation or reimbursement if at any time during the
proceeding he trades in the Debtor's stock.
Id. at 642-43 (footnote omitted).
156. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80
(1943).
157. See also 318 U.S. at 91-92 (short-swing trading proscription of Public Utilities Holding
Company Act is not the limit of SEC power over conduct of holding company management);
cf. Rubin & Feldman, supra note 12, at 499 n.102 (SEC saw Chenery as equivalent to § 16).
158. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 §§ 7, 11 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 79g, 79k (1988)).
159. 332 U.S. at 197-99; see also 318 U.S. at 81-85.
160. 332 U.S. at 205 (quoting SEC order, Holding Company Act Release No. 5584).
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possibly influenced by the way they managed the business or shaped
the reorganization process.' 61 As is well known, the Court sustained
the SEC once it explained itself.
The "notorious market pools"' 162 that figured so prominently in
the debate over the Exchange Act were charged with manipulating
both corporate announcements and underlying corporate business ac-
tivities. 63 The pools were trading syndicates that used whatever tools
161. 332 U.S. at 204-05. The SEC "was led to this result 'not by proof that [the holding
company's management] committed acts of conscious wrongdoing but by the character of the
conflicting interests created by [their] program of stock purchases carried out while plans for
reorganization were under consideration."' Id. at 204; see also id. at 197 ("It was also plain
that there was no fraud or lack of disclosure in making these purchases."); 318 U.S. at 85
("The Commission did not find fraud or lack of disclosure .... ").
162. 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 844. But see H. MANa, supra note 18, at 66 (pools as
device for sharing information).
163. The Senate Banking and Currency Committee, which was responsible for keeping the
§ 16(b) forfeiture provision in the Exchange Act, seems to have been particularly concerned
with manipulation of financial policy and business operations, as opposed to manipulation of
reports of those activities. As noted above, this committee's report was the oaly one that
discussed the provision that became § 16(b). See S. REP. No. 792, supra note 117. It gave
two examples of the sort of misconduct that § 16(b) would prevent, both involving the
manipulation of dividend policy. Id. at 9.
A change in dividend policy might lead to a change in stock prices in two ways. Dividend
policy may somehow determine the amount stockholders will receive from the issuer over time,
or it may reveal information about the issuer's operations. Even if stockholders are indifferent
between receiving corporate income as dividends or capital gains, changes in dividend payout
may affect security prices if they give the market some signal (correct or not) about corporate
income. Managers may be able to manipulate this signal to create trading opportunities. R.
CLARK, supra note 4, at 267. Managers can also manipulate dividend policy to favor one class
of securityholders over another in the distribution of corporate wealth, but like the manipulation
of dividend signals, inter-class manipulation need not affect actual corporate operations. See,
e.g., Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
Stockholders may be indifferent to corporate dividend policy. See R. BREA EY & S. MYans,
supra note 15, at 357-81; R. CIARK, supra note 4, § 14.1, at 594-602; W. KLrnN & J. CoFsua,
supra note 15, at 348-50. Nonetheless, many people stil assume that dividend rates actually
affect corporate earning power, or at least stock prices, and this seems to have been the
prevailing wisdom in 1934. The Senate committee seems to have been particularly concerned
with this aspect of dividend policy. Consider one of its cases:
In a particularly glaring instance, the chairman of the executive committee and
another director participated in a pool organized in [sic] trade in the stock of their
company when the stock was paying no dividends. During the operation of the pool,
which continued for a period of 2 years, they caused the company to resume the
payment of dividends, more than 25 percent of which were received by the pool
participants. These dividends were paid during the pool's operation in spite of the
fact that the company's earnings were not sufficient to meet them and part of its
surplus had to be diverted for that purpose.
S. REp. No. 792; supra note 117, at 9.
* According to the Senate committee, the directors and their cronies simply bought stock,
took dividends, and sold the stock. The scheme did not turn on misleading the public and the
directors did not take advantage of inside information. The pool simply coupled corporate
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were available to move market prices to their own advantage. 16 Cor-
porate officers and directors frequently participated in pools in the
stock of their companies, 65 sometimes conducting corporate affairs
to manipulate corporate stock prices.'6 For example, the issuers of
stocks that were the subject of pool manipulations were often them-
selves the source of the stock options that the pools used to limit their
risks. 167 Issuers managed by pool participants often released misleading
information about corporate operations. 168 Finally, managers could
direct the corporation's assets into the stock market to manipulate
prices by trading. 69 Together with sections 9 and 10 of the Exchange
Act, section 16 was directed at eliminating manipulative pools.170
control with stock trading to gain control of corporate assets. It may well be that managers
cannot realize a disproportionate share of corporate income by coordinating their trading and
dividend decisions; corporate dividend payments are presumably followed instantaneously by
offsetting declines in stock prices. It seems, however, that this is precisely the possibility that
worried the Senate committee. The pool's profit in the example did not come from fooling
the market; it came from bleeding the company. (Interestingly, this scheme would not seem
even to implicate § 16(b), inasmuch as, so far as appears in the report, the insiders held their
stock for two years. Cf. supra note 136 (forfeiture of dividends). The example is based,
however, on an actual pool that traded frequently, and in which the participants lost money.
S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 62, at 66-68.)
164. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 62, at 30-46; 78 CONG. REc. 8165-74 (1934); Jones &
Lowe, Manipulation, in TIm SEcuRrn MARKETS, supra note 21, at 462-99 (techniques and
examples).
165. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 62, at 55-68 (discussing participation of directors,
officers, and principal stockholders in pools and describing § 16 as a remedy); THE SEcutrry
MARKETS, supra note 21, at 690; Dooley, supra note 5, at 56 ("The hearings that preceded
the 1934 Act ... focused on insiders' participation in pools designed to manipulate their
corporation's stock.").
166. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 62, at 67 ("It is difficult to believe that the
conduct of [a director and the chairman of the executive committee of General Asphalt Co.]
was not influenced by their interest in the pool, when as directors they approved the payment
of an initial dividend ... and the payment of subsequent dividends while the company was
showing a deficit."); see also supra note 141 (manipulation of corporate affairs).
167. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 62, at 37; Jones & Lowe, supra note 164, at 447, 463-
64 (option pools), 452-56 (source of options); see also S. REP. No. 792, supra note 117, at 9
(Options "are indispensable concomitants of every pool operation designed to distribute stock
at an increased price."); H.R. RP. No. 1383, supra note 31, at 10 ("The granting of options
to pools and syndicates has been found to be at the bottom of most manipulative operations
.... ").
168. Comment, Market Manipulation and the Securities Exchange Act, 46 YALE L.J. 624,
626-27 (1937) ("The directors of the corporation whose stock is being manipulated, who may
be members of the pool, issue favorable, but not wholly true, statements concerning the
corporation's prospects .... ").
169. Steiner, supra note 141, at 199; see also supra notes 117-123 and accompanying text
(Wiggin's bank trading).
170. S. REP. No. 792, supra note 117, at 9 ("Such a provision will render difficult or
impossible the kind of transactions which were frequently described to the committee, where
directors and large stockholders participated in pools trading in the stock of their own
companies. ); S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 62, at 68; H. MANNE, supra note 18, at 66;
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The principal effect of section 16(b), then, is to discourage af-
filiates of publicly held corporations from speculating on short-term
swings in stock prices. While the forfeiture provision does not remove
the incentive to trade on inside information, it does remove much of
the incentive for corporate managers to manipulate corporate affairs
to create short-lived price changes,' 7' without seriously undermining
the incentive to keep prices rising.
D. Management Regulation and the Anomalies of Section 16
Perhaps what is most satisfying about the interpretation of section
16 offered here is that it explains the anomalies presented by the con-
ventional equal-access-to-information interpretation. The anomalies
most frequently discussed in the literature arise from the short-swing
trading limitation of section 16(b), which is calibrated to make section
16 an effective device for regulating the way businesses are run. As
the reader may have recognized, the management-control interpre-
tation also goes a long way toward explaining other anomalies as weli.
In fact, most of the features of section 16 that undercut its effect-
iveness in assuring all traders equal access to inside information are
precisely keyed to its function as a device to prevent manipulation and
Dooley, supra note 5, at 59; Mathias, Manipulative Practices and the Securities Exchange Act
(pt. 2), 3 U. Prrr. L. REv. 104, 110 (1936).
171. Since § 16(b) forfeiture is triggered only by matched trades, managers may be able
to profit from short-lived changes in stock prices by selling long-held positions on a price
spike. The point is not that § 16(b) makes it impossible for managers to profit from volatility,
but rather that it undercuts any incentive they may have to create such volatility. It does this
by making the price of trading a six-month change of position, and this price is likely to be
high enough to discourage managers from manipulating temporary price changes. For example,
a manager without a position in the stock of her company might buy with a view to creating
a temporary selling opportunity in six months, but this would require her to tie up her funds
and assume an investment risk for six months, during which she would have interests similar
to those of public stockholders. More importantly, if a director, officer, or principal stockholder
sells on a price spike, she will have to forfeit her profit if she buys the stock back at a lower
price within six months. Since the price will fall back to previous levels as soon as the
temporary effect of the manipulative corporate action wears off, managers will not be able to
take advantage of temporary price rises unless they are able to do so without repurchasing
the stock they sell.
Principal stockholders are particularly likely to be interested in promptly repurchasing what
they sell, since they risk losing control of the companies with which they are affiliated if their
sales are large. See S. R.EP. No. 792, supra note 117, at 9 (brothers who controlled company
with a little over 10% of the stock disposed of stock before passing dividend and later
repurchased stock for $9,000,000 less). Yet principal stockholders will not be able to buy their
stock back for six months without surrendering their profits. This will be a problem only if
prices spring back after the sale, but a principal stockholder has no incentive to.depress prices
permanently. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
January 1991] THE GENIUS OF SECTION 16
to align the interests of management and stockholders in publicly held
corporations.
(1) The Limitation to Publicly Held Companies
When section 16 was enacted in 1934, its provisions were limited
to affiliates of issuers that registered equity securities on national stock
exchanges. Although the compass of the section was expanded to vir-
tually all publicly held companies in 1964, it still does not reach trading
in the stock of closely held companies. This would be an important
defect in a statute designed to ensure that insiders do not take ad-
vantage of their access to inside information. Yet, it is an entirely
appropriate limitation in a statute designed to channel the energies of
non-owner managers into the pursuit of appropriate corporate busi-
ness activities.
It is hard to see why Congress would have limited section 16 to
exchange-registered companies if its primary concern was assuring that
all traders had equal access to corporate information. To be sure, there
are fewer investors to worry about when the insiders of closely held
companies take advantage of their access to inside information, but
if it is unfair for insiders to trade stock on the basis of corporate in-
formation, it is unfair even if the issuer is closely held. If anything,
insider trading in the stock of closely held companies seems even more
unfair, 72 and it is also more likely to involve deceit and the sort of
injury to outside investors that would justify a legal proscription. 7 1
In sum, a limitation to the stock of publicly held companies is in-
consistent with the policies that would underlie an equal-access regime.
The limitation of section 16 to publicly held companies cannot
be explained by the Exchange Act's preoccupation with public markets
either. Once section 16 is triggered by the registration of a class of
a corporation's equity securities on an exchange, it governs trading
172. Cf. Yourd, supra note 18, at 146. Those who defend insider trading as an appropriate
incentive device usually confine their arguments to publicly held companies, and some recognize
that closely held companies present much more difficult issues. See Carlton & Fischel, supra
note 45, at 861 n.19; cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 14-15.
173. When the Exchange Act was being debated, the majority common law rule was that
insiders could trade on the basis of inside information, but the few cases that held insider
trading actionable involved negotiated transactions in closely held companies. See supra note
79. Since 1934, some courts have held that publicly held companies can recover from insiders
who trade on inside information. See, e.g., Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70
A.2d 5 (1949); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 29 A.D.2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1st Dept. 1968).
Even those who argued that the common law was moving toward forbidding insiders to trade
on the basis of corporate information acknowledged that the progressive movement was limited
to securities that were not publicly traded. See, e.g., Yourd, supra note 18, at 146.
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in all of the corporation's equity securities, including equity securities
that are not traded in any public market. The limitation may reflect
a narrow conception of federal constitutional power to regulate stock
trading that prevailed in 1934, but even this seems unlikely. If section
16 was addressed to unfairness or fraud, it could have tied regulation
to the insiders' use of the mails or instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce. 174 Congress used that tie in broad provisions of the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act that address fraud, extending coverage to
all securities and basing jurisdiction on the trader's activities rather
than the issuing corporation's activities. 175
Congress may have made an issuer's act of registering securities
trigger section 16 for administrative convenience or because of a nar-
row conception of the constitutional basis for federal intervention, but
it left out some trading that could have been reached conveniently and
constitutionally. 76 Section 16 does not reach any trading in equity se-
174. The drafters apparently rejected a suggestion that insiders of all issuers should be
forbidden to use the mails or means of interstate commerce for short-swing trading. I.N.P.
Stokes' master draft of comments on Fletcher-Rayburn bill, supra note 78, at § 15(b) (hand-
written comment). At the time this suggestion was made, the predecessor of § 16 under
consideration would have prohibited intentional short-swing trading by certain affiliates of
companies with exchange-registered securities. See infra note 284 and accompanying text. Had
the drafters wanted to require forfeiture of short-swing trading profits, they would have had
to restructure § 16. Enforcement of the forfeiture provision depends on trading reports, and
it would have been impracticable to have had insiders of all corporations report their trades
to the SEC. Insiders of privately held companies might have been required to report their
trades to the company or directly to stockholders.
175. See Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. 77q(a) (1988); id. § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. §78j(b)
(1988). The fact that § 16 governs only publicly traded companies does not necessarily mean
that Congress was concerned with a problem unique to such companies of course. The
limitation may have been merely an oversight. When the Fletcher-Rayburn bill was introduced,
the provision that becam § 10(b) of the Exchange Act was also limited to exchange-registered
securities. Fletcher-Rayburn bill, supra note 73, § 9. The first introduced revision extended the
reach of what became § 10(b) to "any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered." H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(c) (1934), reprinted in 10
LEISsTrEW HISTORY, supra note 31, item 28; see Thel, supra note 21, at 443-44. The House
drafters may have forgotten § 16 when they effectively extended the reach of what became §
10(b) to all securities. This seems unlikely, though, for at the same time they were expanding
what became § 10(b), they were contracting what became. § 16. The predecessor of § 16 in
the original bill was triggered by an issuer's registration of any security, Fletcher-Rayburn bill,
supra note 73, § 15, and the first revision narrowed the scope to the registration of equity
securities, which was the form in which § 16(a) was ultimately adopted. H.R. 8720, supra, §
15.
176. The drafters were concerned with convenient administration of the forfeiture provision,
but this concern does not explain their keying § 16 to registered securities. See infra notes
179-180 and accompanying text. A distinct emphasis on publicly held corporations was apparent
in the first introduced version of what became § 16, which absolutely prohibited intentional
short-swing trading. Fletcher-Rayburn bill, supra note 73, § 15(b)(1). That prohibition was
apparently written without concern for enforcement, and it was still limited to trading in
publicly held securities.
January 1991]
curities of issuers that have registered only debt securities, and it leaves
principal holders of unregistered securities (debt or equity) free to trade
registered (that is, publicly held) equity securities. 7 The drafters would
hardly have left these holes if they had wanted to ensure everyone
trading in the public market equal access to corporate information.
They could easily have filled the holes by triggering the section with
the registration of any class of security, equity or debt, which is just
what the provision did when it was first introduced.' 78
On the other hand, there was no need to reach companies outside
of section 16 in order to align the interests of management and stock-
holders. Section 16 applies to all issuers with registered equity secu-
rities, so if section 16 does not apply, it is because all a company's
equity securities are closely held. In that situation the ownership and
control of the corporation probably are not split, and conventional
incentives are likely to ensure that the corporation's affairs are not
mismanaged. If the managers of a closely held corporation do not own
it themselves, ownership will at least be concentrated in a few stock-
holders with the ability and incentive to insist that managers vigorously
pursue corporate profit.179
One of the reasons section 16 is so long and hard to read is that
it sometimes refers to registered equity securities and sometimes to any
equity securities, registered or not. The distinction introduces a numb-
ing complexity to section 16, but in the end it determines what section
16 accomplishes.' 80 As has just been explained, since the trigger of
section 16 is the registration of equity securities, section 16 does not
reach all corporations or even all corporations having publicly held
securities. If a corporation has publicly held equity securities, however,
section 16 reaches affiliate trading in all its equity securities, publicly
held or not. Section 16(b) requires affiliates of companies with reg-
istered equity securities to forfeit their profits from trading any equity
security, registered or not, and section 16(c) forbids them to sell any
equity security short or against the box, once again, whether it is reg-
istered or not.
It is not likely that section 16 covers trading in all equity securities
of publicly held corporations in order to achieve equality of infor-
177. See 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 605-06.
178. Fletcher-Rayburn bill, supra note 73, § 15. The redrafting of the predecessor to § 16
alluded to above, supra note 173, strongly suggests both that the drafters saw the holes and
knew how to fill them.
179. See House Hearings, supra note 85, at 135.
180. The distinction was not inadvertent. Broadly speaking, over the course of the amend-
ment of § 16 references to registered securities became references to any securities, and vice
versa. See infra Part III.B.
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mation. If Congress was unwilling to extend protection to the stock-
holders of .closely held corporations, there is no reason to think that
it would have wanted to ensure equal access to corporate information
to the few holders of a closely held class of equity securities just be-
cause the issuer has a class of publicly held equity. It is even harder
to explain the extension of section 16(c) in terms of traders' access
to information. On the other hand, the extension is natural for a pro-
vision addressed to problems created by the separation of ownership
from control. If affiliates of publicly held companies were free to trade
nonpublicly held securities as they wished, they would be able to ma-
nipulate corporate affairs to shift wealth among holders of registered
and unregistered equity and then trade accordingly. The best expla-
nation for the decision to extend the reach of section 16 to trading
in all equity securities of publicly held companies is the same as the
explanation for the decision to limit section 16 to publicly held com-
panies in the first place: the drafters were intent on controlling the
way corporations are managed.
(2) The Limitation to Control Persons
Section 16(b) is usually called an insider trading provision, but
relatively few corporate insiders are within its scope. It covers only
directors, officers, and principal stockholders, leaving lower level em-
ployees, substantial holders of debt securities, and tippees free to trade'
on the basis of inside information. Thus the vast mAjority of people
who have access to nonpublic information about publicly held cor-
porations are not subject to section 16 at all. Sectioii 16 governs the
conduct of oly those people who ought to be covered by a man-
agement-control provision-the people who control corporations.
Subordinate employees should not be exempt from an equality-of-
information regime, 'and the courts and the SEC do not seem disposed
to exempt them.' One might argue that section 16 excludes non-man-
agerial employees because only directors, officers, and principal stock-
holders regularly learn corporate secrets. Yet people without control
of corporate activities have ample opportunity to trade on the basis
of nonpublic information. To the extent that section 16 burdens in-
siders even when they trade without an intent to profit on inside in-
formation, it might be considered inappropriate to include presumably
181. Cf. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (Wall Street Journal employee);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (financial document printer employee). Indeed,
the argument can be made that trading by subordinate employees is especially damaging to
firms. See Haft, supra note 63, at 1053-56.
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low-paid non-management employees. The burden of section 16, how-
ever, would not justify an exemption for lower-level employees either.
If they are deserving of special consideration at all, it is because they
will seldom trade very extensively, and if this is so then section 16 will
not have much effect on them. The activities that section 16 burdens
are not attractive ones in any case. In 1934, public and congressional
sentiment was strongly against all short-swing, in-and-out trading, and
there is no evidence that Congress wanted to protect employee-spe-
culators and no reason to think that it would have been impressed with
their desire to speculate. 82
In any case, even if the drafters had wanted to protect the le-
gitimate trading activities of lower-level employees, they would not
have seen any reason to limit section 16 to managers, for they did not
think section 16(b) imposed a burden on anyone. As they saw it, the
section does not provide for the punishment of short-swing trading;
it simply takes away the profits. Courts typically compute profits in
a way that can punish active traders,'83 but the drafters thought that
the section simply removed the profits from short-swing trading. As
Thomas Corcoran told the Senate Banking Committee when he was
asked whether the provision might work a hardship on those who
needed their money: "Let him get out what he put in, but give the
corporation the profit."'
Another reason that section 16 is too narrow to achieve infor-
mational equality is that it does not cover trading by outsiders who
acquire inside information. An equality-of-information regime has to
deal with the possibility that insiders who cannot trade will give inside
information to outsiders, perhaps in exchange for inside information
about other companies, yet section 16 leaves tippees free to trade.,',
182. On the contrary, the liberal inclination was to prevent those without substantial wealth
from speculating at all. See Message from President Roosevelt to Congress (Feb. 9, 1934),
reprinted in H.R. RaP. No. 1383, supra note 31, at 1-2 ("[N]aked speculation has been made
far too alluring and far too easy for those who could and for those who could not afford to
gamble."); Letter from President Roosevelt to Sam Rayburn (March 26, 1934), reprinted in
H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 31, at 2; C. DICE, supra note 141, at 8; J. KEYNEs, supra
note 60, at 159 ("It is usually agreed that casinos should, in the public interest, be inaccessible
and expensive. And perhaps the same is true of Stock Exchanges."); Tracy & MacChesney,
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1025, 1030 (1934); see also House
Hearings, supra note 85, at 35 ("widespread speculation or gambling on the part of the masses
of the people").
183. See supra note 36.
184. Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at 6557, quoted in Cook & Feldman, supra
note 12, at 407-08; see also House Hearings, supra note 85, at 133; Stock Exchange Practices,
supra note 31, at 7742.
185. The drafters of § 16 recognized the tippee problem. The Fletcher-Rayburn bill would
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The management control version of section 16 also explains sec-
tion 16's failure to deal with trading by tippees. While tipping presents
a serious problem for those who would guarantee traders equal in-
formation, it is not particularly important for those concerned only
with aligning management and stockholder interests and preventing
manipulation. If managers are allowed to trade on good inside in-
formation, there is no reason to worry about their tipping such in-
formation. Tipping bad information is not likely to be a problem either
if the reason for regulating trades made in contemplation of depressed
prices is to discourage managers from depressing corporate earnings.
Tipping information may be relatively costless for the tippee, but de-
pressing corporate earnings is personally costly for officers and di-
rectors, whose careers will suffer, and for principal stockholders, whose
holdings will suffer.' 86 Insiders who might be willing to tip information
for friendship or in hopes of future reciprocity will presumably be
much less willing to suffer personal loss to create opportunities for
others' profits.'8 7
(3) Disgorgement and Corporate Recovery
Another intriguing aspect of section 16(b) is its enforcement
mechanism.'88 In striking contrast with other substantive provisions
of the Exchange Act, section 16(b) does not require or forbid any-
thing.'9 It simply declares that the profits of certain types of matched
have made it illegal for the enumerated insiders "[t]odisclose ... any confidential information
regarding or affecting any such registered security not necessary or proper to be disclosed as
a part of his corporate duties." Fletcher-Rayburn bill, supra note 73, § 15(b)(3). The bill also
provided for forfeiture of the tippee's profits with respect to transactions in the securities of
the issuer within six months after an unlawful disclosure. Id. It is conventional to explain the
deletion of this provision on the ground that "the burden of proof made enforcement
unfeasible." Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943); 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 611. See infra notes 287-291 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
187. H. MmN, supra note 18, at 30. Managers who share in the profits of their outside
tippees are likely to be held answerable under § 16(b) if they are discovered. See Exchange
Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) ("profit realized"); see also CBI Indus., Inc. v. Horton, 682
F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1982) (director who was trustee of trading trust); Stock Exchange Practices,
supra note 31, at 6556; H. MANNE, supra note 18, at 25; Feldman & Teberg, Beneficial
Ownership Under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 W. Ras. L. REv.
1054 (1966); Jacobs, supra note 12, at 540-44; Seligman, supra note 12, at 10 (distinction
between "beneficial owner" in § 16(a) and "any profit realized" in § 16(b)); cf. 2 L. Loss,
supra note 2, at 572 n.86 (discussing Exchange Act § 20(a)).
188. See also infra note 257 and accompanying text (drafters' interest in sanctions and
enforcement).
189. See Exchange Act §§ 5 (unlawful to effect transactions on unregistered exchanges), 7
(unlawful extension or maintenance of credit), 8 (unlawful borrowing and lending by brokers,
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trades shall inure to issuers and provides a mechanism to ensure that
issuers realize those profits. Not only is there'no such thing as a vi-
olation of section 16(b), the SEC cannot take action to compel the
forfeiture for which it does provide.
Section 16(b) is well designed to discourage the manipulation of
corporate conduct and to compensate the victims of such manipulation
insofar as compensation is practicable when deterrence fails.19° Putting
aside for the moment the question of compensation, consider how well
section 16(b) works as a deterrent. Insiders within its scope are sure
to be forced to disgorge their profits under section 16(b) once their
short-swing trading is discovered, and the reporting requirements of
section 16(a) usually lead to discovery.' 9' Accordingly, section 16(b)
generally keeps insiders from engaging in profitable short-swing trad-
ing. 92 When control persons do effect short-swing trades, the amount
they are required to disgorge under section 16(b) may be less than the
damage they do by trading. 93 So far as modifying behavior goes, how-
ever, it is enough to require insiders to disgorge their profits. If in-
siders are consistently forced to disgorge the profits of short-swing
trading, then section 16 will effectively discourage such trading, and
it does not matter why short-term trading is objectionable. 94 Of course,
dealers, and exchange members), 9 (unlawful manipulation), 10 (unlawful manipulation in
contravention of certain rules), 11 (unlawful to violate rules on functions of brokers, dealers,
and exchange members), 12 (unlawful for exchange members or brokers to trade unregistered
securities), 13 (issuers shall report), 14 (unlawful to solicit proxies in contravention of rules),
15 (unlawful to make over-the-counter market transactions in contravention of rules), 16(a)
(control persons shall report), 16(c) (short-sales by insiders unlawful), 17 (exchanges, members,
brokers, and dealers shall keep records and make reports); see also id. § 32 (criminal penalties).
190. See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 1-8 (1973).
191. See also Regulation S-K, item 404(c), instruction 4, 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(c) (1988);
Schedule 14A, item 7(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1988) (proxy statements must disclose
certain management obligations arising under § 16(b)); Jacobs, supra note 12, at 216-18 (other
sources of information about trading); Smith, supra note 122, at 5, col. 1 (discussing civil
enforcement of § 16(b) by shareholders). The two-year limitations period provided in § 16(b)
is tolled while § 16(a) reports are delinquent. Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981); Jacobs, supra note 12, at 627-29; Kramer, An
Examination of Section 16(b), 21 Bus. LAW. 183, 185-91 (1965). The reporting requirements
of § 16(a) might be more effective if insiders who failed to report faced a more onerous
sanction. See Exchange Act Release No. 26,333, supra note 6, 89,600-01 (reporting delin-
quencies and SEC proposals for reforms); Jacobs, supra note 12, at 218-24; Samuelson, supra
note 15, at 520-22; Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 1102-03.
192. 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 550; Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 1133-34; see
also H. MANNE, supra note 18, at 28 (§ 16 has influenced moral attitudes of the business
community).
193. The measure of the damage insiders do by short-swing trading is a function of what
it is about such trading that is objectionable.
194. This is not to say the definition of profits usually employed in § 16(b) cases-matching
the highest sale price with the lowest purchase price, see supra note 36 and accompanying
text-accomplishes disgorgement. Cf. Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 1135.
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insiders who sell on bad news and do not repurchase, or who buy on
good news and do not subsequently sell, are not required to disgorge
anything; thus, section 16(b) will have relatively little effect on those
insiders who trade on inside information without both buying and
selling. If this is a defect, however, it is a result of section 16(b)'s focus
on short-swing trading, not the measure of forfeiture it incorporates.
So far as its goal simply is to discourage short-swing trading, section
16(b) is a good statute.
While the certainty of being forced to disgorge all profits might
be enough to discourage anyone from effecting matched transactions
within the scope of section 16, sanctions serve purposes other than
changing behavior. Given the emotional overtones of most criticism
of insider trading, 195 one might expect a statute directed at "the unfair
use of information" to condemn the malfeasors and brand them as
criminals. 196 The failure to include a criminal sanction for short-swing
trading may reflect oversight or a political compromise. This is un-
likely, though, inasmuch as the other substantive provisions of the
Exchange Act are enforceable by criminal penalties. 197 A more plau-
sible explanation is that the drafters of section 16 were more concerned
with altering the way corporations do business than with moral failings
of managers. 98 In other words, Congress was concerned with creating
195. See Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chicago
School," 1986 Duym L.J. 628, 628; Lawson, supra note 66, at 727-28 (no other forms of
business conduct "seem to raise moral hackles in quite the same way as insider stock trading");
Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. Rav. 1023, 1046-
50 (1990) (emphasizing the strong political sentiment against insider trading).
196. The government has played a leading role in prosecuting insider trading under rule
lOb-5. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646
(1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); cf. 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 545 n.11
(increased prison time for those convicted of insider trading before eligibility for parole).
If § 16 were to make short-swing trading illegal, it would presumably be necessary to allow
insiders to sell soon after they bought in order to meet unexpected emergencies. This could
be done by requiring the government to prove wrongful intent in any criminal action. The
first version of § 16 would have required the government to prove intent in criminal actions,
Fletcher-Rayburn bill, supra note 73, § 15(b)(1), although it is important to note that it was
intent to trade f6r the short-swing, not possession of inside information. See supra note 73.
197. See supra note 189.
198. The management control hypothesis offered here also helps to explain why the SEC
has such a limited role in § 16(b). The SEC cannot enforce § 16(b) forfeiture and in fact has
no role in § 16(b)'s administration beyond providing exemptions. This sharply contrasts with
the rest of the Act, in which the SEC has a dominant enforcement role.
Here again, one can argue that the statutory enforcement scheme suggests that the drafters
thought they were creating a new incentive system that would change the way managers ran
publicly held companies. The SEC was supposed to protect investors and the public interest
in the stock market, but it was not expected to deveiop expertise in business practices.
Moreover, the most effective opposition to the movement that culminated in the Exchange
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a new system of incentives that would better serve the needs of society
rather than with condemning conduct that is unfair or unethical, apart
from being harmful.
Most of the conduct with which a management control statute
would be concerned is not wrongful, and in the rare cases where it
is, section 16 does provide a criminal penalty. 199 If a manager cannot
cause the price of the company's stock to rise steadily that is too bad,
but it is unlikely that Congress would declare incompetent managers
criminals. 200 These days it seems wrong for managers to manipulate
corporate affairs to produce short-swing trading opportunities, but it
may not have been so clear in 1934 .201 Moreover, short-swing trading
opportunities are most likely to present a problem in times of crisis,
when it is not clear what course management should pursue. 20 2 In con-
trast to situations that may simply involve errors in business judgment,
it is inexcusable for a manager to undermine corporate profits in order
to produce opportunities to sell short; section 16(c) makes it a crime
to sell short.
Remedies should compensate victims as well as deter or punish
objectionable conduct, and if the point of section 16 is to ensure that
all traders have equal access to corporate information it is hard to see
why issuers get the money disgorged under section 16(b). 203 Even if
Act was based on the charge that it would have instituted bureaucratic control. of industry,
and the drafters may have been reluctant to involve bureaucrats in the administration of any
provision that they thought of as being directed at the way businesses were run. See C. MEYER,
THE SEcuRTrms ExcHANGE ACT Op 1934 ANALYZED AND EXPLAINED 21 (1934) ("The Securities
and Exchange Commission is not empowered to interfere in the internal management of any
corporation."); see also infra notes 340-341 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 122-125 and accompanying text (management short-selling).
200. See Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring,
1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 150 ("ITIhe law, while it requires management to pursue profit and gain
... stops well short of mandating optimal performance even to benefit stockholders .... ).
201. Manipulation will usually take the form of delayed disclosure, and in 1934 there was
a substantial body of opinion that felt corporate information belonged to the corporation and
its disclosure was solely a matter of management grace. See Task Force Report, supra note 7,
at 1091 ("[P]rior to the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 . . . and the 1934 Act, there
was virtually no public access to information regarding the financial condition of corporations.
Before 1934, in most states, a corporation's balance sheet was protected from public disclosure
as a trade secret."). See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669 (1984); Seligman, supra note 115.
202. See supra notes 153-161 and accompanying text.
203. See R. CLARK, supra note 4, at 269 (The view that insider trading is unfair or that it
undermines the proper functioning of the market "has profoundly different remedial impli-
cations than the [view that insider trading injures the issuer]. It seems to call for a remedy on
behalf of a subclass of stockholders, while the corporate harm theory calls for a recovery on
behalf of the corporation, as in a derivative suit."). Clark thinks that insider trading seldom
harms issuers, and he particularly doubts that the opportunity to trade on inside information
will change the way insiders run their companies. Id. at 267.
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the disgorgement provision effectively discourages short-swing trad-
ing, it seems that once profits are disgorged they should go to whom-
ever is injured by short-swing trading. If the reason section 16(b)
requires affiliates to disgorge their profits is that it is unfair-to trade
on inside information, then the disgorged profits should go to the vic-
tims of the unfairness.
Those who think that all traders should have equal access to cor-
porate information are not always clear about why they think this is
so or who ought to be concerned about it,2 but it is clear, enough
that they usually feel that insiders who trade on nonpublic information
victimize the people with whom they trade.25 If section 16 reflects a
judgment that all traders should have equal access to corporate in-
formation, then one would expect that it would give the investors the
insider's disgorged profits. Congress took this approach in 1988, when
it amended the Exchange Act to make any person who trades on the
basis of material, nonpublic information in violation of the Exchange
Act, or rules promulgated thereunder, liable to contemporaneous trad-
ers for up to the amount of profit 'gained or loss avoided in the illegal
transaction.m Yet under section 16 disgorged profits go to the issuer,
leaving one to "wonder how lawmakers could ever have been so stupid
as to provide for corporate recovery of insider trader profits. '20 7
204. See id. at 271 ("But others (including myself) find unfairness to be an opaque notion
... ."); Easterbrook, supra note 63, at 83. But see 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 607-08 ("And
the grievous defect of the strictly economic arguments against insider trading regulation is
their apparent scorn for the moral or public opinion factor, which is relegated to the 'it's just
not right' propositions.").
205. See R. CAUC, supra note 4, at 268-73 (the investors injured by insider trading are
either those with whom insiders trade or perhaps all investors who traded while the insiders
kept information secret); id. at 289-90 (investors' claim to compensation is weak, but the
fundamental objection to insider trading is that insiders take gains at the expense of investors);
cf. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is
Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule lob-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. R v. 1217 (1981)
(investors precluded from trading are injured). See generally ABA Comm. on Fed. Reg. of
Secs., Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading-Part 1: Regulation Under
the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus. LAW. 223, 227
(1985).
206. Exchange Act § 20A(a), (b), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a), (b) (1988) (added by The Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 5, 102 Stat. 4680
(1988)). Anyone designing a private action for insider trading must decide who should recover
and define the damages measure. Exchange Act § 20A gives the action to contemporaneous
traders and limits damages to the wrongdoers profits. Both of these techniques were known
in 1934 and embodied in the Exchange Act. Section 9(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78i(e) (1988), gave contemporaneous traders injured by ceratin manipulative practices a private
right of action. The limitation of recovery to the defendant's profit operates along the lines
of the limitation on underwriter's liability for false registration statements that the Exchange
Act added to § 11 of the Securities Act. Exchange Act, ch. 404, sec. 203 (d), 48 Stat. 881,
907-08 (1934) (amending Securities Act § 11(e)) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1988)).
207. R. CLARK, supra note 4, at 288.
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Like the rest of section 16, issuer recovery is entirely appropriate
if the purpose of section 16 is to prevent manipulation and to align
management and stockholder interests to the end of encouraging the
efficient operation of corporations. In many cases in which managers
trade, they will not have manipulated corporate affairs and there will
be no injury at all. When managers do manipulate corporate affairs
to create trading opportunities, their manipulation will damage the
corporation and it is appropriate that the corporation recover. Dis-
gorged profits may not fully compensate the corporation, and in fact
bear no relationship to any injury the corporation may have suffered
at the hand of the trader, but the purpose of disgorgement is to deter
mismanagement. The corporation gets the profits not as compensation
but because it is the best party to receive any ill-gotten gains.
III. The Purpose of Section 16
The preceding material shows that section 16 can be understood
as a management-control statute. No matter what Congress intended
to accomplish, it is important to understand how section 16 influences
the way publicly held companies are run. Having said that, the obvious
question is whether section 16 was intended to regulate the way cor-
porations do business .208 This is an important question, for those who
wrote and enacted section 16 have greatly influenced the conduct of
many people. For the most part there is no question about what it
requires and forbids, and thus there is relatively little need for explicit
statutory interpretation and few opportunities for administrators or
courts to interfere with the section's operation. Because section 16 is
clear and likely to be enforced, its immediate goals have been ac-
IT]he corporate recovery approach seems to make little sense, whether viewed as
an instrument of compensation or deterrence. It pays the wrong persons [the issuer,
and indirectly, non-selling stockholders and post-disclosure buyers], does not help
the injured persons [those who sell before disclosure is made, including those who
sell to insiders], and gives [the insider] a conciliatory handshake rather than a slap
on the wrist.
Id.; 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 543 ("It is interesting that [Congress did not provide] for
civil liability to the other party to an insider's transaction" along the lines that ultimately
developed under rule lOb-5); Munter, supra note 12, at 87 (recovery under § 16(b) does not
even inure to the injured party); Smith, supra note 122, at 6, col. 5 ("That the enactors were
concerned about the effect on the corporation itself is evidenced to some extent by Section
16(b)'s remedy. It is the corporation that recovers ... not the counter-party to the trade.").
208. The intention or understanding of those intimately involved with § 16, which will be
explored here, may be different from the idealized congressional purpose to which courts often
refer when they are called upon to apply statutes in difficult cases. Because of the language
of § 16, it may be singularly inappropriate to consider what motivated the drafters when
applying the statute. See infra notes 389-404 and accompanying text.
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complished: directors, officers, and principal stockholders of publicly
held corporations eventually report their ownership of equity secu-
rities, and by and large, they do not sell short or trade with a view
to short-swing profits. These reporting requirements and trading res-
trictions influence the way corporations work; the drafters were, then,
successful if they wanted to regulate corporate management.
The "conventional wisdom is that Congress... expressed its con-
cern with insiders' informational advantage by enacting section 16."0
Conventional wisdom notwithstanding, the historical roots of section
16 are somewhat obscure, and the political choices that underlie it
seldom have been explored. Nonetheless, the record does show that
some of those involved in enacting the Exchange Act hoped that sec-
tion 16 would prevent insiders from trading on the basis of inside in-
formation. 210
Before the Exchange Act was enacted, academic commentators
had generally condemned insiders who traded on the basis of non-
public corporate information, even though such trading was thought
to be widespread and the common law generally permitted it.21I Draft-
ers and members of Congress alike said that section 16 dealt with the
unfair use of inside information,212 and various proposed versions of
section 16, especially the first one introduced, were clearly directed
at achieving some sort of informational equality among traders.2 13
Moreover, Congress itself explained at least the forfeiture provision
of section 16 in terms of equality of information, stating in the statute
that "[flor the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information
which may have been obtained by [a principal stockholder], director,
209. Dooley, supra note 5, at 56-57.
210. Given the conventional wisdom, surprisingly little was said in Congress about the
propriety of trading stock on the basis of nonpublic information while the Exchange Act was
being considered. The subject of insiders taking advantage of corporate information was not
diligently pursued in either the congressional hearings on the Exchange Act or the broader
Senate investigation of stock exchange practices. The drafters and congressional critics did
occasionally discuss § 16 in terms that seemed to criticize managers for trading while in
possession of corporate information. This broad and undeveloped criticism, however, is open
to more than one interpretation. See H. MAN-E, supra note 18, at 9 ("one looks in vain for
an analysis as to why this trading was deemed evil .... "); Dooley, supra note 5, at 56 n.235
("unfortunately loose language"). A few commentators have questioned whether § 16 was
meant to secure informational equality or prevent insiders from trading on the basis of inside
information. See H. Mx, supra note 18, at 9-10, 34; Dooley, supra note 5, at 55-59
(suggesting that the purpose of § 16 was to prevent insider manipulation).
211. See supra note 77. See generally H. MANNE, supra note 18, at 4-8.
212. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 85, at 133; Stock Exchange Practices, supra
note 31, at 7742; H.R. REp. No. 1383, supra note 31, at 13; S. REP. No. 792, supra note
117, at 20-21.
213. See infra notes 283-304 and.accompanying text.
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or officer by reason of his relationship to" a publicly held company,
the short-swing trading profits of control persons shall inure to such
companies .214
There is also some support for the conventional wisdom in the
way section 16 operates. Section 16(b) in particular may prevent trad-
ing on inside information by a group of people who were thought to
be particularly pernicious in 1934: the speculative pools. 2 15 The pools
manipulated the market, but they also took advantage of inside in-
formation. While insiders can keep their profits from inside infor-
mation if they are willing to hold new positions for six months, section
16(b) would probably deter an insider from joining or assisting a pool.
The pools typically undertook substantial trading operations, and, ac-
cordingly, generally lacked the patience and wherewithal to hold their
positions for very long. It would be difficult for anyone subject to
the six-month holding period imposed by section 16(b) to profit from
participating in a pool.
Of course, section 16 may have been intended to accomplish more
than one end. Indeed, with certain qualifications to make it reflect the
way section 16 works, the conventional wisdom is entirely consistent
with the proposition that section 16 was designed to move managers
to pursue stockholder interests. 21 6 Unfortunately, the broadly stated
proposition that section 16 was designed to prevent insiders from trad-
ing on the basis of corporate information has dominated discussion
of section 16, and it has apparently distracted some commentators who
have suggested that the drafters might have been concerned with the
way corporations go about producing goods and services but then failed
to pursue the possibility.2 1 7
Whatever the drafters and sponsors of section 16 thought about
parity of information among traders, it is clear that they hoped section
16 would bridge the gap between ownership and control in the publicly
held corporations, and thereby improve the way those corporations
214. Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1988).
215. See supra notes 162-170 and accompanying text.
216. Section 16 bridges the gap between managers and stockholders by reinforcing man-
agement incentives to act like stockholders and by destroying incentives for managers to
manipulate corporate affairs in order to create trading opportunities for themselves. In the
latter respect, informational equality and corporate governance are closely related. Corrupt
managers often depend on informational inequality when they manipulate corporate affairs to
produce profitable trading opportunities; they can trade profitably because they know what
they are doing and the market does not. See also Dooley, supra note 5, at 56 ("The few
questions pertaining to inside information [asked during the hearings that preceded the Exchange
Act] were only incidental to inquiries regarding the manipulations in which the information
had been used, which were Congress's primary concern.").
217. See, e.g., O'Connor, supra note 6, at 342 (stating the proposition that § 16(b) may
reduce the incentive to manipulate corporate events).
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are managed. The historical situation in which the Exchange Act was
considered and adopted was such that any proposal to regulate the
stock market was bound to address the separation of ownership and
control. Section 16 seems to address the separation problem, but it
does not do much to ensure informational equality, conventional wis-
dom and the purpose clause of section 16(b) notwithstanding. Indeed,
judging by the operative provisions of section 16-that is, the re-
quirements that directors, officers, and principal stockholders of pub-
licly held companies report their holdings and trading, forfeit short-
swing profits, and refrain from short sales-one would conclude that
the drafters were concerned solely with the way publicly held cor-
porations are run.
It is almost inconceivable that section 16 helped to align the in-
terests of management and stockholders by accident. The Exchange
Act was "worked out ... under the pressure of [a] most vicious and
persistent lobby. ' 218 The legislation was not enacted until after it had
been repeatedly revised, often with the help of its critics. 219 Whether
or not this revision process made for a better statute, it did weed out
unjustified and poorly articulated provisions.2 ° The proponents of the
Act would not have wasted their efforts on section 16 if they had sim-
ply wanted to prevent insiders from taking advantage of inside in-
formation.
Vengeful and stubborn legislators may sometimes be willing to
pay the price for imprecise statutes, but the Exchange Act was more
than the product of populist outrage with the stock market. The Ex-
218. Statement of Rep. Rayburn (Apr. 30, 1934), reprinted in 78 CONG. Ric. 7693 (1934)
("Few bills have ever had such thorough consideration as this stock-exchange bill.... We
have worked out the terms of this bill under the pressure of the most vicious and persistent
lobby that any of us have ever known in Washington."); see also Letter from President
Roosevelt to Senator Fletcher (Mar. 26, 1934), 3 PuB. PAPMns 169-70 (1938), reprinted in S.
REP. No. 792, supra note 117, at 2, and in Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31,,at 7577-
78 ("It has come to my attention that a more definite and more highly organized drive is
being made against effective legislation to this end than against any similar recommendation
made by me during the past year."); H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 31, at 31-32 ("It is
safe to say that no bill has produced more correspondence for Members of Congress than this
bill."); J. SEuom.rN, supra note 21, at 73 ("one of the most bruising lobbying struggles ever
waged in Washington").
219. See House Hearings, supra note 85, at 625 (statement of Rep. Rayburn), 674 (Corcoran
testimony); 78 CONG. REc. 7866 (statement of Rep. Maloney), 7921 (statement of Rep. Mapes),
7935 (statement of Rep. Bulwinkle), 7938 (statement of Rep. Milligan) (1934); M. PARRisH,
supra note 21, at 132; J. SELGmAN, suprd note 21, at 93-95; T. McCtAw, PRoPHETs OF
REoGU.A71ON 178 (1984): D. Levin, supra note 21, at 375-84.
220. The original proposals were typically criticized as overly rigid. The drafters responded
by replacing statutorily mandated changes in the way the market was to work with broad
grants of administrative power, often subject to statutorily enunciated directives of the goals
administrators were to pursue. See Thel, supra note 21, at 458-60. During the course of
congressional consideration, flexibility was introduced into § 16 as well.
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change Act's sponsor in the House of Representatives, Sam Rayburn,
is famous for his unequalled ability to accomplish his goals without
antagonizing anyone unnecessarily. 22' The people who actually wrote
the Exchange Act-primarily Benjamin Cohen, Thomas Corcoran,
and James Landis-were extraordinarily able and careful.2 They would
not have put forward an equality-of-information provision as impre-
cise as section 16, and they must have known that their product reg-
ulated corporate management.
In the preceding exposition of the way section 16 influences cor-
porate operations, commentary dating to the enactment of the Ex-
change Act was cited to show that trading restrictions that may now
seem an excessive response to the problems created by the separation
of management and control might appear reasonable in different cir-
cumstances. While this commentary filled out the management-reg-
ulation explanation of section 16, it also showed that in 1934 many
people, including the drafters of the Exchange Act and some of the
legislators responsible for getting the Act passed, worried that the sep-
aration of ownership and control left managers free to pursue selfish
ends to the detriment of stockholders and the public.
Although section 16 was not as widely discussed as other pro-
visions of the statute, it was repeatedly revised while the Exchange Act
was being considered. The substance of these revisions and the trail
of documents left as the section was perfected show that the drafters
and sponsors of the Exchange Act were interested in the way cor-
porations worked and wanted to use section 16 to close the gap be-
tween ownership and management. The Exchange Act was in large
measure the product of a movement for the reform of large corpo-
rations, and the unique circumstances of the Great Depression focused
attention on the way large corporations were run. The peculiar ap-
proach to improving corporate management embodied in section 16
was determined by prevailing political and constitutional norms, to-
221. "The avoidance of open controversy [was] his genius." N. MAcNEM, FORGE OF
DEMOCRACY 108 (1963) (quoting Rep. Lee Metcalf). See generally A. CHAMPAGNE, CONGRESSMAN
SAM RAYBURN 161 (1984); C. DOROUGH, MR. SAM (1962); D. HARDEmAN & D. BACON,
RAYBURN: A BIOGRAPHY (1987); A. STEINBERG, SAM RAYBuRN (1975).
222. T. McCRAw, supra note 219, at 171 ("The group combined a sophisticated appreci-
ation of the intricate nature of the [securities] industry (the special competence of Corcoran
and even more of Cohen) with an extraordinary understanding of the virtues and defects of
particular tools of administration (the distinctive strength of Landis)."); J. LASH, DEALERS
AND DREAMERS vii (1988) (Cohen and Corcoran had a sixth-sense feeling for the programs
that were politically feasible not simply ideally desirable.); see also id. at 166-67 (describing
various challenges and objections Cohen and Corcoran withstood); Thel, supra note 21, at
443 n.255. See generally J. LASH, supra (biography of Cohen and Corcoran); D. RITcHE,
JAMs M. LANIS (1980) (biography of James M. Landis).
[Vol. 42
THE GENIUS OF SECTION 16
gether perhaps with the fundamentally conservative bias of those most
intimately involved in writing the Exchange Act.
A. Stock Exchange Reform and Corporate Law Reform
Most commentators trace the history of the Exchange Act to the
so-called Money Trust Investigation conducted by the House Banking
and Currency Committee in the aftermath of the Panic of 1907.M The
committee's mandate was to investigate the concentration of economic
power. In its report, the committee noted what it saw as shortcomings
in corporate law and discussed the potential for federal reform.
The committee was troubled by what it took to be the permissive
nature of state corporate law, but it apparently recognized, as Theo-
dore Roosevelt had immediately after the Panic,224 that under pre-
vailing theories of constitutional law the federal government had little
power to regulate corporations directly.225 The committee, however,
suggested that Congress might wisely use its power over the stock mar-
ket to improve corporate business practices as to which, according to
the committee, the states had largely abdicated their responsibilities.
Great and much-needed reforms in the organization and meth-
ods of our corporations may be legitimately worked out through the
power wielded by the stock exchange over the listing of securities.
Much of the confusion and many of the defects in corporate reg-
ulation due to the diversity of State laws and to the bidding of the
States against one another in laxity of administration in order to at-
tract corporations within their borders may be corrected and uni-
fornilty of methods introduced through the listing department of the
exchange.
... In short, [the exchange's] opportunities as an agency of cor-
porate reform are almost endless, provided its own practices can be
223. Money Trust Investigation: Investigation of the Financial and Monetary Conditions
in the United States Under House Resolution Nos. 429 and 504 Before A Subcomm. of the
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913) [hereinafter Money Trust
Hearings]; H.R. REP. No. 1593, supra note 31. See House Hearings, supra note 85, at 15-16
(testimony of James Landis); F. AmimN, THE LoADs OF CREATION ch. 6 (1935); 2 L. Loss,
supra note 2, at 1165-66; Carosso, The Wall Street Money Trust from Pujo through Medina,
47 Bus. HIsr. Rav. 421, 425-26 (1973); Klebaner, The Money Trust Investigation in Retrospect,
3 NAT'L BANKINo RV. 393, 394-96 (1966); Thel, supra note 21, at 402-07; Tracy & MacChesney,
supra note 182, at 1033; Sheldon, supra note 31, at 2251-2381; D. Levin, supra note 21, at
18-20; cf. I M. MYERs, THE NEw YoRx MONEY MAP= 307-14 (1931) (earlier reform
movements).
224. 42 CONG. REc. 1347, 1349 (1908); see also J. SamANi, supra note 21, at 42 ("the
long-held populist and progressive goal of superseding lax state corporation laws with more
stringent federal standards").
225. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 1593, supra note 31, at 115 ("It is doubtful ... whether the
Federal Government has power generally to regulate Stock Exchanges."). See generally id. at
199-28 (power of Congress).
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reformed so as to entitle it to exercise these broad powers?226
The reforms the committee recommended contained the seeds of
Exchange Act provisions that regulate management of publicly held
corporations. The committee proposed to subject stock exchanges to
regulation by the Postmaster General, and exchanges would in turn
have regulated issuers of exchange-traded securities. 227 The commit-
tee's bill would have required exchanges to insist that issuers of listed
securities make periodic reports, 22 and no security could have been
listed unless the issuer ordered its officers and directors not to sell
short and required them to notify the directors in writing before trad-
ing at all.229
The parallels between these recommendations and the issuer re-
porting and insider trading provisions of the Exchange Act are not
coincidental. The committee's findings and recommendations greatly
influenced the drafters of the Exchange Act and the attitude of the
general public toward Wall Street. 20 The committee's counsel, Samuel
Untermyer, became a widely respected commentator, 23  and he was a
key participant in the stock-market reform movement played out early
in the New Deal.232 The constitutional impediments to federal cor-
porate law had not disappeared by 1934 either, and for constitutional
and other reasons any federal regulation of corporations would have
to come through the back door of exchange regulation.
Popular interest in stock-exchange reform waned after the Money
Trust Investigation. The impetus for the Exchange Act was the stock
market crash that began in October 1929. In the depression that fol-
lowed the crash, the operating and financial policies that managers
adopted for their corporations were seen as implicating the interests
of the public at large, not merely the interests of investors. 233 At the
226. Id. at 114-15.
227. The committee's bill is appended to the committee's report. Id. at 170-73 [hereinafter
Money Trust bill].
228. Money Trust bill, supra note 227, § l(a)-(b).
229. Id. § 1(i).
230. Louis Brandeis popularized the findings of the Money Trust Investigation in a series
of magazine articles eventually collected and published in his book Other People's Money. L.
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (1914). Whereas the committee had investigated a wide
variety of abuses, Brandeis focused almost exclusively on business practices. Brandeis was
particularly troubled by the ability of bankers to control so much with relatively little of their
own money. He recommended requiring investment bankers to disclose their profits when they
sold securities, in hopes of depriving them of the wealth they used to control business. Id. at
101. Brandeis and Other People's Money probably influenced the Exchange Act even more
than the published findings of the Money Trust Investigation. See Thel, supra note 21, at 405-
06.
231. See J. SELIGMAN, supra note 21, at 51.
232. See infra notes 242-248 and accompanying text.
233. See J.W. HURST, TI LEorrTMAcy, supra note 53, at 103-04 ("[F]rom the 1930s on
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same time, Berle and Means created substantial doubt about the ef-
ficacy of existing checks on the power of corporate managers. 23 4 Re-
form was almost inevitable in these circumstances, "[flor a democracy
will not long tolerate in its midst centers of power that are not per-
ceived as responsive to the needs of the people and at least in some
measure accountable to the popular will." 23
Manipulative management practices were a recurring theme in the
debate over federal control of the stock market and federal regulation
of issuers of publicly traded securities .2 6 Even in the 1920s, some of
the critics who complained about the unfairness of insiders trading on
the basis of nonpublic information also expressed concern about their
manipulation of corporate affairs to create trading opportunities .237
Harmful management practices were of even greater concern in 1934,
when economic activity was depressed. There was little good news for
insiders to take advantage of by then, but there was a real need for
everyone to get back to business.
The Senate Banking and Currency Comittee began extensive
hearings on stock exchange practices in 1932, and the Exchange Act
was tailored to respond to the abuses identified in those hearings. The
hearings were far reaching, but it is fair to say that the "relationship
between insider trading and the danger of manipulation of corporate
affairs... was frequently alluded to in the congressional hearings. '238
Practices designed to create trading opportunities for corporate man-
agers took on a graver aspect in the context of the Senate hearings.
... a social interest arose in the investor quite different from the original concern with him
as a part of the internal governance of the firms whose shares he held. This new social interest
was an interest in the corporate security structure as a whole, as a now essential part of the
machinery for distributing income and wealth, maintaining broad, reliable, consumer purchasing
power, and bulwarking the life expectations of millions of individuals with such assurance as
contributed not only to economic but also to political stability."); id. at 110 ("[B]y the 1920s
... [t]he new size and reach of corporate enterprises meant that their behaviour affected a
broader range of interests than before."); see also supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text
(importance of large companies according to Berle & Means).
234. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text; see also J.W. Huasr, THE LEG=rrACY,
supra note 53, at 95-111.
235. Stevenson, The Corporation as a Political Institution, 8 HoFsTRA L. Rav. 39, 39
(1979).
236. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
237. W. Rn'x'ny, supra note 31, at 204-06; Berle, Publicity of Accounts and Directors'
Purchases of Stock, 25 MicH. L. REv..827, 830-31 (1927) ("[A] corporate management which,
as individuals, chooses to enter the open market and which at the same time exercises control
over the release of information concerning corporate affairs, can deal with the current value
of its securities ... with tremendous effect; and the liquid value of the corporate securities
held by the stockholder becomes a matter which the corporate management itself can deter-
mine."); see also H. MANmE, supra note 18, at 231 n.21 (criticizing Ripley).
238. H. MANNE, supra note 18, at 8; see also supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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In addition to undermining business, such practices exacerbated spec-
ulative tendencies in the market. Speculation had long been seen as
a problem, but by 1934 excessive speculation was widely held to ac-
count for the collapse of the economy.
The committee's counsel submitted a preliminary report in Feb-
ruary 1933. 239 This report was one of the only carefully prepared and
disinterested commentaries on contemporary stock exchange practices
that was available while the Exchange Act was being drafted.2U Its list
of "practices which . . . might properly be made the subject of crit-
icism and legislative action" included:
the buying and selling of stocks by officers of corporations who had
inside information of the affairs of the corporations and whose trans-
actions on the exchange were conducted in such a manner as to pre-
vent the public from knowing of their dealings; ... short selling and
selling against the box; . . . and the manipulation of the affairs of
trading corporations and investment trusts for the benefit of those
who had the matter of their affairs within their control and to the
detriment of the investing public. 241
During the 1932 presidential campaign, Franklin Roosevelt de-
nounced speculation and called for stock market reform. 2 Shortly
after the election, Roosevelt's staff asked Samuel Untermyer, who had
directed the Money Trust Investigation, to draft a bill to reform the
stock exchanges. 24" Untermyer revised the Money Trust bill, but his
new proposal was rejected because of objections to subjecting the stock
market to regulation by the Post Office. 2" As a result of this false
239. Letter from the Counsel, supra note 85, at 1.
240. See Thel, supra note 21, at 411 n.112.
241. Letter from the Counsel, supra note 85, at 3-4; see also id. at 32 ("Among the
various subjects touched upon ... are ... the manipulations of the affairs of corporations
by those in control; ... [and] the selling of stocks by officers and directors against the box
for the purpose of concealing the fact that they were disposing of the same."). Among other
examples, the report offered the trading pool in the stock of General Asphalt. A pool of
investors including officers of that company bought stock knowing that the company intended
to start paying dividends and subsequently captured a substantial part of those dividends.
All this [the manager of the pool] characterized as a pure coincidence; but one can
not help drawing the conclusion that the existence of the pool and the personal
advantage to those who were managing it and at the same time handling the affairs
of the General Asphalt Co. had a great deal to do with the diversion of part of the
surplus, if not part of the capital, of the General Asphalt Co. into the dividend
channel.
Id. at 12; see also id. at 18-19 (capture of dividends by Warner Bros. Pictures pool). (The
Senate committee report was probably referring to the General Asphalt and Warner pools
when it explained § 16(b). S. RaP. No. 792, supra note 117, at 9-10; see supra notes 144,
163.).
242. R. DEBEDrs, supra note 21, at 25-27; M. PARMsH, supra note 21, at 43-44; J.
SELIGMAN, supra note 21, at 19-20; Thel, supra note 21, at 414.
243. Thel, supra note 21, at 414 n.127.
244. J. SELmAN, supra note 21, at 52; Thel, supra note 21, at 414 n.128.
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start, the Roosevelt Administration's focus turned to a narrower pro-
ject that culminated in the Securities Act. 245 Although Untermyer's
proposal was never offered to Congress, it does reveal what motivated
the reformers who pressed for the Exchange Act. 246
Untermyer would have regulated publicly held companies as well
as exchange members and trading practices. He would have controlled
security issuers by conditioning their participation in the exchange
market on compliance with statutory and administrative requirements.
While Untermyer would have required issuers of publicly held secu-
rities to disclose information from time to time, 247 he did not propose
to perfect an equality-of-information regime, and he would not have
forbidden insiders to trade on the basis of corporate information. He
did, however, propose substantive regulation of security issuers, and
he proposed to require issuers to include certain governing provisions
in their articles and bylaws, including restrictions on insider trading
similar to those that were enacted in section 16. In particular, he would
have required officers and directors to report their security sales im-
mediately and forbidden them to sell securities short.2A
Within a month after being inaugurated, Roosevelt had a nar-
rower bill prepared and submitted to Congress. 249 The bill essentially
245. Thel, supra note 21, at 415-16.
246. Untermyer's bill is the first item in the "Preliminary Drafts" volume of James
Landis's collection of materials relating to the drafting of the Exchange Act. 2 DocuamErARY
HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 78 [hereinafter Untermyer bill].
247. For instance, exchanges would have had to require issuers to file financial reports,
Untermyer bill, supra note 246, § l(b), and to require that the issuer's governing documents
permit stockholder access to corporate books and records, id. § 1(b-l). Exchan'ges would also
have been required to take steps to ensure that trading-pool agreements were in writing and
available for public inspection. Id. § I(d).
248. Untermyer's bill would have made it illegal to use the mails in connection with the
business of stock exchange unless the exchange's governing instruments provided, among other
things:
that no securities of any corporation shall herafter [sic] be listed, quoted or dealt in
on said exchange unless the charter, by-laws or other regulations thereof contain
certain express prohibition [sic] against the sale by any officer or director of any
such corporation of any stock or security of such corporation of which he is not
the owner at the time of such sale or the sale directly or indirectly by him of any
shares of stock or other security of any such corporation or any interest therein,
either alone or jointly with others, unless within one day thereafter written notice
of such sale shall have been given to the corporation, nor unless all such transactions
shall be immediately reported in writing to the secretary.
Untermyer bill, supra note 246, § 1(1).
249. Message from the President Transmitting a Recommendation to Congress for Federal
Supervision of Traffic in Investment Securities in Interstate Commerce, H.R. RaP. Doc. No.
12, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. (March 29, 1933) [hereinafter Message from the President], reprinted
in 2 LErIsLATrVE HIsTORY, supra note 31, item 15 and reprinted in 77 CoNo. RiEc. 937 (1933);
see H.R. 4314, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), reprinted in 3 LBoisLn, HIsToRY, supra note
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provided for full publicity in the sale of securities. The President em-
phasized that it was only a first step that "should be followed by leg-
islation relating to the better supervision of the purchase and sale of
all property dealt in on exchanges, and by legislation to correct uneth-
ical and unsafe practices on the part of officers and directors of banks
and other corporations.1 250
Although the bill had a limited scope, it quickly became contro-
versial. This controversy had important implications for the Presi-
dent's promised legislation on unethical and unsafe practices on the
part of officers and directors (i.e., the Exchange Act) and indeed for
any federal statute regulating corporate management. Section 16's au-
tomatic approach and the unique exclusion of the SEC from its op-
eration can be traced to the failure of the administration's first securities
bill. By the time the Securities Act was enacted, it was clear that any
legislation that limited the discretion of corporate managers would be
controversial and that Congress would not put government bureau-
crats in control of the way corporations do business.
The administration's bill provided that, with certain exceptions,
no security could be offered or sold until after a registration statement
was filed with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).Y The bill re-
quired that the registration statement disclose certain information, but
it went far beyond requiring mere candor. It authorized the FTC to
revoke a registration upon finding that an issuer's affairs were "in
unsound condition or insolvent,' '252 or that the enterprise or business
of an issuer was "not based upon sound principles, and that the rev-
ocation is in the interest of the public welfare.''253
The bill soon came under intense criticism for permitting the FTC
to revoke a security's registration because of the unsoundness of the
issuer's affairs. 254 Even Sam Rayburn, the bill's sponsor in the House,
31, item 22; S. 875, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. (1933), reprinted in 3 LEaisLATw HISTORY, supra
note 31, item 28. [H.R. 4314 and S. 875 are substantially identical and are hereinafter referred
to as the Thompson bill]. See generally J. SELIGMAN, supra note 21, at 52-57 (detailed history
of the bill during the beginning of Roosevelt's administration).
250. Message from the President, supra note 249, at 1-2; see also R. DEBEDTS, supra note
21, at 56 (discussing the President's intention to initiate simultaneously legislation regarding
securities issuance and stock market regulation); Thel, supra note 21, at 416 (the administration
and others did not think the Securities Act would solve the stock market problem).
251. Thompson bill, supra note 249, §§ 3-4. Whereas the Securities Act as finally enacted
contemplated the FTC invalidating a registration statement if it was dishonest, the bill
contemplated that securities could be sold upon filing of the registration statement, with the
FTC revoking the registration if it discovered a problem. Id. § 6(a)-(c).
252. Thompson bill, supra note 249, § 6(e).
253. Id. § 6(0.
254. J. SELIGM , supra note 21, at 56; Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities
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observed that Congress had not "given anybody that much power"
in any of the bills passed in the early days of Roosevelt's presidency,
and he was not sure that Congress should give "an administrative of-
ficer of the Government... that much power, as a general principle-
to pass upon whether or not a man's business is based on sound prin-
ciples."2"
With the bill in trouble, the administration brought in Felix
Frankfurter for help, and Frankfurter brought in three people who
would shape both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act: Benjamin
Cohen, Thomas Corcoran, and James Landis. 6 Cohen and Corcoran
were lawyers with backgrounds in corporate law, and Landis was a
professor of legislation who had been exploring "the nature and va-
riety of the sanctions available to government to bring about con-
formance with its statutory mandates and in dealing with the nature
of standards capable of reasonable enforcement. ' '12 7 They revised the
bill for Rayburn, starting from the premise "that its requirements
should be limited to full and fair disclosure of the nature of the se-
curity being offered and that there should be no authority to pass upon
the investment quality of the security." 8 Their revision served as the
basis for the Securities Act,2 9 and during the next year they would
draft the Exchange Act.
Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 29, 31-33 (1959); Ritchie, The Legislative Impact of the
Pecora Investigation, 5 CArroL STUD. 87, 93 (1977). -The civil liability provisions of the bill
were also criticized, as was another provision that allowed the federal government to enforce
state blue sky laws. See H.R. Rm. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27-30 (1934) (minority views),
reprinted in 2 LEarsLAmTr HIszony, supra note 31, item 18; J. SELIGMAN, supra note 21, at
55-71; Landis, supra, at 30-49.
255. Federal Securities Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 135 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGisLATIVE HIsToRy, supra note 31,
item 18; see also id. at 135-46 (debate regarding the FTC's power to determine whether a
security issuer is financially sound and to regulate registration of securities).
256. J. SELIGMtAN, supra note 21, at 61; Landis, supra note 254, at 32-33.
257. Landis, supra note 254, at 33.
258. Id. at 34. The retreat was signalled clearly in § 24 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §
77w (1988), which declares that the fact that a registration statement has been filed or has
become effective shall not be held to mean that the FTC has in any way passed upon the
merits of such security, and makes any representation to the contrary unlawful. See also
Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II, FoRTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 55 ("Acting upon the
President's suggestion, the Securities Act carefully withholds authority from the Federal Trade
Commission 'to take any action which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that
newly issued securities are sound ... ') (quoting Message from the President, supra note
249).
259. J. SELOMAN, supra note 21, at 63-71; Landis, supra note 254, at 34-49. The concern
of some legislators with the regulation of securities on the basis of their merit as investments
was reflected in the Securities Act's exemption for common carrier securities subject to the
Interstate Commerce Act, Securities Act § 3(a)(6) (since repealed), and Title II of the Securities
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77bb to 77mm (1988), which provided for the establishment of a Corporation
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After the Securities Act was enacted, Assistant Secretary of Com-
.merce John Dickinson organized a committee to study stock exchange
legislation.260 The task the committee set for itself and the way it went
about'that task reveal a lot about section 16. The committee was made
up of Dickinson, Adolf Berle, who had the President's ear and had
just popularized the problem of the separation of ownership and con-
trol, James Landis, who stayed in Washington as a member of the
FTC responsible for administering the Securities Act, and two lawyers
who, along with Dickinson, were sympathetic to the interests of the
business and financial community. 261
This diverse group apparently had little trouble agreeing that ex-
cessive speculation and manipulation had to be eliminated. 262 The com-
of Foreign Security Holders. See J. SELIGMAN, supra note 21, at 68-70; Landis, supra note
254, at 42-43, 48-49. Rayburn had long favored some federal control of the allocation of
capital through Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulation of railroad securities. J.
SEUGMAN, supra note 21, at 55; see also 2 A. SCHLIESINGER, JR., THt AGE OF ROOSEVELT: TmE
COMING OF TnE NEW DEAL 400 (1958). He insisted that common carrier securities be exempt
from the Securities Act even though the ICC did not regulate sales activities. Landis, supra
note 254, at 39.
260. Thel, supra note 21, at 416-24. Another administration committee revised Untermyer's
stock-exchange bill early in 1933. See id. at 417 n.142. The revision was no more an equality-
of-information bill than Untermyer's had been. A memorandum summarizing and commenting
upon the revised bill indicates the considerations that motivated at least some members of the
Roosevelt administration who favored stock market reform. In a section labeled "Restrictions
upon sale of Corporate Securities by Officers and Directors," the memorandum explained that
prohibiting short sales by officers and directors was appropriate because it would prevent them
from taking unfair advantage of nonpublic information. The Stock Exchange Bill (A Synopsis
and Commentary by the Inter-Departmental Committee) (prepared by Grosvenor M. Jones,
Chief. of Finance and Investment Division, Department of Commerce (May 1933)) 8 (copies
in National Archives, Record Group 40, file 80553/21, box 492, and in Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library, Adolf Berle Papers, box 22, Stock Market Investigation-John Dickinson file). Of
course, forbidding short selling will hardly prevent insiders from taking advantage of insider
information. The memorandum's more extensive discussion of manipulative pools suggests that
what really concerned the author was the possibility of insiders manipulating corporate affairs
to create trading opportunities, and that at least when he expressed concern about insiders
taking "unfair advantage of their privileged position," he was not so much troubled by
inequality as by duplicity. See Dooley, supra note 5, at 56-59. The memorandum quoted at
length from a speech in which the president of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) admitted
that insiders occasionally caused their corporations to "issue] false statements in the hope of
making personal profit. The Exchange deeply deplores the fact that any corporate official has
been false to his trust and has put his personal advantage above his duty to stockholders."
The Stock Exchange Bill, supra, at 11; see also id. at 12 ("unduly optimistic or other
unwarranted statements about the company's prospects," "no justification for the publication
of false statements"). In other words, insider trading is objectionable not when insiders take
advantage of information but when, in connection with their trading, they act in a way that
is inconsistent with their fiduciary obligations to pursue their stockholders' interests.
261. Thel, supra note 21, at 418.
262. Report to the Secretary of Commerce by the Committee on Stock Exchange Regulation
at 3 [hereinafter Report to Secretary of Commerce], reprinted in Senate Comm. on Banking
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mittee also recognized that any program of stock market reform would
have important implications for the internal affairs of publicly held
corporations.
Your committee realizes that, perhaps, the most effective way to deal
with certain evils connected with manipulation of stock by directors
and officers[,] ... incomplete publicity of corporate accounts and
similar problems is by the requirement of Federal incorporation ....
These particular problems can, however, to some extent, be dealt
with through the regulation of stock exchanges and stock-exchange
operations.... [Tihis report will concern itself as to ways and means
of controlling these and other evils by the method of regulating the
exchanges. 263
The committee's concern with the internal affairs of large corporations
was not surprising, given Berle's membership. Moreover, the idea that
the federal government should play some role in the operation of busi-
ness was hardly exceptional at the time anyway, for although few were
willing to concede control of business to the government, there was
a broad consensus that the country's best hope was in public-private
cooperation under the National Industrial Recovery Act.264
The difficult question was how to deal with practices that almost
everyone acknowledged could be destructive. The bulk of the com-
mittee's report dealt with "the major problem involved in any con-
sideration of proposed stock-exchange regulation[:] ... the methods
and mechanism through which the proposed regulation is to be ap-
and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.; Letter From the President of the United States to the
Chairman of the Committee on Banking and Currency with an Accompanying Report Relative
to Stock Exchange Regulation (Comm. Print 1934), reprinted in 5 LEoIsrIvE HIsroRY, supra
note 31, item 16.
263. Report to Secretary of Commerce, supra note 262, at 4; see also Id. at 17-19. The
committee seems to have agreed very quickly that any stock exchange bill would somehow
regulate trading by officers, directors, and principal stockholders. See Irreducible Minima
(undated memorandum) (reports of stock transactions) (copy in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
COLLCTION, supra note 78, item 4); Henry Richardson's Draft of Stock Exchange Legislation,
Schedule B (November 16, 1933) (copy in 2 DocuMETARY HISTORY Cou.nCnIoN, supra note
78, item 2).
While it criticized insider manipulation of stock prices, the committee's report did not
develop the idea that it is unfair for insiders to take advantage of inside information. Berle
had criticized the exploitation of inside information during at least one committee meeting,
however, see Grosvenor Jones, Report on Meeting of Stock Exchange Committee 2 (Nov. 7,
1933) (copy in National Archives, Record Group 40, file 80553/21, box 493, folder 4), and
the Committee did recommend forbidding directors and officers to reveal nonpublic information
to trading pools and requiring directors and officers to report their trading. Report to the
Secretary of Commerce, supra note 262, at 18.
264. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (declared unconstitutional
in Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)). See S. BRUCKEY, supra note 47,
at 459 ("Industry leaders greeted the [NIRA] with unrestrained enthusiasm."); Thel, supra
note 21, at 421-22.
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plied. ' 265 This was to be the central problem in the intense debate on
the Exchange Act that was soon to begin. The committee recom-
mended "a method of stock-exchange regulation by broad discre-
tionary authority vested in an administrative agency'rather than through
detailed and specific statutory prohibition and requirement of partic-
ular practices." 2 66The committee's position prevailed in the end, sec-
tion 16's automatic inflexibility notwithstanding. The solution to most
of the problems identified in the Exchange Act was essentially left to
regulatory agencies.
B. Section 16 and the Regulation of Corporate Management
While the Dickinson committee was studying stock exchange re-
form, Landis, Corcoran, Cohen, and others were independently work-
ing on legislation. 267 They intended to use stock exchange legislation
as a vehicle for corporate law reform, but they also recognized a va-
riety of political and practical constraints on federal power to control
publicly held corporations.
Late in 1933 Landis, by then a member of the FTC, directed I.N.P.
Stokes, a member of his staff, to explore alternative methods of reg-
ulation and to begin drafting a bill. 261 Stokes prepared an outline for
a bill that included two sets of substantive suggestions, one for reg-
ulation of exchange transactions and one for "regulation of corporate
management. ' 269 This preliminary bill included many corporate-law
reforms eventually incorporated in the Exchange Act, including man-
datory financial reports and provisions for the regulation of proxy
solicitations and security trading by officers, directors, and affili-
ates.270 Stokes went much further, however, suggesting that the federal
government might regulate corporate mergers and reorganizations and
the selection of corporate directors. In particular, he offered the pos-
265. Report to the Secretary of Commerce, supra note 262, at 5.
266. Id. at 13.
267. On the drafting of the Exchange Act, see R. DEBEDTS, supra note 21, at 56-85; E.
HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 309 (1966); R. MOLEY, AFTER
SEVEN YEARS 284-86 (1939); M. PARRISH, supra note 21, at 108-44; D. RITCHIE, supra note
222, at 95-100; 2 A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 259, at 456-67; J. SEUGMAN, supra note
21, at 73-100; James M. Landis Interviews, Columbia Oral History Collection 197-206; D.
Levin, supra note 21, at 347-56.
268. See M. PARRISH, supra note 21, at 115-16; J. SELIGMAN, supra note 21, at 83-85; D.
Levin, supra note 21, at 347-51. Stokes would hold the yellow pad for the Exchange Act,
keeping track of criticism, suggestions, and proposed revisions as the Act moved through
Congress.
269. Outline by I.N.P. Stokes, 2nd (Nov. or Dec. 1933) (copy in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
COLLECTION, supra note 78, item 3).
270. Id.
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sibility of requiring cumulative voting, board representation of non-
equity security holders, government appointment of directors, and reg-
ulation of voting trusts.27'
Stokes does not appear to have been so naive as to have expected
Congress to enact these reforms, and perhaps his outline was some-
thing of a wish list. Although the Exchange Act did not incorporate
Stokes' more radical suggestions, it did employ the mechanism he rec-
ommended for regulating corporations. As had previous reformers, 272
Stokes proposed to force corporations to agree to specific reforms as
a condition to listing their securities on a stock exchange. 273 The pro-
visions of the Exchange Act that regulated corporations all used this
mechanism. When a company registers its stock with an exchange, it
subjects itself to the reporting, proxy solicitation, and insider trading
provisions of the Act, and when the Exchange Act was enacted these
provisions did not apply at all unless a corporation registered its se-
curities on an exchange. 274
The selection of this mechanism for reforming corporate law had
important implications for the structure and substance of the Ex-
change Act. If stock listing triggered corporate regulation, corpora-
tions could avoid regulation by foregoing the privilege of listing their
securities on a stock exchange. Once the drafters chose this approach,
they had to accommodate the interests of those who controlled cor-
271. Id. Stokes's proposal is described in D. Levin, supra note 21, at 347-48; see also
James M. Landis, Comments on Fundamental Problem 2 (Nov. 8, 1933) ("Reports of stock
transactions of directors, officers, issuers etc." to be filed with exchanges and government
agency); Max Lowenthal, Memorandum entitled "Stock Exchanges" 14-22 (undated) (proposing
extensive investigation of "Listing of securities by the [New York Stock] Exchange in violation
of decent or sound standards of dealing with security investors") (copy in 8 DocUairrsTy
HIsToRY Coa.acTioN, supra note 78, item 25) (Lowenthal was an influential member of
Pecora's staff particularly interested in legislative reform. See M. PARISH, supra note 21, at
113, 115; J. SEuMAN, supra note 21, at 144; Ritchie, supra note 254, at 96.); D. Levin, supra
note 21, at 349; Stokes, Memorandum re Regulation of Stock Exchanges 6 (Nov. 24, 1933)
("Consideration might also be given to the desirability of requiring that a certain number of
directors be elected on a ballot in which each share holder has one vote regardless of the
number of shares he controls.") (copy in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY Cou.EcTIoN, supra note
78, item 9).
272. See supra notes 225-230, 263-266 and accompanying text (Money Trust Investigation
and Dickinson committee).
273. Stokes, Memorandum re Regulation of Stock Exchanges, supra note 271, at 2-3 ("The
most effective solution would presumably be compulsory Federal incorporation for all corpo-
rations whose securities are listed on the exchanges .... Assuming that such a step is out of
the question as too radical, the solution must lie in forcing corporations to adopt provisions
in their charters and by-laws which are adequate to protect the security holders. This may be
achieved by making such provisions a prerequisite ... to listing.").
274. The Exchange Act was amended in 1964 to require most publicly held corporations
to register securities with the SEC and thus subject themselves to the corporate-law provisions
of the Exchange Act. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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porations. If the burdens imposed on them exceeded the value created
by an exchange market, corporations would simply forego listing their
securities. Even if they could have had it enacted, the drafters would
not have wanted a statute with corporate law rules so onerous that
companies would have refused to list their securities on exchanges. The
drafters recognized that by using listing as a trigger they gave the man-
agement of each publicly held corporation effective power to opt out
of the statute, and thus they had to consider and justify the price that
every reform exacted from those who controlled publicly held cor-
porations. 275 This recognition no doubt contributed to the drafters'
willingness to limit the scope of section 16 as the bill was considered
in Congress. It also would have kept them from supporting a provision
as overinclusive and underinclusive as conventional explanations make
section 16 out to be.
Over the next several weeks, Stokes's outline was refined into the
bill that formed the basis for the Exchange Act. Originally, Stokes
proposed to authorize the FTC to determine the conditions under which
a security would be admitted to trading on an exchange, and his early
drafts of the bill did not articulate what would be required of publicly
held corporations. 276 Subsequently, Telford Taylor, another young
lawyer, was brought into the drafting process, 277 and he prepared de-
275. See Draft for Memorandum re Amendments to Order of April 3, 1934 ("in connection
with the threat of de-listing and the answering argument that stockholders will not permit de-
listing the fact should not be overlooked that the influential stockholders may be in favor of
de-listing as a result of this section [i.e., the predecessor of § 16]") (copy in 2 DocuirrARY
HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 78, item 22); Outline by I.N.P. Stokes, 2nd, supra note 269,
at V (handwritten interlineation: "How likely are corporations to forego listing?"); I.N.P.
Stokes, 2nd, Draft No. I for Memorandum § 15 (March 28, 1934) (The predecessor of § 16
"seems to me the most dangerous, in regard to the possibility of a substantial withdrawal
from listing by important corporations. It might be well to confine it merely to reports of
transactions by directors and officers.") (copy in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra
note 78, item 20); see also H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(c) (1934), reprinted in 10
LEGisLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 31, item 31 (bill enacted by House and sent to conference)
(predecessor of § 16 would not apply if securities were registered on an exchange without
consent of corporation). The veto power managers had over any corporate law rules triggered
by exchange regulation was complicated by a dilemma inherent -in trading rules. It is not
practicable to require managers to take and hold large equity positions, and any burden on
selling has the perverse effect of discouraging managers from buying in the first place. See,
e.g., supra notes 76-77 (§ 16(h) may discourage managers from buying at all). In the end, the
judgment on any trading rule must balance the benefits of discouraging inappropriate trading
against the cost of discouraging ownership generally.
276. See Draft of bill by I.N.P. Stokes, 2nd (Jan. 10, 1934) (copy in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 78, item 5); Draft of bill by I.N.P. Stokes, 2nd, with changes
(Jan. 12, 1934) (copy in 2 DOCUmENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 78, item 6).
277. See D. Levin, supra note 21, at 349 (Corcoran directed Taylor to write a bill); see
also M. PARIUSH, supra note 21, at 115, 116 n.7; J. SELiG1AN, supra note 21, at 83 ("Another
young attorney, Telford Taylor, then joined Stokes in drawing up drafts of a Stock exchange
bill; these were reviewed by both Landis and Cohen.").
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tailed provisions that would have empowered the FTC to promulgate
minimum listing requirements
designed to insure that adequate information shall be given and made
public with respect to the financial condition of the issuers of se-
curities ... to protect the interests of creditors of such issuers ...
and to insure that publicity be given to transactions in the stock of
corporations by officers or directors. 27'
Stokes and Taylor then collaborated on a bill that would have for-
bidden directors and officers to sell exchange-listed stock short or buy
it on margin, without any need for implementing regulations. 279
The bill that Stokes and Taylor prepared was submitted to the
Senate committee and its counsel, Ferdinand Pecora.20 Pecora insisted
on a more rigid bill that specifically outlawed a variety of suspect prac-
tices. Although Landis would have preferred to retain the flexibility
inherent in the administrative discretion of the earlier drafts, the bill
was rewritten to the satisfaction of Pecora.2 1 Senator Duncan Fletcher
introduced the bill, on February 9, 1933, and Sam Rayburn introduced
it in the House of Representatives the next day.282 After the Fletcher-
Rayburn bill was carefully considered and repeatedly and substantially
amended, it was enacted as the Exchange Act.
Section 15(a) of the Fletcher-Rayburn bill would have required
officers and directors of companies with exchange-registered securities
and anyone owning more than five percent of any security of such
a company to report the amounts of all securities she owned bene-
ficially or of record, and to report any changes in ownership there-
after.23 Section 15(b) would have made it illegal for an officer or
278. Telford Taylor, Draft of Bill § 19 (undated) (copy in 2 DocuimwARY HisToRY
COLLECTION, supra note 78, item 7); see also Draft by I.N.P. Stokes, 2nd., § 6 (undated, but
subsequent to Telford Taylor draft) (FTC to promulgate rules to "prevent unfair practices in
transactions in securities by" officers and directors) (copy in 2 DocurmTR Y HISTORY
COLLECTIoN, supra note 78, item 10). Taylor's draft is described in D. Levin, supra note 21,
at 349 n.3.
279. Stokes & Taylor, Draft for Stock Exchange Bill § 18 (Jan. 23, 1934) (copy in 2
DocumeNtARY HisToRy COincTON, supra note 78, item 11).
280. The table of contents of Landis's collection of drafts indicates that the draft of Jan.
23, 1934, supra note 279, was submitted to the Senate, but the collection also includes another
draft prepared by Stokes and Taylor, dated Feb. 1, 1934 (copy in 2 DocutENTR y HISTORY
COLLECTION, supra note 78, item 13), which the table of contents indicates was submitted to
Duncan Fletcher, who was the chairman of the Senate committee. The February 1 draft would
have incorporated the provision of the January 23 draft that forbade officers and directors to
sell short or buy on margin, although it moved the provision forward to put it after the
provision prohibiting manipulation of security prices.
281. See J. SELIGumAo, supra note 21, at 83-85; Ritchie, supra note 254, at 96-97; see also
D. Levin, supra note 21, at 350-51; Benjamin V. Cohen, Draft Bill (Feb. 5, 1934) (copy in 2
DocumENTARY HIsTORY COLLECTION, supra note 78, item 16).
282. Fletcher-Rayburn bill, supra note 73.
283. Id. § 15(a): (The structure of the Fletcher-Rayburn bill was retained in the enacted
January 1991] THE GENIUS OF SECTION 16
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
director284 of a company with a security registered on a national se-
curities exchange or anyone owning more than five percent of any class
of stock of such a company to buy
such registered security with the intention or expectation of selling
the same security within six months; and any profit made by such
person on any transaction in such a registered security extending over
a period of less than six months shall inure to and be recoverable
by the issuer, irrespective of any intention or expectation on his part
in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased
for a period exceeding six months. 25
Covered persons would also have been forbidden to sell registered se-
curities short or against the box.2 6 Finally, the Fletcher-Rayburn bill
would have made it illegal for the listed insiders to disclose confidential
information regarding or affecting any such registered security unless
such disclosure was necessary or proper as a part of the insider's cor-
porate duties. Any person to whom an unlawful disclosure was made
would have had to forfeit to the issuer any profit from matched trades
during the ensuing six months unless the tippee had no grounds to
believe the disclosure was improper.28 7
Section 15 of the Fletcher-Rayburn bill was transformed into sec-
tion 16 of the Exchange Act over the following months. The numerous
revisions made over the course of several introduced bills essentially
accomplished two changes. First, the statute became more easily en-
forceable and more certain to achieve the reforms it contemplated.
Exchange Act, but the section numbers changed with the insertion of § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d
(1988), which established the SEC.)
284. Id. § 15(b)(1). The first few lines of § 15(b)(1) were poorly drawn, but Thomas
Corcoran explained that it was intended to reach officers and directors regardless of their
holdings. House Hearings, supra note 85, at 133; Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at
6555.
285. Fletcher-Rayburn bill, supra note 73, § 15(b)(1). The limitation to purchases followed
by sales (as opposed to sales followed by purchases) may have been inadvertent. See Stock
Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at 6557-58.
286. Fletcher-Rayburn bill, supra note 73, § 15(b)(2). The analogous provision of the
Exchange Act, § 16(c), covers sales of any equity security of an issuer with registered equity
securities.
287. Fletcher-Rayburn bill, supra note 73, § 15(b)(3). Although the provision called for
tippees to forfeit profits from any transaction within six months of the disclosure, it apparently
contemplated forfeiture only for matched trades, because it went on to provide for profit to
be calculated by matching the highest sale price during the period with the lowest purchase
price. (Substantially the same language was included in the provision governing short-swing
trading by officers, directors, and principal stockholders. Id. § 15(b)(1).) This provision was
not included in Cohen's draft bill of February 5, which included a version of § 15 that was
otherwise virtually identical to that in the Fletcher-Rayburn bill. See Benjamin V. Cohen,
Draft Bill, supra note 281, § 15; see also Mimeograph Preliminary Print of House Bill § 15
(also omitting § 15(b)(3)) (copy in 3 DocuMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 78, item
2).
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Second, it became less a tool for ensuring equal access to inside in-
formation and more a tool for aligning management and stockholder
interests. While each of these goals are apparent in both the Fletcher-
Rayburn bill and the Exchange Act, in successive amendments the
drafters removed provisions that would have contributed to infor-
mational equality at the same time that they refined the whole section
to direct it to situations in which there was reason to worry that pub-
licly held companies might be mismanaged.
Consider first the anti-tipping provision of the Fletcher-Rayburn
bill. The.bill would have prohibited insiders from improperly dis-
closing corporate information and would have required knowing re-
cipients of improper tips to forfeit any near-term trading profits. This
provision demonstrates the sponsors' interest in informational equal-
ity, but its presence also makes it hard to explain the rest of section
15 of the Fletcher-Rayburn bill (or section 16 of the Exchange Act)
in those terms.
While section 15 of the Fletcher-Rayburn bill made it illegal for
control persons to disclose inside information improperly, it did not
forbid them to trade on the basis of inside information and it did not
require them to forfeit their profits if they did. The failure to forbid
insiders to trade on inside information in section 16 of the enacted
statute is consistent with the conscious exclusion of any sanction that
required proof of anything beyond the fact of trading. 288 That ex-
planation, however, cannot account for the omission from the Fletcher-
Rayburn bill. Section 15(b) of the bill would have forbidden tippees
to trade after knowingly receiving material inside information im-
properly, but it would not have forbidden insiders to trade on the basis
of such information. The bill did contemplate inquiry into the mental
state of a trading insider, but the inquiry was not to be into whether
the insider possessed inside information. Instead, the government would
have had to prove that the insider bought with "the intention or ex-
pectation of selling the same security within six months." ' 9 Thus, the
bill would have let insiders trade on inside information but proposed
to punish them when they undertook to speculate on the possibility
of immediate and transitory price changes.
The failure of the Fletcher-Rayburn bill's tipping provision to
make it into the Exchange Act is also instructive. The decision to drop
the tipping provision does not prove that the drafters and their spon-
288. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
289. Fletcher-Rayburn bill, supra note 73, § 15(b)(1). See also Stock Exchange Practices,
supra note 31, at 6557 (Senate regarding short selling by a corporate director); supra note 73
and accompanying text.
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sors were unconcerned with equality of information. The tipping pro-
vision and the prohibition of intentional short-swing trading probably
were omitted because they could not be enforced. The sponsors did
not want to recommend or fight for statutory provisions that could
not be enforced, 290 and the drafters did not favor corporate-law pro-
visions that would create burdens without accomplishing worthwhile
changes. 29' Both omissions underscore the preoccupation of those re-
sponsible for section 16 with writing an effective statute. Moreover,
the omission of the tipping provision shifted the focus of the section
away from informational equality, although this shift may have been
offset in part by the omission of the criminal sanction for premeditated
short-swing trading, inasmuch as criminal sanctions would presumably
influence the way managers do business even more than section 16(b).
Other modifications definitely made the insider trading section
less effective at discouraging insiders from taking advantage of cor-
porate information while making it a better tool for aligning stock-
holder and manager interests. These changes might well be labeled
technical even in the context of securities law, and they were not made
in response to public criticism. On the contrary, their subtlety suggests
that very few people noticed them, let alone understood their impli-
cations. Nonetheless, those implications were important, and the
changes were made for a reason.
An issuer triggers section 16 of the Exchange Act by registering
an equity security, and once an issuer registers an equity security, sec-
tion 16 regulates affiliates trading in any of its equity securities, reg-
istered or not. As was developed above, this system makes section 16
particularly well suited to aligning management and stockholder in-
terests in publicly held companies. Section 16 covers only companies
in which ownership and management are split, and it reaches virtually
all transactions necessary to discourage those in control from running
290. See House Hearings, supra note 85, at 135-38; Stock Exchange Practices, supra note
31, at 6560-61, 6967-68, 7267; cf. id. at 6955; Dooley, supra note 5, at 58.
291. See supra note 275 and accompanying text (corporations could opt out of corporate-
law provisions); cf. I.N.P. Stokes, 2nd, Draft No. 1 for Memorandum, supra note 275, §
15(b)(1) ("With its prohibition against purchases with the intention of speculating, [the Fletcher-
Rayburn bill, § 15(b)(l)] seems to me entirely too drastic on its face and too difficult to
enforce as a matter of fact. As long as provision is made for recovery of profits, I do not
see the need for a criminal penalty as well."); id. § 15(b)(3) (Fletcher-Rayburn bill § 15(b)(3)
"would seem rather difficult of enforcement."). Aside from problems of enforcement and
burden, the drafters do not seem to have thought that the tipping provision was very important.
See supra note 287 (no tipping provision in Cohen's Feb. 5 draft); see also supra notes 241,
247 and accompanying text (no recommendations on tipping in Untermyer bills or Letter of
the Counsel). But see supra note 259 (Dickinson committee recommended prohibiting giving
tips to pools).
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such companies for their own trading interests. 292 The Fletcher-Ray-
burn bill took the opposite approach; it was triggered by registration
of any security, equity or not, but it governed trading only in reg-
istered securities. 293 That approach would have better assured everyone
trading in the stock market equal access to corporate information. It
would have covered more companies, and its limitation to trading in
registered securities would not have undermined its power to protect
the integrity of the public trading market. Amendments that limited
the operation of the provision (ultimately section 16) to a smaller uni-
verse of companies and regulated a different set of transactions in the
securities of those companies were inconsistent with the goal of in-
formational equality, but they resulted in a provision that is much
better suited to regulating the way publicly owned companies are run.294
292. Thi Fletcher-Rayburn provision would have regulated trading in registered debt
securities, but § 16 does not regulate any trading in debt securities.
293. The change was not an inadvertent one resulting from redrafting. Committee prints
that showed changes from earlier drafts clearly revealed that the trading prohibition was being
extended to all equity securities. See, e.g., Confidential Sen. Comm. Print. No. 2 (showing
changes of substance to the text of H.R. 8720 agreed to by the Senate committee and proposed
changes recommended by the subcommittee to § 15(b)) (Apr. 14, 1934) (copy in 5 Doc-UwMENTARY
HIsroRY Cou.Ec-eno, supra note 78, item 6).
294. The definition of control implicitly incorporated in § 16 also changed as the proposal
was revised. The Fletcher-Rayburn bill reached some people who are not reached by § 16:
principal owners of unregistered debt or equity securities issued by companies with registered
securities; substantial record holders who were not beneficial owners; and beneficial owners
of between five and ten percent of a class. While the changes in the companies and transactions
subject to the provision worked to align the interests of managers and investors better, even
as they undermined the equalizing effect of the Fletcher-Rayburn bill, it is hard to characterize
the changes in the people covered by the provision.
The original inclusion of debtholders may have been inadvertent. The title of the provision
in the Fletcher-Rayburn bill referred to "principal stockholders," and while the Fletcher-
Rayburn bill required large debtholders to report their ownership, it did not restrict their
trading or tipping. Almost no one commented on the fact that the Fletcher-Rayburn bill
reached substantial debt holders. See Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at 7274.
Bondholders may have been removed because their original inclusion was inadvertent or
because there was no reason to include them, on the not entirely satisfactory reasoning that
debtholders typically do not have either control or access to information. See House Hearings,
supra note 85, at 307; Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at 6566, 7226, 7274, 7741-43
(testimony of Untermyer); see also I.N.P. Stokes, 2nd, Draft No. 1 for Memorandum, supra
note 275, at § 15 (Handwritten notes: "Title shd include 'bondholders'; "5% bondholders-
shd be exempt.").
The change that excluded substantial owners of unregistered equity securities of companies
with registered equity securities is difficult to explain under either approach to § 16. These
owners may influence corporate policy and they may have access to corporate information. In
explaining the original bill, Corcoran emphasized that it covered substantial owners of any
class of stock of a company with registered securities, House Hearings, supra note 85, at 132;
Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at 6555, and no one seems to have urged the bill
be rewritten to exclude them. In the end the drafters may not have realized they were excluding
such owners, and the other exclusions may have resulted simply from an over-economy of
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Thomas Corcoran explained the Fletcher-Rayburn bill in the House
and Senate committees that considered it. He suggested that section
15, which he called the "anti-Wiggin provision, '295 was supposed to
prevent insiders from speculating on inside information.2 9 He did not
explain how it would do this, but he did say that the forfeiture pro-
vision would prevent insiders from speculating on short-term swings
in stock prices. 297
Critics of the bill saw that the anti-Wiggin section would control
the way that publicly held corporations were run.298 Richard Whitney,
the president of the New York Stock Exchange, led a coalition of in-
terest groups in a bitter attack on the Exchange Act. 29 Whitney at-
tacked the provisions that dealt with stock exchange practices directly,
arguing that an inflexible statute would cripple the market. °° He took
a different approach to the parts of the bill that regulated issuers.
Whitney freely admitted that state law had failed to prevent abusive
and dishonest corporate management practices. Although he criticized
the Fletcher-Rayburn bill for transferring "many of the functions of
management ... to an administrative department of the Govern-
ment," 0' Whitney emphasized that the New York Stock Exchange
agreed that federal reform "is not only desirable but is really nec-
essary. "302 His problem with the anti-Wiggin provisions was that they
language in § 16(a). Cf. FEDERAL SEcUaRIEs CODE § 605(a) (1980) (reporting requirement
extended to owners of more than 10% of a class of equity security of a registered company).
The drafters did eliminate record owners and move the threshold on beneficial ownership
from five to ten percent on purpose. The change was designed to minimize the burden of the
section and reflected a compromise on the measure of substantial ownership. See infra note
355 and accompanying text.
295. House Hearings, supra note 85, at 134; Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at
6555.
296. House Hearings, supra note 85, at 132-33; Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31,
at 6557; see also id. at 7742 (Pecora).
297. House Hearings, supra note 85, at 133 (§ 15(b) "says he cannot trade in the stock
on short-time speculative swings-that is a 6-month swing"); Stock Exchange Practices, supra
note 31, at 6560 (forfeiture of tippee's profit from "the 6 months' swing in the stock").
298. See, e.g., Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at 7020 (letter from New York
Airbrake Co.) (The Fletcher-Rayburn bill "only purports to regulate exchanges, but through
various provisions directly affects the business and management of all corporations whose
securities may be dealt in or listed on an exchange. . . . [T]he attempt to regulate the internal
management of State corporations seems to be in derogation of the rights of the several States
to deal with such matters.").
299. J. BROOKS, supra note 21, at 200-04; C. COWING, PoPULIsTS, PLUNGERS, AND PRO-
GRESSiVES: A SOCILa HISTORY OF STOCK AND COMMODITY SPECULATION 1890-1936, at 240-42
(1965); M. PARRISH, supra note 21, at 123; J. SELIGMAN, supra note 21, at 89; James M.
Landis Interviews, supra note 267, at 199-200.
300. Thel, supra note 21, at 434-35.
301. House Hearings, supra note 85, at 152; Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at
6624.
302. House Hearings, supra note 85, at 225; Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at
6637.
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did not belong in a stock exchange bill: "They belong in the laws gov-
erning the incorporation and management of companies. ' 30 3 Whitney
accordingly urged Congress to adopt a federal corporation law.304
The broader implications of section 16 were not lost on the con-
gressional committees responsible for the Exchange Act either. When
Corcoran quoted Whitney's support for federal corporation law as
evidence of the need for federal stockholder-protection legislation,
Senator Barkley said he was "not concerned as much about the stock-
exchange reaction to this section as I am about the effect on the av-
erage man. "305 At that point, Senator Gore interjected: "This [i.e.,
the anti-Wiggin provision] is aimed at the general evil of officers and
directors rigging their stock up and down, and squeezing out their own
stockholders.... I think the objective is desirable. " 306
The drafters and others working behind the scenes also saw
section 16 as a device to regulate corporate management. Cohen,
Corcoran, and Landis produced and received a great quantity of cor-
respondence, memoranda, and proposals while they were drafting the
Exchange Act. Landis saved most of the working drafts of the Ex-
change Act (and of the Securities Act) and a great deal of related
material as well. The hundreds of documents he collected invaluably
record what the drafters had in mind as they wrote and refined the
Exchange Act. The first volume of his collection on the legislative
history of the Exchange Act is a set of "previous bills introduced
in Congress relating to stock exchanges. ' 30 7  While not
303. House Hearings, supra note 85, at 225; see also id. at 307; Stock Exchange Practices,
supra note 31, at 6637, 6914, 6954; Raoul E. Desvernine, Memorandum of Important
Differences Between H.R. 7852 and Revision of H.R. 7852 Appended Hereto 7 (undated)
("Section 15 of HR 7852, relating to transactions by directors, officers and principal stock-
holders, has been omitted from the revised Bill as not being pertinent to exchange regulations.")
(copy in 2 DocuENTrArY HisToRY CoLLEcTioN, supra note 78, item 23).
304. House Hearings, supra note 85, at 225; Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at
6636-37; see also House Hearings, supra note 85, at 307 (Frank Hope, president of the
Association of Stock Exchange Firms); Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at 6715-16
(Corcoran quoting Whitney's statement), 6914 (Hope), 6954 (Alfred Bernheim, Director of the
Securities Markets Survey of the Twentieth Century Fund). But see House Hearings, supra
note 85, at 729 (Whitney); Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at 7484 (Whitney) (Roland
Redmond, counsel to NYSE); Letter from Whitney to Presidents of All Listed Corporations,
Feb. 26, 1934, reprinted in Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at 7283-86. See generally
J. SEIGMAN, supra note 21, at 87 (recommendation for federal corporation act).
305. Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at 6559.
306. Id.; see also id. at 6558 (Senator Gore on tipping: "Would this [the forfeiture
provision] prevent him from confederating with someone else, if he were willing to forfeit the
profit? His friends on the outside would take the profit resulting from the influence he
exercised on the market, and then split the pot with him."). Senators Barkley and Gore,
senior Democratic members of the Subcommittee on Stock Exchange Practices, were influential
supporters of the Exchange Act. Cf. J. SELGGMAN, supra note 21, at 98 (Chairman Fletcher
described Barkley as "sympathetic to the legislation.").
307. 1 DoctmmrARY HISToY CoLLEcTiON, supra note 78.
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exhaustive, 08 this compilation does include fifty-one bills introduced
between 1924 and 1933, the first of which is a bill entitled the Cor-
poration Act3°9 that was introduced in the Senate in 1924. The Cor-
porations Act was largely a polemic against Wall Street,310 and it does
not seem to have gone anywhere after it was introduced. It did en-
vision particular substantive reforms, however, and one of its pro-
visions, discussed below, was apparently the model for section 16.
The Corporation Act would have provided for federal chartering
of corporations and more or less complete regulation of the stock ex-
changes, and while the bill was not very clearly written, it seems to
have contemplated forbidding both margin buying and short selling.
Redundantly, the bill made it a crime for anyone to sell short
any security of a corporation ... in which he is an officer or em-
ployee ... [who] relies on .. .buying said security ... at a future
time, which will show a profit in the transaction, and who through
the sale of this security, and his future acts or influence as officer,
or employe [sic], of said corporation . . ., hopes to depress the mar-
ket value of the securities of said corporation ... so that he may
buy said securities back at a profit. 311
This provision proposed to regulate insider short sales (addressed
in section 16(c) of the Exchange Act) when combined with offsetting
purchases of the sort addressed by section 16(b). As the cited passage
suggests, however, it would have operated only on insiders who in-
tended to mismanage their companies. Even if the Corporation Act
was not the model for section 16, it brought home to the drafters both
that those in control of corporations might manipulate corporate af-
fairs in order to create trading opportunities and that trading rules
could regulate the way corporations are run.
The most extensive discussion of the anti-Wiggin provision in the
drafters' private papers is contained in a long memorandum on "cer-
tain provisions of the [Fletcher-Rayburn bill] bearing upon the rela-
308. Cf. Hanna, The Federal Regulation of Stock Exchanges, 5 S. CAL. L. REv. 9, 10,
11, 18 n.9 (1932) (noting some earlier bills).
309. S. 1826, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924). See generally Thel, supra note 21, at 407 n.95.
310. See, e.g., S. 1826, supra note 309, § 1 ("The term 'gambler in stocks' means one
who stakes his money on a contingency-he is not an investor or a speculator, never buys a
share outright-he it is who plays against the bank, or the other gamblers who accept his bet.
It is this element who are destroying the confidence of the investing public and security values,
and who this Act is meant to eliminate ....").
311. Id. § 4; see also S. 4647, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. § (1)(i) (1932) (no security to be dealt
with on a stock exchange unless the issuer forbade officers and directors to effect short sales
and required them to give the board advance notice of any purchase or sale of any security
of the issuer and post-trade notice to the exchange) (copy in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
COLLECTION, supra note 78, item 35); S. 782, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. § (1)(i) (1933) (same) (copy
in I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 78, item 36).
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tions between investors in, and managements of, American corporate
enterprise."3 12 Alexander Sachs, an economist who had just left the
National Industrial Recovery Administration, prepared this fine piece
of work for Landis, Corcoran, and Cohen in response to their request
for his comments on the bill.313 The gist of his argument was that "while
motivated by the high minded purpose of eliminating the manipulation
of prices by interested parties exploiting confidential information re-
garding corporate action, 31 4 the [Fletcher-Rayburn] Bill, particularly
Section 15, is vitiated by an underlying self-contradiction. ' 315 Sachs
suggested that, by limiting management to "lock-in" investments with
the short-swing trading provision and by placing an almost intolerable
burden on any management communication with the provisions on
tipping and false statements in filed documents, the bill "effected a
312. Memorandum on Obstacles in the Securities Exchange Act to Efficient Investment
and Enterprising Management, Abbreviated Statement I (Feb. 1934) [hereinafter Sachs Mem-
orandum] (copy in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 78, item 35); see also
Letter from Alexander Sachs to Landis, Corcoran, and Cohen [hereinafter Letter from
Alexander Sachs] (addressed "Dear Jim, Tom and Ben") I (Mar. 9, 1934) (cover letter for
Sachs Memorandum) ("I have confined myself largely to the effects of the Bill on the processes
of investment and business in their bearing on recovery.") (copy in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
COuECTION, supra note 78, item 35).
313. Along with the criticism discussed in the text, Sachs articulated objections to the Act
that have since come to be regarded as the Act's most important flaws. He saw that the
Exchange Act reflected a "touching faith in ... mere information," Sachs Memorandum,
supra note 312, Abbreviated Statement 3, when what investors really wanted was access to
management interpretation of facts and predictions of the future, id. at 3-4; cf. H. KiUPKE,
THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979). He also
saw that any prohibition on insider trading and tipping would interfere with investment
analysis. Sachs Memorandum, supra note 312, Part I (entitled "Obstacles in the Act to
Efficient Investment Research and to Management Enterprise"); cf. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646, 678 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing vagueness of the disclosure requirement).
He suggested that such a prohibition would lead to "a bootleg market in confidential
information," Sachs Memorandum, supra note 312, Part I, at 13, in which government.
officials were likely to participate, id. Part II, at 3; cf. H. MIANN, supra note 18, at 171
(outlining government access to information affecting stock market prices).
314. Sachs saw that the authors hoped to reform corporate management, but he focused
on what he saw as the Fletcher-Rayburn bill's unintended effects on business operations. Sachs
predicted that the immediate consequence of the bill would be "economic deflation and
disorganization of the system." Letter from Alexander Sachs, supra note 312, at 3. By
discouraging management investment and restricting the flow of inside information, the anti-
Wiggin provision would separate ownership from management and would leave investors with
little choice but to invest in widely followed market-leaders. The Brandeisian drafters must
have been troubled by his prediction of the stifling of smaller units of business and the
acceleration and magnification of "monopolistic tendencies." Id. at 1-2.
315. Sachs Memorandum, supra note 312, Abbreviated Statement, at 3. Sachs's problem
with managers using inside information for their own ends.was not that everyone should have
equal access to inside information, but instead that managers who can take advantage of inside
information may manipulate the flow of that information. Insider trading was wrong chiefly
because it might lead to manipulation; not because it was inherently unfair.
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complete divorce of ownership from management!" 3 6 There is no rec-
ord of how the drafters responded to Sachs's memorandum, but the
enacted statute accords with his recommendations to the extent that
it eliminates the restrictions on tipping and provides for administrative
flexibility.317
C. The Purpose Stated in Section 16(b)
The Senate and House committees considering the Fletcher-Ray-
burn bill took the public and private criticism seriously, and Rayburn
introduced a revised bill on March 19, 1934.318 Most of the substantive
provisions of the bill were changed, including the anti-Wiggin pro-
vision.319 The new provision was triggered by the registration of an
equity security (the original anti-Wiggin provision applied whenever
any security was registered), 32° and it applied to officers, directors, and
beneficial holders (the Fletcher-Rayburn bill applied to principal rec-
ord holders as well). 321 It was no longer a crime to buy with a view
to selling within six months, but affiliates had to forfeit their profits
if they sold a registered equity security (as opposed to any registered
security in the Fletcher-Rayburn bill and any equity security in the
Exchange Act) within six months after buying or, for the first time,
if they bought within six months after selling.322 The prohibition of
short selling also was limited to registered equity securities as was the
prohibition of sales against the box, which was further modified to
allow affiliates twenty days to deliver (as opposed to five under the
Fletcher-Rayburn bill) .323
316. Id.
317. See id. at 8 ("Concretely the plan is as follows: (1) that the Act be amended along
flexible, realistic lines and that its administration be invested in a regulatory body independent
of the existing" FTC.).
318. H.R. 8720, supra note 175.
319. Id. § 15. See generally Thel, supra note 21, at 442-47.
320. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
321. Id. Record owners were deleted "to protect banks when acting as agents or trustees
where the securities held by the banks for its principals are registered in the name of nominees;
and also brokers 'in whose name there was registered more than 5 per cent of a corporation's
stock who might not own or have a beneficial interest in a single share."' Herlands, Criminal
Aspects of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 21 VA. L. REV. 139, 167 (1934) (references
to congressional hearings omitted); see House Hearings, supra note 85, at 307; Stock Exchange
Practices, supra note 31, at 6914, 7226.
322. Senator Bulkley had suggested this extension to Corcoran during the latter's committee
testimony on the Fletcher-Rayburn bill. Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at 6557-58.
323. Witnesses had recommended this change. House Hearings, supra note 85, at 262;
Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at 6836, 6830 (statement of Frank Shaunessy,
President of the San Francisco Stock Exchange), 6992-93 (statement of Eugene Thompson,
President of the Associated Stock Exchange), 7228 (statement of William Potter, Chairman
of the Board, Guaranty Trust Co.).
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Rayburn also provided for the exemption of securities and trans-
actions from his revised anti-Wiggin provision. The provision would
not have applied to any "exempted security."' 32 This was a new term
in the bill, and broadly speaking, it encompassed securities of the United
States and any other securities that the Act's administrators deter-
mined should be exempt from particular provisions of the Act.325 Ray-
burn also provided two exemptions from the forfeiture provision in
a single sentence at the end of the provision:
This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where
such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase
and sale or sale and purchase of the security involved, nor any trans-
action which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt
as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection [i.e., the
forfeiture provision] of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer
by reason of his relationship to the issuer.3 26
The exemption for beneficial owners who were not such both at
the time of the purchase and the sale has had a history befitting its
turbidity. The only explanation suggested by the hearings is the pos-
sibility that an estate that received a substantial amount of stock and
then had to liquidate to raise funds would have to forfeit profits. 327
If so, the phrase "was not such" was supposed to mean that the for-
feiture provision applied only when the same entity bought and sold
324. Only the reporting part of the anti-Wiggin provision of Rayburn's bill explicitly
excluded exempted securities, H.R. 8720, supra note 175, § 15(a), but the short-swing trading
and sale provisions referred to "such registered equity security," id. § 15(b), (c), apparently
incorporating the exemption. The Exchange Act explicitly excludes exempted securities from
each operative part of § 16.
325. H.R. 8720, supra note 175, § 3(a)(13).
326. Id. § 15(b). The bill also added an exception for securities "acquired in good faith
in connection with a debt previously contracted." Id. This exception is incorporated in § 16(b)
of the Act in the same words.
For what it is worth, the exclusion of securities acquired in connection with previous debts
seems to have been agreed upon first, then the exclusion of exempted securities, and finally
the exemption that began with "[This subsection shall not be construed to cover any
transaction." Id. Compare Second Revision of Bill after introduction with Second Revision
of Bill with changes and Third Revision of Bill (copies in 2 DocnsaENrARY HISTORY COLLEMCTON,
supra note 78, items 6, 7, 8 respectively).
327. See Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at 6558, 7266. The explanation is weak,
but it is the best one based on the historical record. See also H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(Committee Print with handwritten comments) (handwritten comment facing first line of §
15(b): "estate sells under 6 mos after acquiring ... shd exempt bks, trustees & exrs but may
exempt") (copy in 4 DOCumENTARY HISTORY COLLEcTIoN, supra note 78, item 9). The SEC
offered this explanation to the Supreme Court, but the Court rejected the Commission's
argument that the exemption should be limited to persons who became principal stockholders
involuntarily. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1972); see also
Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 29-34, Reliance Electric, 404 U.S. 418 (No. 70-79).
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(or sold and bought).3 28 The Supreme Court has construed the clause
to limit forfeiture to people who beneficially owned the requisite
amount of stock (as enacted, more than ten percent) at the time of
each of the matched trades, substantially limiting the burden that sec-
tion 16(b) places on principal stockholders. 29 If the drafters only meant
to clarify that trades effected by different beneficial owners were not
to be matched, the subsequent history of the clause teaches a great
lesson in the dangers of using the word "such" as a substitute for
careful drafting.
Section 16 also retains administrative power to grant relief from
the forfeiture provision (substituting the SEC for the FTC), but Ray-
burn's language was broken into two parts. Rayburn would have per-
mitted transactions to be exempted from the forfeiture provision if
they were not comprehended within the stated statutory purpose. Sec-
tion 16 incorporates this exemption, but the stated statutory purpose
is at the beginning of section 16(b) and the administrative authority
at the end.330 A9 enacted, then, the forfeiture provision begins with
the defined statutory purpose, expressed in the same words Rayburn
used, and ends with the exemptive authority, again stated in Rayburn's
words. Section 16(b) begins: "[flor the purpose of preventing the un-
fair use of information which may have been obtained by such ben-
eficial owner, director or officer by reason of his relationship to the
issuer," certain short-swing trading profits shall inure to and be re-
coverable by issuers.
Commentators and courts often cite the introductory language of
section 16(b) to support the proposition that section 16 was supposed
to achieve parity of information.3 31 The purpose clause does seem to
328. In other words, the word "such" was intended to refer to ownership (i.e., "where
such beneficial owner was not the owner both at the time of the purchase and sale") rather
than the status of being a principal stockholder (i.e., "where such beneficial owner was not
the owner of more than 5% of a class both at the time of the purchase and sale").
329. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976) (§ 16(b) does
not apply if the owner of the securities was not a beneficial owner at the time of both sale
and purchase); see also Reliance Elec. Co., 404 U.S. at 423. The proposed Federal Securities
Code would change the language of the statute to overrule these cases. FEDERAL SECUmms
CODE § 1714(d)(1), (2) (1980); see also id. comments 5, 6.
330. The Senate Banking Committee divided the clause this way when it reworked Rayburn's
revision, and it may have put the purpose clause at the beginning of § 16(b) as a matter of
style. Compare S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 7(a) (1934), reprinted in 11 LEoISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 31, item 37 (purpose clause at end of first sentence) with Exchange Act § 7(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1988) (purpose clause at beginning of sentence).
331. See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 591 (1973) ("As
specified in its introductory clause, § 16(b) was enacted '[flor the purpose of preventing the
unfair use of information which may have been obtained by [a statutory insider] ... by
reason of his relationship to the issuer."'); Exchange Act Release No. 26,333, supra note 6,
89,599 ('For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
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justify the conventional understanding that the drafters created section
16 (or at least section 16(b)) 32 to ensure equal access to corporate in-
formation; it is certainly a nagging problem for anyone who-would
explain the section in the terms proposed in this Article.
In thinking about the purpose clause, it is important to bear in
mind how it got into the statute and the function it was intended to
perform. The clause may deserve respect, 333 but when it was inserted,
no one suggested that it would control the operative reach of the stat-
ute, and by and large-it has not. 334 Congress did not enact the purpose
clause because the drafters or, anyone else wanted Congress to justify
the section. Even if Congress wanted to justify section 16, the cir-
cumstances in which the Exchange Act was drafted and revised were
not calculated to produce statutory language that correctly or clearly
expressed the purpose of section 16.
The legislative history bears out Professor Loss when he explains
that the purpose clause, which he calls a preamble, "was intended
merely as an aid to constitutionality, as well as a guide to the Com-
mission in the exercise of its rulemaking authority. ' 335 The purpose
clause was only a tag on the grant of administrative power to exempt
transactions from the forfeiture provision, which authority Rayburn
presumably incorporated in response to consistent complaints of stat-
utory inflexibility. The purpose clause, in turn, was presumably in-
cluded in order to avoid giving the administrators unfettered
discretion. 3 6
Given the drafters' reasons for adding the purpose clause and the
constraints on their work, there is reason to be cautious in taking it
at face value in trying to discover what they wanted the operative pro-
obtained by [an insider] by reason of his relationship to the issuer,' Congress enacted Section
16(b).") (footnote citing § 16(b) omitted; alteration in Release); R. CLARK, supra note 4, at
295 ("The purpose of section 16(b), as stated in the statute itself...."); W. PAINRMR, supra
note 115, at 12; Dietz, A Practical Look at Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 43
FoRDTAn L. REv. 1, 1 (1974); Meeker & Cooney, supra note 12, at 950; Seligman, supra note
12, at 3.
332. Section 16(e) refers to the plural but unstated "purposes" of the section, whereas §
16(b) refers to a singular, stated "purpose" of the subsection.
333. If congressional intent is to determine the way § 16 operates in marginal cases, perhaps
the purpose stated in the statute should control the actual purpose of the drafters and their
sponsors. See infra notes 392-393 and accompanying text.
334. It is very well settled that "a showing of an actual unfair use of inside information
is not required for recovery" under § 16(b). 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 547; see also id. at
556. The purpose clause, however, has sometimes informed the construction of the statute.
The Supreme Court has construed the language of the statute to avoid forfeiture in so-called
unorthodox transactions in which it is unrealistic to assume or infer that the defendant had
access to inside information when it traded. Kern, 411 U.S. at 596-97. See also infra notes
394-404 and accompanying text.
335. 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 547-48.
336. Cf. 78 CONG. REc. 7864, 8091 (1934).
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visions of section 16 to accomplish. 37 If they were simply trying to
ensure that the grant of rule-making authority was not unconstitu-
tionally broad, it was not important to state the purpose accurately;
any stated goal would do, so long as it was a goal Congress had the
right to pursue. The whole bill was being revised at the time, and other
changes that had clear and important substantive implications no doubt
appeared more important. In any case, it seems clear that the drafters
put little time into the change that included the purpose clause.338
337. It is clear that those most intimately involved with the anti-Wiggin provision continued
to see it as a device for aligning the interests of ownership and management, notwithstanding
the language of the purpose clause. This is apparent from a five-page congratulatory telegram
Alexander Sachs sent the drafters a few days after Rayburn introduced his revision. Telegram
from "Alexander'! to Winfield Riefler (Mar. 22, 1934) (original in Library of Congress,
Thomas 0. Corcoran papers, box 266, Exchange Act correspondence folder 1) [hereinafter
Telegram] (Riefler was a friend of Benjamin Cohen who was on the staff of the Federal
Reserve Board and who helped draft the Exchange Act. M. PARRISH, supra note 21, at 115.
"Alexander" was almost certainly Alexander Sachs; the telegram was sent from New York
and it referred to Sachs's memorandum to Cohen, Landis, and Corcoran, Sachs Memorandum,
supra note 312, as "my report." Telegram, supra, at 2. The telegram closed by asking Riefler
to "please show this to my friends the authors," and the original ended up in Corcoran's
papers.).
Sachs recommended that the anti-Wiggin provision be changed further. He suggested that
the six-month lock-in of the revised anti-Wiggin provision would discourage management stock
ownership and the "unrealistic application" of that restriction to five percent stockholders
would injure small business by causing substantial investors to flee to big-capitalization
companies. Id. at 1-2. He argued that these provisions could be liberalized without undermining
the "object" of the provision, which in the turgid language of a telegram Sachs said was "to
eliminate temptation exploitation or influencing corporate policy on dividends and like for
market manipulation." Id. at 2.
The telegram also reinforces the conclusion that the forfeiture provision was intended to
focus on the initial leg of a pair of matched trades. See infra note 338 and accompanying
text. Sachs asserted that the sort of manipulation that the provision was designed to eliminate
surely "never extends to six months." Telegram, supra, at 2. Yet the six-month holding period
effectively required by the provision would discourage managers from owning stock, which
was too high a price "for catching dimly premeditated plan which all sorts economic market
forces bound change in six months." Id. Accordingly, Sachs recommended changing the period
to 30 days, a recommendation the ABA Task Force recently repeated. See supra note 74.
338. The purpose clause does not seem to have been written very carefully. It does not,
for example, proscribe all use of inside information, but only the unfair use of such information.
Moreover, whereas the forfeiture provision of the Rayburn revision (and the bill) refers to the
purpose of the subsection, the arbitrage provision of the revision (and the bill) refers to the
purposes of the section. The loose language of the beneficial-owner clause, added at the same
time as part of the same sentence, is also instructive. See supra notes 327-329 and accompanying
text.
The drafters might have stated their corporate governance goals more clearly had they
thought that their language would have influenced future regulators, but they were acutely
aware that the course of administrative regulation was going to be determined not by what
the statute said but by who administered it. The question of who would administer the statute
was central in the debate over the Exchange Act. House Hearings, supra note 85, at 148-49;
see also Thel, supra note 21.
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In the end, though, the drafters did put the purpose of section
16(b) in terms of information availability rather than manipulation or
management regulation. It is odd that they did so, since the practical
implications of section 16's operation and the whole history of its en-
actment suggest that the drafters were intent on improving the way
large corporations worked. Even if they were not paying much at-
tention, the drafters were clever, and it is unlikely that their choice
of words was entirely unconsidered.
The drafters and their sponsors may have been trying to hide their
agenda.3 39 In the face of tremendous opposition to other parts of the
proposed Act on the grounds that they would result in government
control of business, 314 the drafters might have been reluctant to explain
how section 16 would affect the way corporations operate, especially
since they were introducing administrative discretion into the section
at that time. Cohen, Corcoran, and Landis must have been acutely
aware of the potential political problems. After all, they had been
asked to work on the securities statutes only because of the outrage
that greeted Roosevelt's original proposal to authorize federal bu-
reaucrats to forbid the sale of securities if they found the issuer's af-
fairs were unsound. 341
The drafters' reluctance to admit that they were regulating the
way corporations did business would have been reinforced by their
anxiety over the extent of the federal government's constitutional power
to regulate business, an understandable concern at a time when the
federal government was thought to have less of a role in regulating
commerce than is now recognized. Critics of the proposed Act con-
sistently argued that Congress was exceeding its power, and supporters
recognized that the issue was difficult. 342 The key to the Act's con-
339. If this was what happened, it was an interesting turn in which legislative staff tried
to hide a substantive reform that was adopted by Congress instead of claiming a reform that
was rejected. Cf. Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368 (1987); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480
U.S. 616 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Posner, Legislation and Interpretation: A Primer, 68
NEn. L. REv. 431, 440 (1989).
340. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 31, at 30 (minority views); S. REP. No. 792,
supra note 117, at 10; D. Rrrcnam, supra note 222, at 55-56; J. SE]UouA, supra note 21, at
89-90, 96-97; see also supra note 301 and accompanying text (Whitney charged that bill
transferred functions of management to the government); cf. J. S o usAX, supra note 21, at
76-81 (pressure to amend Securities Act); Tracy & MacChesney, supra note 182, at 1056-57
(controversy over § 16).
341. See supra notes 251-258 and accompanying text.
342. Landis was the first witness to testify before Congress on the Fletcher-Rayburn bill.
He started by saying that he thought there was no need to speak upon the need for regulation
of the stock exchanges and turned immediately to the question of constitutionality, which he
conceded was "not free from doubt." House Hearings, supra note 85, at 16-20; see also id.
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stitutionality was the relationship between stock market transactions
and interstate commerce.34 3 It was safer to say that the purpose of
section 16 was to prevent insiders from trading on inside information
than to say that the purpose was to improve the way corporations went
about producing goods and services. Under the first characterization,
Congress was trying to prevent fiduciaries from effecting inherently
fraudulent securities transactions in an interstate market.3 4 Under the
second, Congress would have been trying to use its power over in-
terstate trading in securities ,to influence manufacturing and other ac-
tivities, which at the time were thought to be quite remote from
interstate commerce. 345
Finally, the language of the purpose clauses may have been a re-
sult of the drafters being lawyers as much as of any strategy for ac-
complishing a controversial program .3  Henry Manne has attributed
what he takes to be a misguided consensus that it is unfair for insiders
to trade on the basis of nonpublic information to the fact that lawyers
have dominated public discussion of the subject to the exclusion of
more objective and morally detached economists.347 Lawyers do not
all think the consensus is misguided of course, 3 8 but critics of insider
trading would have to agree that much discussion of insider trading
has heavy "overtones of fairness and morality. ' 349
at 917 (Memorandum Submitted by Noel T. Dowling Concerning the Power of Congress,
Under the Commerce Clause, To Regulate Security Exchanges), 925 (Brief Submitted by
Thomas G. Corcoran and Benjamin V. Cohen in Support of Constitutionality of Stock
Exchange Bill).
343. See, e.g., id. at 16 (Landis testimony).
344. This was the argument proponents offered in favor of the provision. Id. at 937-38.
345. See, e.g., id. at 29-32 (discussion between Landis and Rep. Huddleston), 41-42 (letter
from Landis to Rep. Rayburn), 233-46 (Thomas B. Gay), 246-51 (Landis' written opinion
questioning constitutionality of earlier bill), 562-71 (brief of Hunton, Williams et al.); Hanna,
supra note 308, at 18-23; Tracy & MacChesney, supra note 182, at 1037 n.*; cf. Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (Congress could not prohibit interstate commerce in goods
produced with child labor).
346. See supra notes 256-257 and accompanying text; see also supra note 222.
347. H. MANE, supra note 18, at 2-4.
348. See Macey, supra note 5, at 21 n.53 (referring to "a veritable cottage industry"
attempting to respond to Manne).
349. See supra note 2 (fairness arguments against insider trading). According to Manne:
[W]hen lawyers, judges, and law professors are faced with issues of broad social or
economic consequences, their tendency is to approach the subject with relationships
between specific individuals in mind. Their acceptance or rejection of a practice will
reflect their notion of the fairness of the transaction simply from the point of view
of the two individuals involved. It is not difficult to see why lawyers have generally
concluded that there is something unfair (primarily in the sense of "unequal") about
insiders with undisclosed good news buying shares from existing shareholders.
... The absence of any accepted economic tools for analyzing this subject made
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The fairness argument against insider trading is a winning one, 0
and accordingly advocates of section 16 had much to gain by using
it.3s1 Moreover, the fairness argument is available whenever a cor-
porate manager manipulates corporate affairs to create trading op-
portunities. To profit from price changes created by the manipulation,
the manipulator has to trade before the market understands the ma-
nipulation.3 -2 Thus, while not everyone who trades on inside in for-
mation manipulates corporate affairs, everyone who manipulates
corporate affairs to create trading opportunities intends to trade on
the basis of inside information.
the insider-trading area a fertile one for the lawyers' equity approach with its
overtoiles of fairness and morality.
H. MAmN, supra note 18, at 3.
350. See supra note 18 (commentators have ignored anti-manipulative character of § 16).
Section 16 states the equality-of-access argument in its strongest form; it does not condemn
all use of nonpublic information, but instead condemns "unfair use of information which
may have been obiained by [an affiliate] by reason of his relationship to the issuer."
351. It is also simpler to assert that it is wrong for insiders to take advantage of information
they obtain by reason of their relationship with their corporation than it is to explain how
management incentives can be refined by regulating insider trading.
352. Commentators often assert the unfairness of trading on nonpublic information at the
same time they condemn managers for manipulating corporate affairs to create trading
opportunities. See, e.g., 78 CoNG. REc. 8038 (1934) (Rep. Rayburn); Samuelson, supra note
15, at 513 ("Congress' primary concern in passing Section 16 was to protect the interests of
public market participants against company insiders who were able to take advantage of
privileged information to manipulate stock prices."); see also supra notes 155, 260, 313-317
and accompanying text. This can complicate and obscure the argument. Consider for example
one of the most cited articles on § 16, Meeker & Cooney, supra note 12. That article noted
that when Congress adopted the Exchange Act, it was aware that, "On occasion, the ability
to obtain [trading] profits led corporate insiders to manipulate the market for their stock by
causing their corporation to follow financial policies calculated to produce sudden changes in
market prices." Id. at 952. The authors nonetheless thought that in enacting § 16, Congress
was concerned with the misuse of confidential corporate information and that "[s]ection 16(b)
is tailored to eliminate profiteering on short swings in market value on the basis of advance
information." Id. "The strictures of section 16(b) ... were designed to prevent short swing
market speculation on the basis of inside information and its concomitant evil, the manipulation
of corporation affairs in a manner designed to cause market fluctuations." Id. at 979. The
article went on to examine several interpretative questions in terms of confidential information.
While Meeker & Cooney recognized a relationship between § 16 and the way managers
conduct corporate business, their treatment of the relationship differs from that suggested
here. They seem to have thought that Congress objected to managers trading corporate
securities after causing the corporations to act in a way that temporarily changes the price of
those securities only because Congress felt that insiders should not use confidential corporate
information for their own advantage. This Article takes the position that the manipulation of
corporate affairs is itself objectionable, apart from any objection to the related trading, and
for reasons that may be more compelling than those that make trading on nonpublic information
objectionable. Those in charge of public corporations should not run them for their own
benefit; and when they do, they undermine the legitimate expectations of investors and the
interests of the public. Apart from discouraging the use of confidential information by corporate
insiders, § 16 protects, the expectations of non-trading investors and the interest of the public
by encouraging the proper management of public corporations.
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D. The Enactment of Section 16
Although Rayburn's revision was not introduced in the Senate,
the Senate Banking Committee considered it.31 3 The Senate committee
modified the bill further, and wrote an anti-Wiggin provision very
similar to the one eventually enacted as section 16. 314 The Senate com-
mittee's version applied only to officers, directors, and beneficial own-
ers of more than ten percent of a class of exchange-registered equity
securities, 3-" and it exempted arbitrage transactions except those made
in contravention of administrative regulations. 3 6 The Senate com-
mittee also broke up the provision that authorized administrators to
exempt transactions from the forfeiture provision, putting the purpose
clause at the beginning of the subsection where it is now. 357
The House Commerce Committee also modified Rayburn's re-
vision. Its anti-Wiggin provision followed Rayburn's revision in cov-
ering beneficial owners of more than five percent of a class of registered
equity securities (as opposed to the Senate committee's ten percent
threshold), as-well as officers and directors. It also augmented the
reporting requirements by requiring issuers to include information on
353. See Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at 7414, 7538.
354. S. 3420, supra note 330, § 16.
355. Id. In testimony before the Senate committee, Samuel Untermyer argued that the five
percent threshold was too low. Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at 7741-43; see also
78 CONG. REc. 7961 (1934); I.N.P. Stokes's master draft of comments on Fletcher-Rayburn
bill, supra note 78, item 2 (handwritten comment facing § 15(a): "Untermyer contra 5% SH
rule").
356. S. 3420, supra note 330, § 16(d). See Memorandum Submitted on Behalf of Members
of the New York Stock Exchange who are Engaged in Domestic Arbitrage 18-19 (copy in 9
Docuim TARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 78, item 8). Richard Whitney proposed the
statutory language that was used eventually to exempt arbitrage transactions. He explained
that the New York Stock Exchange continued its general opposition to the bill, Stock Exchange
Practices, supra note 31, at 7479-80, but he proposed a set of amendments, including one that
the committee added as § 16(d) of its bill, which were explained by Roland Redmond, a
lawyer for the Exchange. Id. at 7539-86; cf. H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (Confidential
Committee Print with handwritten changes) (handwritten note at end of § 15: "(d) Redmond's
addition-exc arbitrage.") (copy in 4 DocutENTARY HISTORY COLLECTION, supra note 78, item
11).
357. The bill that the House of Representatives sent to conference did not contain a
forfeiture provision, see infra notes 358-365 and accompanying text, so the report of the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency was the only committee report that discussed
what became § 16(b) of the Exchange Act. The section-by-section analysis in that report stated:
"The expressed purpose of [the forfeiture provision] is to prevent the unfair use of inside
information. The Commission may exempt transactions not falling within this purpose." S.
REP. No. 792, supra note 117, at 21. The narrative portion of the report explained that § 16
would "render difficult or impossible the kind of transactions which were frequently described
to the committee, where directors and large stockholders participated in pools trading in the
stock of their own companies, with the benefit of advance information regarding" dividend
changes. Id. at 9.
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changes in the holdings of officers and directors in their periodic re-
ports to stockholders. On the whole, however, the House committee's
bill was much less intrusive than the Senate committee's. In the House
committee's bill short sales and sales against the box were still for-
bidden, but the House Committee's bill no longer provided for the
forfeiture of profits from short-swing trading.358
When the House of Representatives took up the House committee
bill, the discussion was rather broad, with much talk about the evils
of Wall Street and Socialism. Nonetheless, in the face of sustained
criticism that the bill would result in government control and regi-
mentation of industry, 359 the sponsors of the bill admitted up front
that it was addressed to the way publicly held corporations did busi-
ness. 36o
358. H.R. 9323, supra note 77, § 15(a). The differences between the treatment of the anti-
Wiggin provision in the Senate and House committee reports may shed light on what the
forfeiture provision was meant to accomplish. The Senate committee discussed § 16 of its bill,
which included a forfeiture provision, along with the provisions that became §§ 9 and 10 of
the Exchange Act, under the heading "Manipulative Practices." S. REP. No. 792, supra note
117, at 7-9. (It also referred to all three provisions as containing "sanctions[ aimed at those
manipulative and deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful
function." Id. at 6.) The House committee discussed the anti-Wiggin provision of its bill,
which did not contain a forfeiture provision, together with the provision governing proxy
solicitation under the caption "Control of Unfair Practices by Corporate Insiders." H.R. REP.
No. 1383, supra note 31, at 13. (The House report discussed the predecessors of §§ 9 and 10
of the Exchange Act alone under the caption "Control of Manipulative Practices." Id. at 10-
11.) See also supra note 280 (Stokes and Taylor saw insider short selling as form of
manipulation).
359. See, e.g., 78 CoNG. REc. 7690 (1934) (Rep. Cooper), 7691 (Rep. Cox), 7691 (Rep.
Parks), 7710 (Rep. Merritt), 7710 (Rep. Britten), 7937-38 (Rep. Bakewell), 7944 (Rep. Britten),
7961 (Rep. Dirksen), 8009 (Rep. Treadway), 8012 (Rep. McGugin), 8090 (Rep. Snell); cf. 78
CoNG. REc. 7696-97 (Rep. Rayburn discussing criticism).
360. According to Representative Clarence Lea, a senior Democrat member of the Com-
merce Committee who had helped revise the bill:
It is well to realize that today the vast wealth invested in stocks, bonds, corporate
securities, and bank deposits represents nearly one half the wealth of the United
States and involves the separation of ownership and control.... It means that those
in control of our great corporations ... are not the people who primarily suffer
from fraud or imprudent investments these stocks may represent. There is the greatest
temptation that managements have ever had to be unfaithful to their trusts.
In the main, the men controlling these great corporations are not large owners of
the stocks of the corporations they control. Too often they have yielded to the
temptation to control these great business institutions to their own interests, and
with a zeal out of proportion to the loyalty they have shown their stockholders....
... At the present time, however, under remote stock transactions, the victims
of mismanagement of a corporation are remote from those who inflict the injury,
the associates of the perpetrator do not ostracize or upbraid him. The victims are
unseen by those who inflict their injuries. This bill proposes to hold these wrongdoers
to a higher degree of responsibility.
This measure, as I suggested, goes a good deal further than the regulation of
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It might seem that the relatively innocuous anti-Wiggin provision
of the House committee bill, which only required ownership reporting
and forbade short sales and sales against the box, would not have
attracted much attention, but it did. In defending the bill, Sam Ray-
burn made it clear that his goal was to regulate those in control of
publicly held corporations.
Several representatives suggested that the disclosure of sales by
substantial stockholders might lead to unwarranted panic, leading to
the destruction of values.3 61 The committee had considered excluding
principal stockholders from the anti-Wiggin bill, and one of its mem-
bers proposed that the House amend the bill to the same effect.3 62
After some debate, Rayburn successfully defended the anti-Wiggin
provision of the committee bill, which he called "a very important
antimanipulative section," and the amendment was defeated.3 63 Ray-
burn argued that if principal stockholders were excluded, they would
simply dominate corporations by choosing and controlling officers and
directors. He made clear that his concern was with managers running
companies for their own ends to the detriment of public stockholders:
Here is a man however, who says: "I do not want to be an officer
or a director for the reason that if I accept such office I am held
under this provision .... I will not, therefore, allow myself to be
elected an officer; I will not allow myself to be elected a director;
but I will stay on the outside, I will control the company, I will ma-
nipulate its stock up and down. When it is the proper time to run
the market up I will run it up; when it is to my interest to run the
market down I will have the power to run it down.364
stock exchanges .... The question of the integrity of the management of the
corporation is involved; the question of the prudence of the investment represented
by the stock is involved.
78 CONG. Rc. 7861-62 (1934); see also id. at 7864 (Rep. Wolverton), 7866-69 (Rep. Maloney),
7938 (Rep. Milligan); M. PAMuSHI, supra note 21, at 131-32 (Lea's influence).
361. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 7937 (1934) (Rep. Bakewell), 8036 (Rep. Pettengill).
362. 78 CONG. REc. 8036-37 (1934) (Rep. Pettengill); see also Amendment intended to be
proposed to S. 3420 by Mr. Hebert, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (May 10, 1934) (limiting anti-Wiggin
provision to reporting by officers and directors and forbidding short sales and sales against
the box), reprinted in 11 LEGISLATrv HISTORY, supra note 31, item 38; Suggested Amendments
to H.R. 8720, Submitted by John Dickinson, Assistant Secretary of Commerce 10-11 (Mar.
30, 1934) (copy in Harvard Law School Library, James McCauley Landis Papers, box 1, file
7) ("It is highly questionable in my opinion whether it is necessary or desirable to prevent
trading in the stock of a corporation by anyone who owns more than five per cent thereof.");
Thel, supra note 21, at 453-54 (discussing this memorandum).
363. 78 CONG. REc. 8038 (1934).
364. Id. The House then approved an amendment providing that the anti-Wiggin provision
would not apply if the predicate registration of an equity security was secured without the
consent of the issuer. H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(c), reprinted in 10 LEGISLATWE
HISTORY, supra note 31, item 31; see also H.R. REP. No. 1838, supra note 143, at 36.
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The House passed its bill on May 4, 1934.365 The Senate then
amended the Senate committee's bill in a few respects and passed it
in place of the House bill. 3" The Senate floor debate was more sub-
stantive than that in the House, but the anti-Wiggin provision was not
an important issue. Instead, the Senate focused on the creation of a
new regulatory commission and a set of amendments to the Securities
Act.367
There were substantial differences between the House and Senate
conference bills, and the conferees spent most of their time on the
margin provisions and on the creation of a new regulatory agency.3"
Section 16 of the conference bill was substantially the same as the
Senate bill,3 69 and it was enacted. 370
IV. Implications of the Regulatory Explanation of
Section 16
Clearly section 16 was designed to prevent manipulation by cor-
porate insiders and at least some of those who secured the enactment
of section 16 thought about it in terms of the separation of ownership
and control. It is less clear what to make of all this. The explanation
of section 16 offered here may have important implications for the
meaning of section 16 and the rest of the Exchange Act, but the mean-
ing of a statute turns as much on institutional values as on the words
it employs or the events that led it to be enacted in a particular form.
The greatest value of the preceding examination of the operation of
section 16 and the way it came to be enacted may lie in the insight
it provides into the way legislation should be understood and the im-
portance of individual effort in law reform.
A. Writing and Understanding Statutes
Statutes should be read in historical context. As Felix Frankfurter
wrote in describing the Securities Act shortly before the Exchange Act
365. 78 CONG. REc. 8116 (1934) (bill passed); see H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934),
reprinted in 10 LEGmsLAmra HisTORy, supra note 31, item 31.
366. 78 CONG. R c. 8712-14 (1934) (bill passed); see H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934), reprinted in 10 LEGISLATrvE HISTORY, supra note 31, item 32.
367. The Senate debate is reprinted in 4 LEsLATInV HIsToRY, supra note 31, item 10.
368. See H.R. 1383, supra note 31 (conference report); 78 CONG. RaE. 10,111 (explanation
of Sen. Fletcher), 10,260-66 (statement of House managers and eiplanation of Rep. Rayburn);
M. PMUmsH, supra note 21, at 139-42; J. SEumAAN, supra note 21, at 98-100; D. Levin, supra
note 21, at 400-02.
369. The conferees added the requirement that any suit to recover short-swing profit be
brought within two years of the date such profit was realized. See H.R. REP. No. 1838, supra
note 143, at 36.
370. 78 CONG. REC. 10,185 (1934) (Senate); id. at 10,269 (House).
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was introduced, "Legislation is not anticipation. It is a response, too
often a laggard response, to serious need. ' 3 71 The Exchange Act was
a product of the pervasive unemployment that preoccupied the country
in 1934. It was adopted because many people thought that the stock
market collapse that began in 1929 had somehow caused the Great
Depression. This is not to say that parochial interests did not shape
the Exchange Act. The various securities exchanges, commercial bank-
ers, securities dealers, industrialists, and other powerful institutions
and individuals tried to shape the Act to protect their interests, and
their efforts are clearly reflected in the compromise legislation that was
finally enacted. Nonetheless, these interests shaped only the edges of
the Exchange Act; the Exchange Act really was supposed to protect
the productive economy from the stock market.
Probably just about everyone who knows that the Exchange Act
exists would agree that it was passed in response to the Depression,
yet the Depression hardly figures in recent academic or judicial dis-
cussion of the Act. To say "Of course the Exchange Act was a re-
sponse to the Depression" and then move on to some particular
problem is to miss the point: the Depression was not a matter of course.
If Congress had been responding to injured investors, it might have
done what conventional wisdom claims was done: made the stock mar-
ket a level playing field. On the other hand, when finally moved by
a profound crisis to take control of what was arguably the country's
most powerful and important private institution, Congress would hardly
have rested with a statute that did no more than "substitute a phi-
losophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor. '37 2
This Article argues that the Exchange Act was supposed to protect
the productive economy by reducing speculation and manipulation and
by aligning the interests of managers with stockholders. Others might
argue that the Act was supposed to protect the economy by making
the stock market work more efficiently, whether by eliminating waste-
ful practices or by improving the market's product-security prices.
Maybe the Act was supposed to do all of this. No matter what the
Act was supposed to do, though, it is necessary to bear in mind the
circumstances in which the Act became law to make sense of it.
The history of section 16 also shows that even when reformers
convince the legislature that reform is necessary, someone must craft
a statute carefully if reform is to occur. The enactment of section 16
371. Frankfurter, supra note 258, at 53.
372. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States, 406 U.S. 138, 151 (1972) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963))).
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was an interesting example of law reform.373 Adolf Berle eventually
claimed the Exchange Act was at least partly his on the basis of The
Modern Corporation,374 yet the book did not propose anything like
the Exchange Act, and Berle did not help to write the Act. Berle did
make an important contribution to the Act and to section 16. With
Means, he showed that something had to be done about the separation
of ownership and control in the publicly held corporation. What Berle
and Means did not do was identify the solution. The Modern Cor-
poration did not set out an agenda,375 and little of the particular tech-
nique eventually incorporated in section 16 can be traced to the book
or to any of Berle's other works. 376 More than any other provision
of the Exchange Act, section 16 emphatically rejects the collectivist
ideology usually attributed to Berle.3 77
After the problem of management manipulation was identified,
it remained to be solved. More than anything else, the drafters of the
Exchange Act knew how to solve problems. Sam Rayburn, Benjamin
Cohen, and Thomas Corcoran have been widely recognized for their
ability to get legislation enacted.378 James Landis supplemented their
talents by focusing on crafting sanctions and enforcement devices to
implement policy choices. Landis is best known today for his con-
tributions to the theory and practice of administrative law.379 He started
his career, however, as a professor of legislation, and he became in-
373. Commentators often explain the early New Deal as a conflict between two schools:
one, characterized by Adolf Berle, favoring national planning and the other, characterized by
Frankfurter, favoring a more conservative individualism. See J. SExLIoA, supra note 21, at
39-42 (Berle), 58-59 (Frankfurter). This explanation may be simplistic, but section 16 was
influenced strongly by both schools.
374. A. BELEn & G. MEANs, TM MODERN CoRPoATIoN AND PluvAT PROPERTY at vii,
253 n.* (rev. ed. 1968); Berle, Modem Functions of the Corporate System, 62 CoLum. L.
Rnv. 433, 437 (1962); see also J. ScawApz, supra note 46, at 61 (crediting THE MODERN
CORPORATION with laying the foundation for reform).
375. See McCraw, supra note 45, at 8 (discussing lack of concrete suggestions for reform).
376. Berle and Means did criticize trading by officers and directors whose possession of
nonpublic information gave them "a tremendous advantage in speculating in the securities"
of the corporation over the public. They thought the solution lay in requiring public corpo-
rations to disclose information and concluded that "[a]s the standards of disclosure of corporate
affairs become more exacting, the problem of the directors and managers in the market will
become increasingly less important." A. BERiE & G. MEANS, supra note 31, at 330.
377. See J. ScHwARz, supra note 46 (characterizing Berle's solution to the problem of
bigness: "Big corporations should be regulated by a supreme national power in Washington
that liberated Americans from economic oligarchy and broadened wealth without altering the
essentials of American individualism.").
378. See supra notes 221-222 and accompanying text.
379. See J. LANDIS, Tan ADmuisTaRATv PaocEss (1938); see also G. CAIABRnsi, A CoMoN
LAW FOR ran AGE OF STATUTES 85-86 (1982) (Landis's powerful contribution to the under-
standing of statutes).
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volved in drafting the federal securities statutes because of his expertise
with statutes. 8 0
What distinguished Landis as both statute writer and adminis-
trator was his recognition of "the importance of matching the sanc-
tions to the problems. ' 38 1 One of his biographers credits him with
originating "the fundamental SEC strategy of manipulating private
incentives to serve public ends. ' 382 A refined set of incentives along
the lines of section 16 is exactly the sort of device Landis would have
used to regulate corporate management. Section 16 nonetheless stands
apart from the rest of the Exchange Act. Everywhere else in the Act,
administrators are trusted to accomplish reforms. In stark contrast,
section 16 takes an approach one might find in the common law, cre-
ating a set of rules like those that govern fiduciaries.
In devising this solution, the drafters had to deal with what to
them probably seemed a profoundly unsettling new problem. They
were sensitive enough to its implications that they did not try to force
their preferred solution of delegation on it. Nor did they propose to
punish errant affiliates or subject their affairs to review by courts or
bureaucrats. Instead, recognizing that prevention is cheaper than cure,
they tried to eliminate the incentive for mismanagement that they
thought attended the separation of ownership and control. 3 3 In short,
their contribution was to put care and energy into solving a problem
that others had identified.
380. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARvARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (R.
Pound ed. 1934). Landis first became involved with federal securities regulation when Felix
Frankfurter asked him to help draft what became the Securities Act because of his study of
legislation. N. DAwsoN, Louis D. BRANDEIS, FELix FRANKFURTER, AND THE NEW DEAL 79
(1980); Landis, supra note 254; see also supra note 256 and accompanying text.
381. T. McCRAw, supra note 219, at 175; see also supra note 257 and accompanying text
(Landis's study of the use of sanctions to bring about conformance with statutory mandates).
382. T. McCRAw supra note 219, at 195.
383. See Douglas, supra note 42, at 1322-23:
[I]t is timely to consider the corrective measures necessary if the board is to be
employed as a medium for the protection and enhancement of the interests of the
corporation and the stockholders, rather than as a convenient device for the exercise
of economic and political power for the selfish interests of those who happen to be
in a position of dominance .... The problem then becomes one of making as
explicit as possible the various types of situations to be controlled. The record of
the last decade has revealed most of them. Specific statement in a statute, within
minimal and practicable limits, has several advantages.... This leaves the difficult,
and in spots the insoluble, problem of designing methods of control which will be
both just and fair from the viewpoint of directors and efficient from the viewpoint
of investors. In that connection our remedies should not be as hysterical as the
practices which made the demand and need for regulation insistent. Prevention will
prove more wholesome than punishment. It is a rebuke to our skill and judgment
if we cannot effect competent police measures without driving from the field of
enterprise the men of greatest competence and substance.
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The current movement to reform the governance of publicly held
corporations suggests the measure of their task. Some reformers have
gotten bogged down in trying to draft precise standards by which to
judge corporate officers and directors. 384 Other reformers have desired
to shift control of publicly held corporations from management to
some other group, whether stockholders, employees, or the state, but
have failed to accomplish their agenda. This failure is hardly sur-
prising, for conferring great power on anyone is suspect in a de-
mocracy, 385 and most reformers would not be interested in publicly
held corporations were they not confident that such corporations are
powerful. 386
Section 16 approached the problem of publicly held corporations
more pragmatically. It undertook to reduce the opportunity for those
in control of publicly traded corporations to abuse their power, and
it accomplished this change at minimal political cost. It did not shift
power over publicly held corporations to some other group of persons,
and it did not subject managers to review by others. 317 The reform
simply undertook to prevent managers from abusing their power over
publicly held corporations. Since everyone agreed that those corpo-
rations did not belong to their managers, it was hard for anyone to
quarrel with section 16. Despite its broad implications, section 16 was
enacted in substantially the same form in which it was first pro-
posed. 388 The drafters took a situation that everyone saw as a problem,
and without calling any more attention to it than necessary, they forged
a solution. It may be that the separation of ownership from control
in fact did not harm anyone, but when the Exchange Act was passed
most people thought it did. One lesson of section 16 is that identifying
a problem is not enough; it is equally important to construct effective
and politically palatable solutions. This work need not arouse con-
384. See Dent, supra note 45, at 882.
385. See J.W. Hun-T, LAW AND SocIAL ORDER, supra note 50, at 242 ("The constitutional
ideal, a stubbornly enduring part of the country's political tradition, insisted that all forms of
private and public power should be accountable to others than the powerholders."); Chayes,
The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CoRu'oRATioN l MODERN SocETrY 25,
31 (E. Mason ed. 1959). See generally J.W. Huasr, LEGrmIAcY, supra note 53. State anti-
takeover laws may owe their political success to the fact that they typically leave control where*
it is, in management. See Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes,
87 MicH. L. R-v. 846 (1989).
386. See Manning, Thinking Straight About Corporate Law Reform, 41 LAW & CoNEMrn,.
PRoB. 3, 9-27 (1977) (nine species of corporate law reform).
387. The reporting requirements of § 16(a) may be an exception. Like the proxy provisions
of the Exchange Act, they were presumably intended to shift control or provide for its
monitoring. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
388. In this, § 16 was almost alone among the provisions of the Exchange Act. See J.
SEuAN1, supra note 21, at 100.
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troversy. On the contrary, the key to success may often lie in con-
ciliation.
B. The Operation of Section 16
Although it is usually clear how section 16 is supposed to work,
occasionally courts have to decide what specific terms mean in order
to apply it in specific cases.38 9 Courts often turn to what they call leg-
islative intent or purpose for guidance in construing statutes,39 and
they have done so in construing the federal securities laws.3 91 The task
of construing a statute to achieve the goals of Congress is a difficult
one in any case, but it is complicated especially in a section 16(b) case
because Congress expressly stated a purpose in the statute. Powerful
arguments can be made for respecting such a stated purpose. 392 If courts
and administrators take Congress at its word, it may be easier for
Congress to express itself and for members to understand what they
are deciding, and sponsors of legislation may find it more difficult to
hide what they are doing from the public. On the other hand, there
is reason to interpret statutes on the assumption that legislation is en-
acted by reasonable people. Since section 16 works to improve the way
corporations do business and the history of its enactment suggests that
Congress wanted to improve business, one can argue that section 16
should be construed to effectuate this implicit-albeit hidden-pur-
pose.
389. See 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 550 ("There is no rule so 'objective' ('automatic'
would be a better word) that it does not require some mental effort in applying it on the part
of the person or persons entrusted by law with its application.") (quoting Blau v. Lamb, 363
F.2d 507, 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1966)); see also R. CLARKC, supra note
4, § 8.6 (discussing case law by focusing on the statutory terms "beneficial owner," "equity
security," and "any profit").
390. G. CALABREsI, supra note 379, at 6 n.27 ("interpretation is defined conventionally as
a search for original legislative intent").
391. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1985); Marine Bank v.
Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555-59 (1982); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78
(1977); United Hous. Found., Inc., v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849-51 (1975); Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 345-46 (1967); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953);
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). See generally Chang, Meaning,
Reference, and Reification in the Definition of a Security, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 403, 404
(1986) (cases interpreting statutory definitions of society have relied on legislative history and
the purposes of the securities acts for guidance); Karjala, Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the
National Markets in the Interpretation of Federal Securities Law, 80 Nw. U.L. Rv. 1473,
1474-75 (1986) (discussing how judicial interpretation of the Exchange Act frustrates legislative
purpose).
392. See Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:
An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. Ray. 223 (1986) (traditional approach to statutory
interpretation best furthers public goals).
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A discussion limited to section 16 probably cannot show whether
courts dealing with statutes should try to accomplish the goals of Con-
gress or how courts should determine such goals if they choose to.
An exploration of statutory interpretation is beyond the scope of this
Article.3 93 Nonetheless, section 16 offers a rich opportunity for study,
since the SEC and the courts can choose between at least two purposes
when looking for guidance or support in interpreting section 16. To
the extent that the scope of section 16 is to be determined by its pur-
pose, that choice may be critical. Accordingly, it may be appropriate
to illustrate the interaction of the competing purposes of section 16
that have been identified here.
Courts have often cited the expressed purpose of preventing trad-
ers from using inside information to support their constructions of
section 16(b). They have sometimes applied section 16 expansively so
as to prevent insiders from profiting from inside information, and they
have sometimes construed it as not applying to principal stockholders
who they have concluded could not have had access to inside infor-
mation.3 9 The scope of section 16 might be different had courts rec-
ognized it as a tool to prevent the manipulation of corporate affairs
by those seeking. to create trading bpportunities.
Consider, for example, the apparently simple interpretation of the
meaning of "officer." Section 16 requires officers of issuers with reg-
istered equity securities to file ownership and trading reports, forbids
them to sell short or against the box, and provides that any profits
they realize from short-swing trading will inure to their companies.
The word "officer" is not defined in the statute, however, and in some
cases it is difficult to determine whether a person is an officer. 39 5 If
393. For recent examples of treatment of the issue of legislative intent, see Posner, supra
note 339; Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. Rav. 405
(1989); Symposium: The First Annual Federalist Society Lawyers Convention, I1 HARv. J.L.
& PuB. POL'Y 1 (1988).
394. See, e.g., Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 249-52
(1976) (construing "at the time"); Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411
U.S. 582, 593-98 (1973) (construing "sale"); Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962) (construing
"director"); Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107, 110-12 (2d Cir. 1967)
(construing "class of equity security"); Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1949)
(construing "officer"); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp. 136 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir.) (construing
"any profit"), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). But see Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec.
Co., 404 U.S. 418, 423-27 (1972) (construing "at the time"). Chemical Fund is an especially
interesting example. See R. CtARK, supra note 4, at 298-99; 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 576-
78.
395. See generally 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 564-65 (discussing the definition of officer
for § 16); Comment, Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934: Is a Vice
President an Officer?, 58 NEB. L. Rav. 733 (1979) (authored by David E. Gardels) (discussing
eight cases construing "officer"); Comment, Who Is an "Officer" Under Section 16(b)-Who
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Congress created section 16 to prevent trading on the basis of inside
information, Congress' purpose will be served best by construing the
term "officer" to mean employees with access to confidential infor-
mation. 396 On the other hand, if Congress created section 16 to align
stockholder and management interests, the term should encompass
only the smaller group of those with influence over corporate oper-
ating policies. 397
This is only one example of the way competing visions of the
statute may come into conflict in defining the scope of section 16.398
Knows?, 12 SAi DIEGo L. REv. 378, 379 (1975) (authored by A. John Murphy) (discussing
various tests that are applied to construe "officer").
396. Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1949).
397. The SEC has proposed to define the term officer in this manner for purposes of §
16. Proposed rule 16a-l(f), 4 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) j 26,013, at 19,031 (certain executive
officers and "any other officer who performs a policy-making function"); see also Exchange
Act Release No. 27,148 (Aug. 17, 1989), supra note 6, at 80,383-84; cf. rule 3b-2; 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.3b-2 (1988) (definition of officer).
398. Another example is suggested by Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962). The question
in that case was whether an investment banking firm had to forfeit profits from short-swing
trading in the stock of a corporation when one of its partners was a director of the corporation.
Id. at 404-05. The Supreme Court said that a partnership can be a director for purposes of §
16(b) if it has deputized one of its members to serve as director. Id. at 409-10. There was no
deputization in the case before the Court, however, because the partner-director did not
participate in the partnership's trading profits and adequate steps had been taken to ensure
that he did not pass corporate information to the partnership. Id. at 406-08. If the Court had
seen the purpose of § 16 as focusing the attention of management on long-term corporate
profitability, it might have approached the case differently. Even if the partner-director did
not influence the partnership's trading decisions, he might have tried to manipulate the
corporation's operations for the purpose of benefiting his partners had he known of their
position or their trading plans.
Yet another example is § 16(b)'s exclusion of transactions "where such beneficial owner [of
more than 10% of a registered class of equity securities] was not such both at the time of the
purchase and sale ... of the security." In Foremost-McKesson, 423 U.S. 232 (1976), the
Court held that where a defendant holds less than 10% immediately before a purchase it does
not have to forfeit profits sales within six months. This holding might have been based on
the language of the statute, but the Court focused instead on the purpose of the statute.
According to the Court, § 16(b) does not apply to a stockholder until after it exceeds 10%
beneficial ownership, because only at that point did Congress presume it would have access
to inside information. Id. at 253-54. The Court might have reached a different conclusion had
it seen § 16 as a corporate governance provision. Even if a substantial buyer does not have
access to information, it may by virtue of its purchase alone influence the operations of the
issuer. For example in Reliance Electric, 404 U.S. at 420, the beneficial owner's initial purchase
led to the issuer's merger into another company, presumably with substantial consequences
for its operations. Thus the statute might be construed to match the trade by which a person
becomes a 10% holder with subsequent dispositions if the point of forfeiture is to assure that
managers devote themselves to profitable operations. This example underscores the fact that
agreement on a statute's purpose does not determine interpretive questions. Even if a court
accepted that § 16 is a corporate governance measure, it would have to decide whether to
extend forfeiture to cases that raise the possibility of manipulation by non-trading officers and
directors in hostile response to trading principal stockholders. This possibility may not have
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Even when the courts apply section 16(b) "automatically" and no
questions of statutory construction or interpretation seem .to be in-
volved, the nominal purpose of section 16 (preventing the unfair use
of inside information) and the actual purpose of the drafters (pre-
venting manipulation by managers) conflict.399 Courts have consis-
tently refused to condition forfeiture under section 16(b) on proof that
the defendant-insider had inside information when she traded. 4°° When
courts order forfeiture without considering whether an affiliate in fact
took advantage of inside information, they effectuate the congres-
sional intention that is reflected in the operative terms of the statute,
which does not call for such consideration. Yet reflexively ordering
an affiliate who did not know any secrets to forfeit her profits some-
times imposes a significant burden without furthering the stated pur-
pose of preventing the unfair use of information. This incongruity has
led to repeated calls to amend section 16(b) to better serve its stated
goals.401 As noted above, it has also led the Supreme Court to construe
section 16 narrowly to avoid forfeiture in so-called unorthodox trans-
actions in which there is supposedly no possibility of abuse of inside
information.4o2
Legislators sometimes buy easy statutory administration at the
price of occasional unfairness, 4°3 and Congress certainly might have
decided to accept the occasional unfairness of the strict rule articulated
in section 16(b) because a strict rule would best achieve its goal, what-
ever that goal was. Just as certainly, at some point judges should re-
fuse to apply Congress' flatly stated rule when the prophylactic effect
occurred to anyone in 1934, and even if it did, clearly the drafters were concerned primarily
with the possibility that officers, directors, and principal stockholders might manipulate
corporate affairs to further their own trading schemes. See R. CLARK, supra note 4, § 8.7
("[ft]akeovers, as a species of recurring corporate behavior, only became common and salient
after [§ 16] was passed."); Block & Barton, supra note 6, at 204 (§ 16(b) is ineffective in
handling problems associated with corporate takeovers); cf. Ribstein, supra note 12, at 504-05
(§ 16(b) should not apply to tender offerors who are outsiders). This application is remarkably
similar to the controversial new Pennsylvania anti-takeover statute, which speaking broadly,
requires control persons to disgorge short-term profits. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2573, 2574
(1990); cf. 76 A.B.A. J. 24 (1990) (quoting one of the drafters to the effect that the disgorgement
provision, the most controversial in the new statute, is "new and novel and untested").
399. Cf. D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The "Easy Case" of the Under-Aged
President, 84 Nw. U.L. Ray. 250 (1989) (there are no real easy cases).
400. This was settled by Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 751 (1943).
401. See, e.g., Munter, supra note 12, at 96; cf. Weinstock, Section 16(b) and the Doctrine
of Speculative Abuse: How to Succeed in Being Subjective Without Really Trying, 29 Bus.
LAW. 1153 (1974) (definition of purchase and sale).
402. See supra note 394; see also 2 T. HAzmN, supra note 12, at 19-20 n.1, 37 n.1
(bibliography of law review commentary).
403. R. ,CLRK, supra note 4, at 296.
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of application does not justify imposing an outrageous burden on a
real person. To know whether they are facing an outrageous case,
judges have to know what it was that Congress wanted to achieve;
sometimes tolerating a particular unfair result may help align man-
agement and stockholder interests in the long run but not prevent the
unfair use of information (and vice versa).
Judging only the operative terms of the statute, one would never
conclude that Congress adopted an arbitrary rule because it thought
that was the best way to prevent the unfair use of information. On
the contrary, judging only on the operative terms, Congress intended
to align management and stockholder interests. The reflexive appli-
cation of section 16(b) will further the congressional purpose reflected
in the operative terms of the statute in the long run. The "plain mean-
ing" of section 16(b) seems to dictate a refusal to inquire into what
the defendant knew or might have known; however, over the long run
that refusal furthers a legislative purpose (preventing manipulation)
different from the one stated in the statute (preventing the unfair use
of inside information).404 The refusal to make insiders who trade on
the basis of inside information over six months and a day forfeit their
profits also furthers the purpose of Congress that is implicit in the
way the statute operates, rather than the purpose that is stated in the
statute.
C. The Compass of Federal Securities Regulation
The conventional wisdom that Congress created section 16 to en-
sure equal access to corporate information is mirrored in the con-
ventional statement that "the fundamental purpose of the [Exchange]
Act [is] to 'substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy
of caveat emptor." ' 40 If the Exchange Act is essentially a mandate
for full disclosure, then it has little role to play in the way corporations
are run; on the contrary, Congress "did not seek to regulate trans-
actions which constitute no more than internal corporate misman-
agement."406
404. Cf. Meeker & Cooney, supra note 12, at 958 ("IT]he desirability of preventing conflict
between the insider's interests and his duties, as well as the express purpose of preventing the
unfair use of inside information, might suggest an application of the statute to all cases which
may come literally within its scope.").
405. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States, 406 U.S. 138, 151 (1972) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963))).
406. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (discussing
§ 10(b)); see also Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 12 (1985) (Congress did not
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Settled doctrine notwithstanding, section 16 does regulate internal
corporate affairs, and at least some members of Congress did seek to
regulate corporate management in the Exchange Act. Section 16 is not
the only provision of the Exchange Act that was designed to protect
the productive economy from selfish managers and the effects of dis-
ruptive stock market practices. Some provisions, most obviously those
that provided for the regulation of proxy solicitations, contemplated
the regulation of information flow toward the end of controlling busi-
ness operations and changing the way publicly held corporations are
run.407 Others, such as the provisions providing for the regulation of
credit used in stock market operations, 4°s contemplated direct sub-
stantive regulation of practices that were thought to have undermined
economic growth and efficiency. 409 Whatever accounts for the change
in prevailing views, 410 securities regulation under the Exchange Act has
evolved in ways that probably could not have been foreseen when the
Act was enacted.'
The changing conceptions of the purpose of the Exchange Act
have not always worked to limit the scope of federal involvement in
the securities markets and corporate affairs. Consider the way that the
SEC and the courts have regulated insider trading under rule 10b-5.
The issue is largely academic now, 411 but there are problems with the
intend, through § 14(e), to have courts judge fairness of tender offers); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 78-87 (1987); Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479 ("Corporations are
creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the
understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of
directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the
corporation.") (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)). For a particularly broad
statement in a related context, see Schotland, supra note 67, at 1452 ("The corporation's
welfare probably is not a consideration cognizable under the federal securities laws, which
focus upon disclosure and not upon the internal running of the corporation."). Compare
Anderson, The Meaning of Federalism: Interpreting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 70
VA. L. REv. 813 (1984) with Kitch, A Federal Vision of the Securities Laws, 70 VA. L. REv.
857 (1984) (responding to Anderson).
407. See J.W. Hursr, LEorrGMACY, supra note 53, at 94-95; Dent, supra note 45; Thel,
supra note 21, at 396-415. Even the issuer reporting requirements that epitomize the disclosure-
orientation of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1983), represented an intrusion into internal
corporate affairs that had not theretofore been the subject of state law. There is some debate
over whether publicly held corporations were prepared to disclose information themselves, but
clearly corporations were free to keep secrets before Congress acted. See supra notes 77-93
and accompanying text.
408. Exchange Act §§ 7, 8, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g, 78h (1988).
409. See generally 2 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 652-53 (discussing Exchange Act's credit
provisions). In addition, the Act provides for pervasive substantive regulation of the securities
industry. See, e.g., Exchange Act §§ 15, 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78q (1988).
410. For one tentative explanation, see Thel, supra note 21, at 461-64.
411. Congress has effectively ratified regulation of insider trading under rule lOb-5. See
supra note 4 (recent insider trading legislation).
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SEC's regulation of conduct that Congress was entirely capable of
regulating in an area in which Congress enacted a pervasive regulatory
scheme. 41 2
Congress intended to confer broad authority on the SEC when
it enacted section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 4 13 but no matter how
broad the SEC's regulatory authority may have been, it is a stretch
to say it extended to forbidding conduct Congress specifically declined
to forbid. During the debate over the Exchange Act, proposals to make
it illegal for insiders or tippees to trade while in possession of material,
nonpublic corporate information were considered and rejected. 414 The
enacted statute regulated trading by insiders, and it did not forbid
them to trade on the basis of inside information. Moreover, the draft-
ers and their sponsors knew that insiders could continue to trade le-
gally on the basis of inside information so long as they complied with
section 16. The House Commerce Committee report recognized that
the reporting provisions of its anti-Wiggin provision "are not air-tight
and that the unscrupulous insider may still, within the law, use inside
information for his own advantage. ' '415
On the other hand, Congress created the SEC and gave it ex-
tensive rulemaking power because it wanted the statute to be flexible
enough to deal with a complicated and evolving business environment.
Perhaps the SEC should regulate insider trading if it has determined
that it is wrong for insiders to trade on the basis of inside information.
Congress intended the SEC to decide what practices needed regulating,
412. See H. MANNH, supra note 18, at vi, 13, 30; Dooley, supra note 5, at 55-56 ("By
proceeding without due regard for the legislative process the courts and the SEC have produced
a system that is unjust and inefficient. These undesirable consequences result from the
dissonance between the courts' purposes in regulating insider trading under section 10(b) and
the purposes for which that statute was enacted."); Easterbrook, supra note 66, at 317-20 (the
courts have read SEC rules more expansively than warranted); Manne, Insider Trading and
the Administrative Process, 35 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 473, 491-92 (1967); Ruder, Civil Liability
Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. Rsv. 627, 652-54
(1962); cf. Kitch, supra note 406, at 861 (Congress could have promulgated rule lOb-5 itself).
413. See Thel, supra note 21.
414. See, e.g., Suggested Amendments to H.R. 8720, Submitted by John Dickinson, supra
note 362, at 11 ("I suggest that Section 15b ... be amended by ... substituting the following:
'Any profit realized by such beneficial owner, director or officer from any purchase and sale,
or sale and purchase, of any such equity security as a result of information available to him
only in his character of such beneficial owner, director, or officer, shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer."'); see also supra notes 283-291 and accompanying text.
415. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 31, at 13; see also House Hearings, supra note 85,
at 134 (testimony of Thomas Corcoran) ('You cannot sell your own stock short. If you know
from your information that the company is in a bad way, be honest and sell your stock and
get out and do it publicly."'); Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 31, at 7742 (comment of
Pecora) (an insider can profit from inside information provided his transactions are more than
six months apart).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
January 1991] THE GENIUS OF SECTION 16 501
and maybe in the last fifty years issues of fairness in the securities
markets have become more important than issues of economic effi-
ciency. Moreover, if Congress was primarily interested in regulating
the way corporations do business when it enacted section 16, it is
somewhat artificial to say that Congress made a conscious decision
not to adopt an equality-of-information rule. Critics of rule lOb-5 have
argued that forbidding insider trading undercuts the efficient opera-
tion of corporations. If they are right, maybe it is incumbent on the
SEC to use its discretionary power to modify the regulatory scheme,
in which case the challenge to rule lOb-5 comes down to a simple crit-
icism of the policy the SEC has chosen to pursue. If the issue is one
of administrative power, however, critics should address it with sen-
sitivity to what Congress actually did.
Appendix: The text of section 16
DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, AND PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS
Sec. 16. (a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the ben-
eficial owner of more than 10 percentum of any class of any equity
security (other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant
to section 12 of this title, or who is a director or an officer of the
issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of such
security on a national se6urities exchange or by the effective date of
a registration statement filed pursuant to section 12(g) of this title, or
within ten days after he becomes such beneficial owner, director, or
officer, a statement with the Commission (and, if such security is reg-
istered on a national securities exchange, also with the exchange) of
the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the
beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar
month thereafter, if there has been a change in such ownership during
such month, shall file with the Commission (and if such security is
registered on a national securities exchange, shall also file with the
exchange), a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the
calendar month and such changes in his ownership as have occurred
during such calendar month.
(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information
which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or
officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized
by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any
equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within
any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired
in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall
inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention
on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not re-
purchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit
to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court
of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security
of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall
fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall
fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall
be brought more than two years after the date such profit was realized.
This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where
such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase
and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any
transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and re-
gulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this
subsection.
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(c) It shall be unlawful for any such beneficial owner, director,
or officer, directly or indirectly, to sell any equity security of such
issuer (other than an exempted security), if the person selling the se-
curity or his principal (1) does not own the security sold, or (2) if
owning the security, does not deliver it against such sale within twenty
days thereafter, or does not within five days after such sale deposit
it in the mails or other usual channels of transportation; but no person
shall be deemed to have violated this subsection if he proves that not-
withstanding the exercise of good faith he was unable to make such
delivery or deposit within such time, or that to do so would cause
undue inconvenience or expense.
(d) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not apply
to any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, and the provisions
of subsection (c) of this section shall not apply to any sale, of an equity
security not then or theretofore held by him in an investment account,
by a dealer in the ordinary course of his business and incident to the
establishment or maintenance by him of a primary or secondary mar-
ket (otherwise than on a national securities exchange or an exchange
exempted from registration under section 5 of this title) for such se-
curity. The Commission may, by such rules and regulations as it deems
necessary or appropriate in the public interest, define and prescribe
terms and conditions with respect to securities held in an investment
account and transactions made in the ordinary course of business and
incident to the establishment or maintenance of a primary or sec-
ondary market.
(e) The provisions of this section shall not apply to foreign or
domestic arbitrage transactions unless made in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may adopt in order to carry
out the purposes of this section.
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